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Saddam had no weapons in 2003 { October 6 2004 } Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12115-2004Oct6.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12115-2004Oct6.html
Iraqi Arms Threat Was Waning, Inspector Says
Hussein Had Almost No Nuclear Weapons Program by 2003
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, October 6, 2004; 4:00 PM
Charles Duelfer, the chief U.S. weapons investigator in Iraq, told Congress today that Saddam Hussein destroyed his stocks of chemical and biological weapons and agents in 1991 and 1992 and that his nuclear weapons program had decayed to almost nothing by 2003.
Duelfer, a former U.N. inspector and the personal representative of the CIA director, said the former Iraqi dictator had intentions to restart his program, but after weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Hussein instead focused his attention on ending the sanctions imposed by Western governments following his incursion into Kuwait and the Persian Gulf war of 1991.
The Bush administration said in its justification for going to war in Iraq that Hussein had an active weapons program. Duelfer's account is expected to reinforce claims by Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry that President Bush and Vice President Cheney took the country to war based on inaccurate information.
The White House has responded that the Iraqi leader had an intent to restart his programs, some of which he could do quickly, and that he was working on developing prohibited missiles that, if armed with chemical or biological agents, would threaten the region.
Duelfer testified this morning about results of a lengthy and long-awaited report, released today, of his findings about Iraq's weapons program.
He said a threat remains that chemical weapons could be used against U.S. and coalition forces, noting information from earlier this year that Iraqi scientists had linked up with foreign terrorists in Iraq. A series of raids beginning last March, Duelfer said, prevented the problem from "becoming a major threat."
Saddam Hussein was debriefed by Duelfer's team, but, as the lead investigator said, the Iraqi leader "naturally had limited incentives to be forthcoming or candid at all."
Hussein told U.S. interrogators that he undertook his program to develop weapons of mass destruction because of the threat from Iran, according to a source familiar with the Duelfer report who spoke on condition of anonymity. Saying that Hussein remains "very cagey" but still "compelling" in his presentation, the source said the incentive for the onetime Iraqi dictator to talk about the subject was to "shape his legacy."
"He focused on the Iranian threat, their programs which he was going to match," the source said. During the Iran-Iraq war the Baghdad regime used 1,000 rockets and bombs armed with chemical or biological agents to combat attacks by waves of Iranian ground troops. "Iran was a real and present danger to him," the source said, adding Israel was a secondary threat.
As for his relations with the United States, Hussein said he believed that U.S. officials would eventually deal with Baghdad, so the weapons of mass destruction were not aimed for use against Washington.
Duelfer, the source said, arranged for questions to be put to the former Iraqi leader by an FBI agent who is handling the questioning.
In discussing the broader Iraq weapons issues, Duelfer told the Senate committee that Iraq's nuclear program "decayed" in the 12 years after 1991, although Hussein never abandoned his nuclear ambitions. The former Iraqi leader tried to keep knowledgeable scientists together, but the sanctions harmed that effort and "over time there was decay in the team," Duelfer said.
The Iraqi chemical weapons program, which Hussein and others believed saved Iraq from defeat by Iran, was all but ended after U.N. inspections began in 1991. "Iran chose to yield most of its weapons and bulk agents as well as the large facilities which were known to exist," Duelfer reported.
Hussein's government retained data and personnel knowledgeable about weapons, and used funds from the Oil for Food relief program to upgrade his chemical industry so that weapons materials could be produced once sanctions ended. But, Duelfer said, "we did not come across explicit guidance from Saddam" that would show a plan to resume chemical weapons production.
The case of biological weapons was different. Duelfer reports that Hussein "secretly destroyed existing stocks of [biological] weapons and agent in 1991-1992" but chose to initially hide facilities that could produce new ones under the guise of an animal feed program.
In 1995, however, U.N. inspectors discovered aspects of the program, and the defection of Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamel led to destruction of the facilities. Nevertheless, Duelfer said he believed reconstitution of the program "could be accomplished quite quickly" because the scientific talent needed to restart the program was kept together.
Saddam Hussein "believed possession of WMD deterred the U.S. from going to Baghdad in 1991," Duelfer said. Senior officials also believed that if they had completed a nuclear weapons program before invading Kuwait, "the outcome would have been different."
The "top priority" for Hussein "was to escape the economic stranglehold of U.N. sanctions," Duelfer said. Although Duelfer did not make the judgment that sanctions were working to prevent Hussein from developing new weapons, he reports, "Sanctions limited his ambitions and took an enormous toll on Iraqi society."
He reported that sanctions were weakening and in 2000-2001, Iraq "was confidently designing missiles around components that could only be obtained outside sanctions." But, according to the source familiar with Duelfer's report, the Iraqis were not able to purchase those components until sanctions were lifted. The Iraqi military was, however, able to purchase some military items, such as aluminum tubes, that were prohibited under the Security Council resolutions.
While the Iraqis worked on propulsion, fuels and even guidance systems, "there was little work done on warheads," the source said. Delivery systems themselves took a long time to develop, but Duelfer pointed out that the "CW [chemical warheads] and BW [biological warheads] put on Iraqi missiles in 1990 and 1991, for example, were built in months."
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
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