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Rolling start Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5405599.htmhttp://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5405599.htm
Posted on Sun, Mar. 16, 2003
War plan aims for `rolling start'
IRAQ-INVASION STRATEGY IS RADICAL CHANGE FROM 1991
By Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt
New York Times
CAMP DOHA, Kuwait - The American-led coalition that is preparing to topple Saddam Hussein's government is planning for a complex invasion of Iraq to begin even as allied troops are still arriving in the region, senior commanders say.
With three dozen ships carrying heavy tanks and equipment for the Army's 4th Infantry Division waiting off the coast of Turkey because of a political standoff, the military is scrambling to put together a backup plan for the northern front of a war with Iraq.
In Kuwait, only a portion of the 101st Airborne Division's three brigades -- equipped with Apache gunships and Black Hawk troop carriers -- is ready to be sent into combat.
Three powerful armored units -- the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment -- are still in the United States or Europe and will not be in the Persian Gulf region until mid- to late April, intended as a postwar stabilization force.
``We recognized from the very beginning that we're going to be fighting and building up combat power at about the same time,'' said Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, the V Corps commander who would lead the Army's attack.
But there are military experts -- including experienced commanders -- who are worried by this plan, which has come to be called a ``rolling start'' to a possible war.
Staggered arrival
Assuming that no peaceful resolution is found to the confrontation with Iraq, the concept of the rolling start gives the coalition's commanders the option of starting at any time. Meanwhile, as diplomacy delays military action, the coalition can continue to assemble an ever-more-threatening force.
Nevertheless, its adoption marks a sharp departure from the doctrine articulated by Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, under his leadership, the military took six months to assemble an overwhelming force, which stormed into Kuwait only after a massive troop and logistical buildup was completed and allied warplanes carried out a 39-day bombardment of Iraq and its army of occupation.
The staggered arrival stems partly from the limited capacity of Kuwait's ports, but it also reflects Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's view that large, heavy ground forces are not always needed. This time, the United States military is trying to get more firepower from fewer troops, supported with a heavy air campaign. The Iraqi army is also much smaller and less capable than it was 12 years ago.
Improved weaponry
If the American-led operation turns out to be as short and decisive as the Pentagon hopes, it will be less the result of brawn and more a matter of improved weaponry, closer cooperation among the American military services, a more effective combination of intelligence, surveillance and air power, and propaganda efforts to persuade many Iraqi soldiers not to fight. All those things bolster the commanders' confidence in the rolling start, they say.
``When I look at the enemy, when I look at the terrain over which he's arrayed, I think we have adequate forces to do the job,'' Wallace said. ``There seems to me to be perhaps a more coherent joint fight this time with the air, naval and certainly a very pronounced Marine presence.''
Some former American commanders from the 1991 conflict, however, say the United States would be in a better position and could keep risks to its troops to a minimum if it had more forces on hand.
``The key to success is rapid victory on the ground, and bringing stability as quickly as you can,'' said a former senior officer who commanded land forces during the gulf war. ``Based on what I know about the forces in the region, or flowing in, I am concerned they don't have enough to give high assurance they can do this quickly. It's strange for most of us. If we did it so well last time, using the Powell doctrine, why would you do anything less than that now? Why take that risk?''
More than 225,000 American military personnel are in the gulf region, with more than 130,000 in Kuwait alone. About 25,000 British ground soldiers are also in Kuwait. About 1,000 Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps strike and support planes are poised to attack from five aircraft carriers and land bases in the region. The Pentagon's war plan calls for unleashing 3,000 precision-guided bombs and missiles in the first 48 hours of a short air campaign, to be followed quickly by ground operations.
For military professionals, however, readiness is not a black-and-white issue. The question is not whether American and British forces could attack on short notice and defeat the Iraqi military if ordered to do so. Rather, the issue is how swift such a campaign would be, what risks it would entail and whether it would be more effective with more forces.
The commanders know their mission is daunting. U.S. forces plan to advance all the way to Baghdad to overthrow Saddam and install a new government, a more challenging job than ejecting Iraqi invaders from Kuwait 12 years ago. They plan to hunt down suspected caches of chemical and biological weapons. They need to be able to handle tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners. They need to guard long supply routes from Kuwait. They need to provide food and relief assistance to millions of Iraqis, who will become the responsibility of United States and British forces during the advance.
Demands on troops
Even with more effective weapons and more synchronized operations, the military's many tasks put demands on the troops.
``You need enough forces to fight the war itself, and sustain it,'' said Gen. Richard Neal, a retired Marine officer who served as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's deputy operations director in the gulf war. ``But then you have to deal with displaced persons and enemy prisoners of war.''
Demands like that, he said, are ``force eaters'' that reduce an army's combat power.
Gen. Ronald Griffith, who commanded the 1st Armored Division in the gulf war, voiced similar concerns. ``War planners need to take into account the impact of large numbers of surrendering Iraqi soldiers,'' he said. ``We faced this problem in 1991 and it impacted our rate of movement. Disarming the Iraqi soldiers, providing them with essentials such as food and water, and establishing minimal custody will require a level of force commitment.''
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