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Nato says Quetta is taliban headquarters { September 30 2006 } Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/where-roads-end-the-taliban-begin/2006/09/29/1159337341413.htmlhttp://www.theage.com.au/news/world/where-roads-end-the-taliban-begin/2006/09/29/1159337341413.html
Where roads end, the Taliban begin
Trevor Royle
September 30, 2006
FIVE years ago, it all seemed so easy. Following the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the US-led coalition led a high-tech assault on Afghanistan to clear out the Taliban government, sponsors of al-Qaeda.
Aided by friendly (i.e. handsomely remunerated) warlords, they smashed the flimsy political architecture in Kabul and set about trying to put the country back on its feet. Then they took their eye off the ball. In the spring of 2003, Iraq was invaded and although it, too, was a successful operation, the coalition forces were quickly sucked into a brutal and unwinnable counter-insurgency war.
The knock-on effects in Afghanistan have been disastrous. Vital military equipment and boots on the ground were diverted, thus allowing the Taliban to regroup.
Tactics used by the insurgents in Iraq were adopted for use in Afghanistan, notably improvised explosive devices or roadside bombs and the hitherto unknown employment of suicide bombers. It also proved impossible to break the power of local warlords, who employ their own armies, many of whose members are still loyal to the Taliban.
The failure to plug the border with Afghanistan has also allowed the Taliban to train and recruit in the remote and dangerous tribal areas that act as a buffer zone between the two countries. Although President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan claimed last week that the Waziristan tribal leaders were stamping down on Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps, NATO intelligence sources have evidence that weapons and fighters continue to cross the border and that the city of Quetta has become a centre for terrorist activity in the region. The money is there too. Thanks to an alliance with opium traffickers, the Taliban leadership is prosperous and can easily afford to pay its fighters $US5 a day, a good rate of pay in Afghanistan. As NATO's supreme commander, General Jim Jones, told the US Congress last week, Afghanistan is already far down the road to becoming a "narco-state".
The Taliban are well able to take on the US and NATO forces ranged against them. In a straight fire-fight, where they group to defend a position, they are usually beaten off and suffer a large number of casualties. Their AK-47 rifles and obsolescent (though still useful) rocket-propelled grenades are no match for modern assault rifles, heavy machine-guns and air support but the Taliban fighter is a determined enemy, schooled in the Pashtun code of pukhtunwali, which demands that he takes vengeance for any injury or slight to his own or his tribe's honour.
By tradition and history, blood feuds are passed from one generation to the next and battles are usually fought to the knife, with neither side showing much mercy and certainly expecting to receive none.
"The fighting in Helmand is proving to be somewhat tougher than we anticipated," admits a senior British military source. "The opposition rarely gives any ground, and air support is essential if we are going to kill them and minimise our own casualties. But it puts us in a bind — it's difficult to win hearts and minds when you're involved in constant fire-fights and blowing up the local landscape."
In fact, winning the support of the local population is proving to be hugely difficult, largely due to the ramshackle nature of Afghanistan's infrastructure. For all the good work being done by non-government organisations, the nation-building operation is under-resourced and many of the projects are stillborn or fail to find support among the local community. As the US commander in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry puts it: "Where the roads end, the Taliban begin."
Destroying the Taliban is one thing but creating a decent future for Afghanistan is another. In the long term, perhaps five to 10 years, it might be possible to crush their fighters, provided that overwhelming force is used. While they are stubborn and courageous in battle, their numbers are finite they are unlikely to succeed in their aim of regaining control of the country.
However, the countries involved — Australia, NATO, the US — need to realise that much more needs to be done, not just from a military point of view but also by introducing political, economic and fiscal structures that will get the country and its people back on their feet.
"When you live in a mud hut with no water or food, fine words won't sustain your family," claims a British officer working with NATO's stabilisation force in Afghanistan. "A well-fed, happily employed person is a happy person. A happy person doesn't lay bicycle bombs that kill innocent children and wound hapless peacekeepers. We need to do less military posturing and lot more thinking about our cheque stubs."
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