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Army report on abu ghraib faults military intelligence Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
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Army Abu Ghraib Report Faults Military Intelligence (Update4)
Aug. 25 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. Army investigators implicated 27 military intelligence personnel, including four private contractor employees, in the abuse of Iraqi prisoners, a day after a separate probe said responsibility extended all the way to the Pentagon.
The Army probe led by General Paul Kern also blamed the abuse in part on strained resources stemming from inadequate postwar planning and the insurgency that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime. The abuses at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad sparked public fury around the world following the release of photographs of naked and bound prisoners.
``This is clearly a deviation from everything we have taught people on how to behave,'' Kern said at a press conference where he released the report of the investigation. ``There were values we treasure in the United States Army that were not upheld.''
The focus of the field investigations led by Major General George Fay and Lieutenant General Anthony Jones was the role of intelligence personnel at the prison. Senior U.S. officers were faulted for failing to oversee Abu Ghraib, where ``morally corrupt'' troops and civilians mistreated inmates, sometimes during questioning.
Forty-One Referred
In total, investigators referred 41 people for courts martial or other legal or administrative action.
Twenty-seven military intelligence personnel, including four contractors under the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade -- the main unit at Abu Ghraib -- have been referred for possible administrative or criminal action in 44 cases.
Another eight brigade members, including two contractor personnel, have been referred for possible action for a failure to report abuses that they witnessed.
Separately, the Army report identified new four military police who have been referred for possible abuse charges, in addition to seven previously charged and two medical personnel who failed to report abuses.
Titan
Two of the unnamed contractors were from CACI International Inc., and the other two were from Titan Corp., according to the report. Titan provides translators to the military, while CACI trains interrogators.
One female Titan translator failed to report the improper use of dogs during an interrogation and participated in another session where a detainee was placed in a prohibited position. A second male Titan interpreter ``actively participated'' in a detainee abuse, the report said.
A third Titan employee was cleared of allegations that he failed to report detainee abuse, the report said. Titan has not been formally notified of the cases but will cooperate fully with the Army, said Wil Williams, a company spokesman.
``We don't know if they are current employees or former employees or subcontractors,'' he said. Still, ``it goes beyond our imagination for anyone to participate or remain silent on issues such as what occurred at Abu Ghraib,'' he said. Titan has more than 4,000 employees in Iraq.
CACI
One of the two CACI employees referred for potential charges was cited for the improper use of an unmuzzled dog during a detainee interrogation and later lying to investigators about its use.
``CACI has consistently communicated to the public that the company does not condone, tolerate or in any way endorse illegal behavior by its employees and would take appropriate action if any inappropriate behavior by a CACI employee was substantiated,'' CACI spokeswoman Jody Brown said in an e-mail statement.
``CACI is reviewing the information contained in the Fay report and continuing its own investigation. We regret that any CACI personnel are alleged to have engaged in inappropriate behavior,'' she said.
CACI International Chief Executive Jack London told analysts this month that he had ``no deep concern'' about the possible findings of the probe. CACI is not aware of ``anything significant'' about its employees in the report, he said Aug. 19.
```Torture is a subjective term,'' Major General Fay said. ``In my use of the word, I would consider these things to be `abusive' in nature,'' he said.
``Torture is sometimes used to define something in order to get information,'' Fay said. ``There were very few instances where in fact you can say there was `torture.' It's a harsh word, and unfortunately in some cases I think it was appropriate.''
Separate Abuses
``Most, though not all, of the violent or sexual abuses occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes,'' the Army's report said. ``No policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused violent or sexual abuse.''
A four-person panel led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger yesterday released its report of prisoner abuse. Schlesinger said none of the prisoners in photos released in April was an ``intelligence target.'' Abuses during interrogations weren't photographed, Schlesinger said.
``The events at Abu Ghraib cannot be understood in a vacuum,'' the summary of the Army's report said. Military police and intelligence personnel lacked the resources to deal with detainees as well as the ``robust hostilities'' that followed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's defeat, or to ``conduct tactical counter-insurgency operations,'' the summary said.
Fay's Role
Fay, the second-highest-ranking Army intelligence officer, stepped down from the panel's leadership in June so that Jones, who is more senior, could question higher-ranking officers, including Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq at the time of the abuses.
Sanchez removed himself as supervising officer for the investigation and was replaced by Kern, head of the Army Materiel Command.
Schlesinger's investigation found that the breakdown in order that allowed the brutal treatment of Iraqi detainees stemmed from lax leadership, poor training, the confusion rampant in a war zone, and a lack of resources dedicated to restoring civil order after the invasion.
War planners didn't ``anticipate a major insurgency,'' Schlesinger said.
``It is very clear to us now that it would have been far preferable if they had anticipated that,'' said Schlesinger, who served as defense secretary under presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and as energy secretary under President Jimmy Carter.
To contact the reporter on this story:
Jon Steinman can be reached at jsteinman@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this column:
Rob Urban at robprag@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: August 25, 2004 19:36 EDT
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