PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 493
THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
We, the undersigned, find it impossible to concur with the findings and
conclusions of the Committee's report because they are illogical, and
unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee.
The conclusions of the diplomatic aspects are based upon incomplete
evidence.
We, therefore, find it necessary to file a report setting forth the
conclusions which we believe are properly sustained by evidence before
the committee.
HOMER FERGUSON
OWEN BREWSTER
494 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
Page
Duty of the committee ............................................. 495
Fundamental questions before the joint committee .................. 496
Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the
record .......................................................... 497
Form of this report ............................................... 502
Conclusions of fact and responsibility ............................ 503
Conclusions restated with supporting evidence [1] ................. 506
No. 1-(Growing tension with Japan) .............................. 506
No. 2-(Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............ 510
No. 3-(Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................ 511
No. 4-(Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the
first shot" by the Japanese) .............................. 512
No. 5-(Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to
warn Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 513
No. 6-(Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ... 514
No. 7-(Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities
in Washington) ............................................ 520
No. 8-(Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the
United States) ........................................... 521
No. 9-(Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ...................... 521
No. 10-(Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost
commanders for war) ...................................... 524
No. 11-(Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the
decision to await Japanese attack) ....................... 530
No. 12-(Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to
the Hawaiian commanders .................................. 530
No. 13-(Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............ 532
No. 14-(Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize
probability, of a Pearl Harbor attack) ................... 537
No. 15-(Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in
Washington) .............................................. 538
No. 16-(President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation
between high military authorities in Washington) ......... 540
No. 17-(Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to
the Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 543
No. 18-(Washington's responsibility for the competence of
subordinate officers) .................................... 553
No. 19-(Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii) 553
No. 20-(Failure of the President to take instant Executive
action on December 6 and 7) .............................. 565
No. 21-(American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) .......... 570
Conclusion ...................................................... 572
Summary of responsibilities ....................................... 572
[1] Substance of conclusions, paraphrased.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 495
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THE DUTY OF THE COMMITTEE
The duty of this Committee is fixed by the terms of the joint resolution
under which it was created, as expounded by Senator Barkley, author of
the resolution, in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945,
explaining the purpose of the resolution.
Section 2 of the joint resolution reads:
"The Committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts
relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory
of Hawaii n December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the
House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946 (later extended
to July 16, 1946), the results of its investigation, together with such
recommendations as it may seem advisable."
In his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, Senator Barkley
pointed out the need for this investigation by declaring that the
reports on Pearl Harbor by the President's Pearl Harbor Commission, the
Roberts Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of
Inquiry, and other authorities "are confusing and conflicting, when
compared to one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and
inconsistencies within themselves." In this connection he referred to
the "widespread confusion and suspicion" that prevailed "among the
American people and among the Members of Congress."
In all these reports, which had resulted in contradictions, confusion,
and inconsistencies, the central issue had been the fixing of
responsibility for the catastrophe that befell the American forces at
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This fact Senator Barkley fully
recognized in his statement that the first purpose of the investigation
is that of "fixing responsibility" for the Pearl Harbor disaster "upon
an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which
they operated or cooperated or failed to do either." In fulfillment of
this obligation, Senator Barkley said, the investigation-
"should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any
responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living
or dead. * * * Congress itself should make its *own thorough,
impartial*, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and
conditions prevailing *prior* to and *at the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack*, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to
appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the
attack (Congressional Record, p. 8480, September 6, 1945)."
The Joint Committee, therefore, is charged with the duty of
investigating the entire subject de novo. It is and should be free from
the findings and conclusions of all previous investigations and in
496 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
quiries except such material as members of this committee in their
discretion may see fit to cite or incorporate in their report.
The second purpose of the investigation, Senator Barkley explained, is
that of ascertaining whether in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor
the findings might be useful to Congress in legislating with regard to
military and naval forces and the executive departments having control
of them, or which are supposed to work with them.
These views of the obligation of the committee were supported
wholeheartedly on the floor of the Senate by Senator Brewster and
Senator Ferguson and thereafter the Senate unanimously passed the
resolution as so interpreted.
Of necessity, as used in relation to the obligation of this committee,
responsibility means responsibility for failure on the part of
individual officers or groups of officers or civilian officials to do
their full official duty in preparing for and meeting effectively the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and the term "duty"
means duty according to the Constitution, laws, and established
administrative practices under which all such individuals and groups of
individuals were bound to operate prior to and on the day of that
catastrophe.
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE
Inasmuch as all decisions and activities connected with this occurrence
at Pearl Harbor were decisions and activities of executive authorities
of the Government of the United States, the issue of responsibility for
the degree of success attained by the Japanese attack involves at least
one general question and four subsidiary and specific questions:
The general question is: Did all the civil, military, and naval
authorities of the United States charged with responsibility for the
conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government and for
preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor competently, efficiently, and
with proper regard for the trust imposed in them fulfill the duties of
their respective offices under the Constitution and laws of the United
States?
The subsidiary and specific questions are:
1. Did the high civil, military, and naval authorities in Washington
secure in advance of 10 o'clock a. m. (E. S. T.) December 7, 1941,
information respecting Japanese designs and intentions sufficient to
convince them beyond all reasonable doubt that war with Japan was
immediately imminent?
2. If so, did they give to General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, the commanders at Pearl Harbor, clear and definite orders,
immediately prior to the Japanese attack, instructing them to be fully
alert for defense against such an attack?
3. Was Hawaii adequately equipped for its defense against a Japanese
attack in accordance with the known circumstances?
4. Did the commanders at Pearl Harbor take the appropriate measures
required by the orders issued to them from Washington, by the duties of
their respective offices, and by the information in their possession and
the resources at their disposal, to maintain the security of the
possessions of the United States as far as that responsibility was
invested in them?
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 497
The question of the wisdom of the foreign policy pursued by the
Government of the United States is excluded by the terms of the
committee's instructions. In any case, to go into this issue would
involve thcommittee in the complexities of history extending back more
than 50 years and in matters of opinion which cannot be settled by
reference to anything as positive and definite as the Constitution,
laws, and established administrative practices of the United States
Government. To understand the questions involved, however, an
examination of our relations in the Far East, and of the diplomatic
negotiations leading up to December 7, 1941, are part and parcel of the
explanation of the responsibilities involved in this inquiry.
DIFFICULTIES FACING THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND INCOMPLETENESS OF THE RECORD
When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence
duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes apparent that
the record is far from complete. The Committee did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine any of the high civil executive principals
in the Pearl Harbor affair. President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox had
died before the Committee was created. Harry Hopkins, who was intimately
and officially associated with President Roosevelt, died shortly after
the Committee began its work. The health of Secretary of War Stimson and
Secretary of State Hull prevented the Committee from getting the full
benefit of their knowledge, except for the information they voluntarily
furnished.
It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so
hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under
oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The
Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were
available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The
Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts
contained, who received them, or what was done about them, although the
failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital
intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those commanders
performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this
Committee:
"I would not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic)
if it had been shown to us (Tr., Vol. 47, p. 8836):"
If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many
shortcomings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of
our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require an
extended criticism of the Roberts Report.
It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal
experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving
evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the
Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in
Washington. They could not then have been ignorant of their whereabouts
at important times or have forgotten the details of events and
operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would
have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these
obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the
attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation.
498 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stemming from
Presidential restraints on the Committee and from the partisan character
of the Committee itself.
Even before the Committee commenced its work, it was confronted with an
order issued on August 28, 1945, and signed by President Truman, which
severely limited the power of the Committee to gain access to the full
facts. The order is as follows (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 26):
"AUGUST 28, 1945.
"Memorandum for-The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.
The Attorney General.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Director of the Budget.
The Director of the Office of War Information.
"Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent
release to the public, except with the specific approval of the
President in each case, of-
"Information regarding the past or present status, technique or
procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any
cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States
Government or any Department thereof.
"HARRY S. TRUMAN.
"Restricted."
It was not until October 23, 1945, that President Truman made the order
less stringent by a new order. The modification left much to be desired.
The application of the new order was limited to the State, War, and Navy
Departments. It relaxed the secrecy of records only so far as "the Joint
Committee" was concerned, while it continued to prevent "individual"
members of the Committee from searching records as responsible Members
of Congress either alone, in groups, or even when accompanied by
Committee counsel. By one way or another, control over papers, records,
and other information remained in the hands of the majority party
members.
The President's October order also contained the unfortunate phrase "any
information in their possession *material to the investigation*," which
provided a cloak for those reluctant to yield information requested by
members of the Committee. It was always possible to confront individual
members with the view that the papers, data, and information desired was
not "material to the investigation." Decisions were made by the majority
ruling out evidence as "not material to the investigation" without
members of the Committee ever seeing the material about which the
decision was made.
No subsequent modifying orders wholly removed these restrictions. In an
order of November 7, 1945, President Truman relaxed restraints on
executives of the Government in order that they may speak freely to
*individual members* of the Committee, but the order closed with the
direction: "This does not include any files or written material"
In this fashion every facility and concession afforded to members of the
Joint Committee was hedged about with troublesome qualifications and
restraints. The relaxation of restraints was often publicized while the
continuing qualifications were but little discussed. The effect was to
restrict individual members of the Committee in practice while the
appearance of their freedom of operations was
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 499
held out to the public. In justice to Committee counsel and to
individual majority members of the Committee, efforts made by them to
overcome these restrictions should be recognized. It is a great tribute
to their fairness that the Committee did not break up over this issue
but continued to work despite the handicaps which were never wholly
removed.
The plain fact that an investigation could not be an investigation of
committee members remained mere spectators, persuaded some members that
restraints on their freedom were not justified. The flimsiness of the
argument for restrictions became even more evident when permission to
search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual
members *even when accompanied by Committee counsel*. Rightly or wrongly
it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block
the search for the truth.
Such a view was supported by the knowledge that restrictions on
individual members of congressional investigatory bodies were contrary
to the best practices in other investigations. Some celebrated instances
were recalled. Speaking in the Senate on November 9, 1945, during one of
the discussions on Committee powers, the Senator from Montana (Mr.
Burton K. Wheeler) observed:
"I concur in what the Senator from Illinois has said with reference to
the authorizing of a single member of the committee to hold hearings. I
have served on a good many investigations since I have been a Member of
the Senate, and some very important ones. I assisted to quite an extent
in the Teapot Dome investigation carried on by my colleague, Senator
Walsh, of Montana, and likewise I carried on the investigation of the
Department of Justice. I was a minority member of the committee.
"In all my experience with any investigating committee, I have never
known of any one member of a committee not being permitted to go and
look over the files in any department of the Government of the United
States. This is the first time I have every known anything of that kind
being questioned * * *.
"* * * I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation
I sent for files myself, I asked for files from the Attorney General of
the United States, Mr. Daugherty. He refused to give them to me. I have
forgotten the ground he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them
to me. When he did so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge,
called him in and asked for his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was
eliminated from the office of Attorney General. After that time, when
the new Attorney General was appointed, every single file I ever asked
for, as a minority member of the committee, was furnished to me.
"* * * As I have stated, my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, was a
minority member of the committee investigating the Teapot Dome
situation. I know of my own personal knowledge that he got from the
Department, and from officials in the Department, information which he
afterward used, and if he had not been permitted to do that, and if I
had not been permitted to do it, I am sure there would have been a
complete failure of the investigation of the Department of Justice.
(Congressional Record, vol. 91, No. 198, November 9, 1945, p. 10755.)"
Another instance is the more recent one in which President Truman
himself is well versed. As Senator, Mr. Truman headed a distinguished
committee bearing the popular designation "The Truman Committee" (now
the Mead Committee). The cardinal principle of the Truman Committee in
the 4 years during which it won the respect and confidence of the
American people, rested on the proposition that every individual member
of the committee was wholly free to search for any information deemed by
him to be relevant wherever and whenever he thought it could be found.
Never once did the chairman or the majority of the committee refuse to
recognize that right and that responsibility of each individual member.
500 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these instances
did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be the case in the
Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure and results in each
case did honor to the committees concerned and proved salutary for the
Nation. Complete concurrence with the most admirable outline of the
purposes and scope of the investigation of the events leading up to
Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World War as presented to the Senate
by the author of the resolution at the time of its introduction and
hearty approval of much that has been done by the Committee must not
blind us to the extent to which the investigation lived up to its
advance billing by its distinguished sponsor.
At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this
character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the entire
history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected and
neither of the two members of the Committee who had received rather
extended training under the then Senator Truman were allowed to follow
the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that had repeatedly
produced most gratifying results in their earlier experience.
This firm refusal by the Committee majority, consisting of six Democrats
as against four Republicans, at the very outset to allow the scope to
individual members even with every safeguard proposed against the
alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and disquieting.
Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light of this
iron curtain that was thus imposed.
Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing records.
Vigorous and public denial was made-presumably on Executive authority-
that any records were missing. Subsequently it developed that several
records were missing and most inadequate explanations were supplied. How
any public interest could possibly have been prejudiced by affording any
opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this character
has never been satisfactorily explained.
These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep entire
control of the investigation in the hands of the Committee majority who
were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to themselves the
capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate investigation of their own
administration. The history of human conduct furnishes few precedents to
justify such confidence.
Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the data and
testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty
surrounding the work of the Committee.
Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health did
not permit him to undergo the strain. Access to his diary was denied by
majority vote.
To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness, Senator
Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the
official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in open
hearing of the Committee (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14437 ff.).
Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the
Committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these questions,
which were highly pertinent to the inquiry.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 501
Later, Senator Ferguson submitted a supplementary list of 61 questions
to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476).
Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his answers
are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make up for the
deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176 questions.
Secretary Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he gave
his official version of the matters before the Committee and was briefly
examined by the counsel, but minority members of the Committee were not
permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers to written
interrogatories from Committee members proved unresponsive, there was no
way to secure further information from him.
The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise denied to the
Committee. The assertion of its confidential character was somewhat
belied by its submission for examination to certain individuals with a
view to its commercial publication.
The denial to the Committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was
particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of the
diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the
prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the
record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand
the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the
Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpoenas for their
production.
Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston Churchill and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to December 7, 1941, were
not available to the Committee, although there is good reason to believe
that they bore on the gathering crisis. Other messages between Mr.
Churchill and the British Embassy and American authorities were made
available to the Committee, but our Government replies or action taken
were not so available.
The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country not on
official business while hearings of this Committee were going on. His
intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would have
cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a request for
the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused.
President Roosevelt's secretary, Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to
determine for herself and the Committee and the country what portions of
the official correspondence of the late President had any relevancy to
Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the
responsibility placed upon this Committee.
One of the very important questions concerning the defense of Hawaii
dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to install
radar and other warning devices. Members of the Committee sought to
inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., in this
connection, but the Committee decided against it.
The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible to
avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl Harbor
tragedy was left largely unexplored.
We are permitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but these are
fascinating.
A modus vivendi was under discussion with Japan in November 1941 to run
for 3 months. This had been strongly urged by the War and Navy
authorities in order to supply absolutely essential time for
502 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preparation. Secretary Stimson and Knox went over the terms of this
document and advised Secretary Hull that it adequately protected our
interest.
Suddenly the modus vivendi was dropped from the agenda and there was
substituted the Hull message which was followed shortly after by the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Early on the morning after the delivery of the Hull message Lord Halifax
arrived at the State Department. He found Mr. Welles in charge and asked
him what has become of the modus vivendi. Mr. Welles replied that it was
dropped because of Chinese lack of interest. Lord Halifax intimated a
continuing British interest and Mr. Welles significantly replied: "That
is not the way London sounded yesterday."
The message from Churchill of the preceding day certainly bears out the
Welles' observation. The Committee was told by the State Department that
there is no record of any telephone conversations between Mr. Churchill
and President Roosevelt. This certainly invites inquiry.
The Halifax early morning visit in apparent ignorance of the Churchill
message of the day before and of the decision to drop the modus vivendi
is not in tune with usual British diplomatic procedure.
Whether or not the Japanese would have accepted the modus vivendi must
remain a matter of opinion.
Whether or not it should have been submitted is a matter on which light
might well be shed.
Particularly is this the case when we have the testimony of Gen. George
C. Marshall that a delay by the Japanese from December 1941 into January
1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the
wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before
Moscow in December 1941.
Whether or not such a development would have been one to be desired must
remain for future investigation when more of the diplomatic history of
the closing months of 1941 can be more thoroughly explored.
In short the Committee labored under great difficulties and was not in
possession of the full historical record pertinent to the ease before
it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing amount of
material was developed in the limited time allowed to cover such a vast
field. It is the duty of the Committee to render a report, regardless of
the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts are at hand to pass on
the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. A
careful review of the evidence is convincing enough that these issues
can be decided now.
FORM OF THIS REPORT
Accepting the primary obligations of the Committee thus defined and
regarding the questions presented above as directly relevant to this
inquiry, we have reviewed the testimony, documents, and other materials
before the Committee, and we have drawn the following conclusions in
respect of responsibility for the catastrophe, which we submit, are
fully warranted by the evidence before the Committee. For convenience,
we present the conclusions seriatim and then re-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 503
produce each conclusion separately with comment and citations Of
evidence in support of it whenever it is not a mere statement taken from
the evidence before the Committee.
These citations, of course, do not exhaust all the evidence which would
be adduced to support the respective conclusions. To make them so
comprehensive would require the reproduction of hundreds, if not
thousands, of pages of testimony and documents. The conclusions stated
below resolve all the evidence developed by the Committee. The citations
are in each case merely representative and authoritative-by way of
explanation and clarification of what is confirmed by numerous witnesses
and exhibits and stated by men who were in a position to know what was
known and done by officials of he United States, civil and military, in
relation to Pearl Harbor. In other words, citations of hearsay,
controverted evidence, and gossip have been avoided in an effort to keep
the conclusions within the bounds of unmistakable fact.
Another point with regard to the conclusions listed should be
emphasized: *Collectively, they constitute one statement* in answer to
the general question and the four specific questions presented above as
necessarily raised by the primary duty of this Committee; and many items
of evidence cited in support of one or more conclusions also help
sustain other conclusions. Hence in testing the validity of any one
among the conclusions, attention must be given to the cross references
to other items of evidence which are made in various parts of the text.
This unfortunately makes for some unavoidable duplication has been held
to a minimum.
CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND RESPONSIBILITY
1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
after November 26 the immediate imminence of war.
2. By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached
the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such point as to
convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at
Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration
"what the tactics would be" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415). Unless Japan
yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States,
there were three choices on tactics before the President and the
Cabinet; they could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without
a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue
of peace or war before Congress (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.).
3. So imminent was war on November 25, that the President in a
conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson,
General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were
likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1);
and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should
maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position firing the first shot
without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).
4. Having considered without agreeing upon the proposition that message
on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President and the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre-
504 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tary of the Navy, pursued from November 25 to December 7 the tactics of
waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.
5. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization
for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior
to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to
make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the
imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders.
6. Through the Army and Navy Intelligence Services extensive information
was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs by intercepted and
decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the growing danger of
war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence of a Japanese
attack.
7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war
was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national
preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations.
8. Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities
in Washington and the Commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for
expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make Lt
surprise attack on the United States.
9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other
information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of
the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding
from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the
probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence
to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary
from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable and that
President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account-before
December 7.
10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of the
President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at least
10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few days was
so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having reached this
conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their armed
forces on an all-out alert for war.
11. The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await
the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress
increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use
the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full
alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7,
1941.
12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and operations
which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed
in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor
commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate
instructions to the latter in language not open to misinterpretation as
to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions.
13. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
authorities in Washington during November were couched in such
conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 505
the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations
with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting
the particular actions to be taken-orders that were beyond all
reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard
the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.
14. High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the
evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which
indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and they
failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian
commanders.
15. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and
consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and
sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in
considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation,
unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in
Washington.
16. The President of the United States was responsible for the failure
to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the
Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and dispatching
clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated
the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the
United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested this power in
him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people
of the United States.
17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities for their failures in
this respect.
18. Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and
whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for Japanese attack,
attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military
administration requires taking note of the fact that they were
designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington-all of whom
were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of
subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed
forces of the United States.
19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its
ultimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence
information, direction of affairs and constitutional duty to plan e
defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the
commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet
essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do
those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost.
Washington authorities failed in (1); and the commanding officers at
Hawaii failed in (2).
20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American
outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday morning,
December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick
and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by
the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship
506 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
establishment of the Republic to our own times.
21. The contention coming from so high an authority as President Truman
on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken.
CONCLUSIONS RESTATED WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
1. *The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months
preceding December 7,1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and
after November 26 the immediate imminence of war*.
The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from March
4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws, and established practice of the
United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, such correspondence and communications relating thereto as he
deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to him it was
the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed of all
transactions that were critical in nature and especially those involving
the possible use of the armed forces of the United States.
At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that
affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become
involved in a war with Japan. On that day Admiral Richardson asked the
President "if we were going to enter the war." According to the
admiral's account the President replied-
"that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the
Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked
the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they
(the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the
war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they
would make a mistake and have would enter the war (Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 683-
4).
In a letter dated January 21, 1941, President Roosevelt informed
Ambassador Grew that "our interests are menaced both in Europe and in
the Far East. * * * Our strategy of self-defense must be a global
strategy * * *" and that "our strategy" must envisage "helping to
prevent a closing of channels of communication" between Great Britain
and various parts of the world (Grew. Ten Years in Japan, pp. 361-363).
Grew's letter dated December 14, 1940, to the President contained this
sentence, "* * * the principal point at issue, as I see it, is not
whether we call a halt to the Japanese program. But when." (Grew, Ibid.,
p. 360.) The President replied in a letter: "I find myself in decided
agreement with your conclusions."
There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January 1941
President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global war
and that his decisions as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief must
thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction. This evidence
is as follows: Beginning in January 1941 representatives of the American
armed forces and representatives of British and Dutch armed forces on
the suggestion of the United States started a series of conversations in
respect of cooperation against Japan in the Far East. Out of these and
subsequent conversations were developed
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 507
American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against Japan
if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against British, Dutch,
*or* American possessions in the Far East. President Roosevelt approved
these plans, "except officially," as Admiral Stark testified
The President's commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed by
understandings previously reached between American, British, and Dutch
military authorities. In a memorandum to the President dated November
27, 1941 (exhibit 17), General Marshall and Admiral Stark stated:
"After consultation with each other United States, British, and Dutch
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan
attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the
United states the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 East or
South of the 10 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands."
The agreement referred to by Admiral Stark and General Marshall was
reached at conferences in Singapore in April 1941 between United States,
British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. It provided
that they would advise their respective Governments to authorize
military operations against Japan in the event of any of the following
Japanese movements (exhibit 50, par. 26):
"(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not
possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of
war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which although
technically an act of war could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is
recognized the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war
must lie with the government concerned.
"(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to
the West of 100 East or to the South or 10 North.
"(c) The movement or a large number of Japanese warships or of a convoy
of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships which from its position
and course as clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands. The East
coast of the Isthmus of Kra of the East coast of Malaya or had crossed
the parallel of 6 North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from
the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island or the Equator East of Waigeo.
"(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
"(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands."
The report of the Singapore conversations and the memoranda to the
President by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on November 5 and 27,
1941, set forth definite geographic lines, over which a Japanese advance
was considered to require armed resistance from the United States, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands. One line ran north and south through
Thailand. It was parallel to longitude 100 east. A Japanese movement
west of it was prohibited. This line protected Burma and the Indian
Ocean. Another line ran east and west across the Isthmus of Kra and was
parallel with latitude 10 north. A Japanese movement over this line was
forbidden. This line in effect protected the Malay Peninsula and
Singapore. The Singapore report sets out certain additional lines. One
such line was parallel of latitude 6 north and extended between Malaya
and the Philippines.
This line protected the Dutch East Indies. They were also protected from
Japanese attack, particularly one originating in the
508 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Palau Islands, by another line extending from the Gulf of Davao in the
Philippines to Waigeo Island in the Dutch East Indies. On December 4,
1941, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent to the British and
Dutch Admiralties his recommendation-
"that if the Dutch authorities considered a warning should be given
Japan it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of
the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces
crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be
attacked (exhibit 79 p. 12)."
While the President did not approve written agreements on these
understandings he and the high authorities in Washington acted with the
British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made. Likewise the
Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United States, Britain, and
Netherlands East Indies were working together. There is ample evidence
in the record to this effect. (Ex. 1, p. 205- Tokyo to Berlin dispatch:
Id. P. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.)
Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were based upon
the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the Dutch Netherlands,
China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan for the simple defense
of American possessions against Japan was developed by the armed forces
of the United States between January 1941 and December 7, 1941, with a
view to safeguarding American interests separately. After the Japanese
attack on December 7, American, British, Dutch, and Australian
operations in the Pacific theater were conducted on the cooperative
principle which had governed the military and naval conversations and
planning between January and December 1941.
The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of discussion
between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941, and agreements or understandings reached by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at that Conference were
based on a common program for dealing with Japan and close cooperation
between the United States and Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and
naval affairs in respect of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their
chief understandings as thus far disclosed by official records were
three in number:
(1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking any further
steps in dominating neighboring countries by force or threat of force.
(2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States
with protective assistance by British armed forces in guarding against a
possible Nazi thrust from the mainland.
(3) Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in "the
policing of the world" during a transition period following the close of
the war.
Admiral Stark and General Marshall did not approve these Singapore
agreements because they were of a "political nature," beyond their
authority to sanction. They recommended, however, that these be taken up
by the political departments of the governments involved. Further, under
other provisions of the Singapore agreements, Britain entrusted the
naval defense of her vital interests in the so-called Malay barrier
exclusively to the United States and the Dutch. Only three British
vessels were allocated to the defense of this area, and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 509
these only for escort and patrol. This arrangement was not approved by
Stark and Marshall (exhibit 65).
After an understanding was reached at the Atlantic Conference on common
diplomatic action against Japan-
"the President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any
further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in
war *could be held off for at least thirty days*." [*Italics supplied*.]
The Prime Minister thought that there was a reasonable chance of
averting a war in the Pacific (Sumner Welles, Memorandum of
Conversation, August 11, 1941; Ex. 22-C, p. 9).
It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister
Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, President Roosevelt
would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with Great
Britain in "the policing of the world" for a transition period after the
war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the development of
the war the United States would become involved in it.
In his statement to the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday, August 17, 1941,
immediately following his return from the Atlantic Conference, President
Roosevelt warned Japan against further attempts to dominate "neighboring
countries," not merely the possessions of the United States, and used
diplomatic language which, according to long-established usages, had
only one meaning, namely, that such further attempts would result in a
conflict with the United States. His statement read:
"* * * this Government (of the United States) now finds it necessary to
say the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes *any
further steps* in pursuance of a policy or program of military
domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the
Government of the United States *will be compelled to take immediately
any and all steps* which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the
legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American
nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United
States. [Italics supplied; Foreign Relations of the United States:
Japan, vol. II, p. 556-557.]"
In urging upon the State Department, in September 1941, an acceptance of
the Japanese proposal for a conference between President Roosevelt and
Premier Konoye, the American Ambassador in Tokyo Joseph Grew, declared
that, in his opinion, unless a certain amount of confidence be placed by
the United States in the professed sincerity of the Premier Konoye and
his supporters in making arrangements for he proposed conference:
"the ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be
successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of
Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be
avoided in the Pacific (Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 436-442)."
Accordingly, in rejecting the Japanese proposal for this conferences
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull whatever their reasons and
however justifiable these reasons may have been, had before them the
deliberate judgment of the American Ambassador in Tokyo that such action
would reduce the chances of peace and increase the probability of war.
The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, after all Japanese efforts
to bring about the conference between President Roosevelt and Premier
Konoye had failed.
On November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President
Roosevelt, rejected the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a
510 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
temporary agreement, sometimes called a modus vivendi (below conclusion
19) and presented to Japan his memorandum of that date, the Secretary
recognized, and said, that there was then "practically no possibility of
an agreement being achieved with Japan." Having reached this conclusion,
the Secretary, according to his account of what happened, declared on
November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this
Government, "that the matter of safeguarding our national security was
in the hands of the Army and Navy." (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144.) This
was presumptively a warning to the War Department and the Navy
Department to make ready for war. Accepting it as such the two
Departments sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel messages which, the
Departments claimed, ordered the commanders to put into effect a due
alert for war-a possible Japanese attack (but see conclusion 13).
The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the
Secretary of the Navy were, therefore, certainly bound by the duties of
their respective offices to be on the alert day and night after November
26, 1941, for the receipt of any word or message from Japan and for the
receipt of any intercepts or other information respecting Japanese
designs and intentions that were indicative of a breach of relations and
war. They were also bound by their duties to alert and to keep on the
alert for sudden attack their immediate subordinates and the outpost
commanders having duties in connection with war operations.
2. *By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached
the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such a point as to
convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at
Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration
"what the tactics would be." (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415.) Unless Japan
yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States,
there were three choices on tactics before the President and the
Cabinet: They could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without
a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue
of peace or war before Congress. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.*)
The proposal of an appeal to Congress was not new. So high was the war
tension in August 1941, that Prime Minister Churchill, recognizing the
constitutional inability of President Roosevelt to declare war, proposed
that the President seek authority from Congress to act on certain
conditions. The Prime Minister's proposal contained in his draft of
parallel communications to Japan read:
"If any third power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in
consequence of such counter measures or in their support of them the
President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to
give aid to such power. (Welles, memorandum of conversation, August 10,
1941.)"
The proposal to incorporate in the American communication to the
Japanese Government an announcement of this intention to appeal to
Congress was not accepted by President Roosevelt.
Sometime after November 7, 1941, when the President and his Cabinet
unanimously agreed that "the country" would back them up in case they
struck at Japan in the Far East, high administration authorities
discussed the tactics of an appeal by President Roosevelt to Congress in
a special message laying before it the serious danger that was
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 511
threatening the United States and its interests in the Far East. The
officers of the State Department, the Secretary of War, and the
Secretary of the Navy took part in drafting the proposed message for the
resident and their draft when completed was accompanied by a Memorandum
for the President," dated November 29, 1941, initialed by Secretary Hull
(Ex. 19; 161). In a note sending this draft message to the President,
Mr. Hull wrote:
"I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress *until the
last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities*. [Ex. 19,
italics supplied.]"
The decision against laying the issue before Congress left to the
administration authorities only the tactics of renewing negotiations
with Japan (which as to substantive issues had come to an end on
November 26) or the tactics of waiting on Japanese decisions and
actions.
Mr. Roosevelt chose to wait until December 7, 1941, rather than place
this grave issue before Congress. This seems clear from the testimony as
late as the night before the attack as follows:
Commander Schulz said that when he delivered the 13-part message to the
President on the night of December 6:
"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going
to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could
not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The
President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are
a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this
much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record."
"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that
record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait
until it came (Tr., Vol. 63, p. 12442-3)."
3. *So imminent was war on November 25 that the President, in a
conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Know, Secretary Stimson,
General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were
likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1);
and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should
maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot
without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418).
In the diplomatic documents, exhibits, and testimony before the
Committee there is a wealth of evidence which underwrites the statement
that the tactics of maneuvering the Japanese into "the position of
firing the first shot" were followed by high authorities in Washington
after November 2S, 1941. Examples of such tactics are afforded by-
(a) Secretary Hull's decision, with the approval of President Roosevelt,
to discard the proposal for a temporary agreement with Japan without
notifying the Secretary of War or the British and Australian
representatives in Washington who had collaborated in working out a
draft of a memorandum with a view to reaching such an agreement if
possible (conclusion 19).
(b) The substitution for the proposed modus vivendi of the note of
November 26 to Japan, which, as Secretary Hull knew and said at the
moment, practically put an end to negotiations with Japan and passed
over to the Army and Navy the burden of safeguarding the security of the
United States.
512 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary Stimson quoted his diary for November 26 as follows:
"* * * Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about
made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I
passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing
over-to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. * * * I
called Hull up this morning to tell him [of Chiang Kai-shek's objections
to the modus vivendi as set forth in a letter to T. V. Soong and shown
by him to Mr. Stimson] and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. * *
* He replied as I have said above-that he had made up his mind to give
up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese
that he had no further action to propose. * * * (Tr. Vol. 70 p. 14420.)"
(c) The rejection of appeals made to President Roosevelt by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark on November 5 and also later on November 97,
1911, for a delay in bringing about a breach with Japan-appeals based on
their belief that the Army and Navy were not then ready for a war with
Japan.
(d) The orders of the Secretary of War to the effect that General
Marshall and Admiral Stark should not put into their memorandum
appealing for delay, signed November 27, anything that could be
"construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to
reopen the conversations" (Tr. Vol. 20, p. 3325, and below, especially
conclusion 19).
According to Secretary Hull, the tactics of waiting for the Japanese to
fire the first shot was, in a measure, forced upon the Administration by
the attachment of a large part of the American people to neutrality as
expressed in the neutrality legislation of Congress and by their
opposition to involvement in war in the Far East as well as elsewhere.
This view Secretary Hull expressed in his statement to the Committee
(Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1096 ff.) and it is set forth more fully by other
documents before the Committee, particularly the State Department's
publication: *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-41*,
especially chapter 1.
In this chapter the State Department explains that the President and
Secretary Hull were hampered in the pursuit of the foreign policy they
had "clearly" decided upon-at a date not fixed by the Secretary-on
account of the opposition by "much of public opinion" in the United
States. In this chapter the State Department also explains that-
"Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration (1931-41)
necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of
public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation
expressed in "neutrality" legislation. * * * The pages (in the volume)
which follow show the slow march of the United States from an attitude
of illusory aloofness toward world-wide forces endangering America to a
position in the forefront of the United Nations that are now (l943)
making common cause against an attempt at world conquest unparalleled
alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation."
It is a serious question whether the President and his advisers were
justified in making the conclusions that the country would support them
for war; and whether actions taken by them upon their own opinion
without placing the matter before Congress was in violation of their
responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the land. (See
Conclusion 2.)
4. *Having considered, without agreeing upon the proposition,, that a
message on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 513
and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of
the Navy pursued, from November 25 to December 7, the tactics of waiting
for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.*
Nothing that indicates any easing of the tension between the United
States and Japan appears in the records of the exchanges with the
Japanese representatives in Washington between November 27 and December
6, inclusive. On the contrary, relations were rapidly deteriorating
(Foreign Relations: 11, pp. 772-784).
It was the general opinion among Washington authorities that the
question was no longer "would Japan attack," but "when and where."
On November 28, President Roosevelt said to Secretary Stimson that he
could see only three alternatives before him in the situation: "first,
to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at
once" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14423)
As late as December 2, President Roosevelt seemed to be still
considering the subject of a message to Congress. Secretary Stimson
recorded on that day: The President "is quite settled, I think, that he
will make a message to the Congress and will, perhaps, back that up with
a speech to the country" (ibid., p. 14427). On December 2, he was also
considering the possibility of a message to the Japanese Emperor (ibid.,
p. 14427).
With these possibilities of tactics before him, the President fully
abandoned the three projects: another ultimatum, fighting at once,
sending a message to Congress. He only turned to the fourth possibility-
sending an appeal to the Japanese Emperor-after it was too late; that
is, after 9 p. m. on the night of December 6, when the White House had
been alerted that the Japanese answer to our note of November 26 was
coming in and being decoded and his naval aide was on special duty to
receive and deliver it to him. Hence, in such respects, he adhered to
his first alternative, that of waiting for Japanese action.
5. *The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization
for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior
to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to
make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the
imminence of war went to the Hawaiian Commanders.*
For the purpose of taking concerted actions in fulfillment of the duties
imposed upon them, authorities in Washington formed two groups or
organizations with a view to coordinating the operations of the civil
and military branches of the executive department. If these groups were
so loosely constituted as not to deserve the name of organizations, this
was due to a failure on the part of the members to make them effective
bodies for the discharge of their coordinating responsibilities.
The first of these two groups consisted of the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the
Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes it was called colloquially the "War
Council."
The second group included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary
of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations, and occasionally commanding general of Air Force,
General Arnold. This group was sometimes colloquially called the "War
Cabinet."
514 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The use of these terms-"War Council" and "War Cabinet"-while the country
was still at peace seems to indicate that high civil and military
authorities in Washington were thinking in terms of war and should have
been more alert to the probable events of war such as an attack upon our
most important outpost and fleet in the Pacific.
Each of these groups or organizations-
"was a sort of clearinghouse for information, a gathering place for
discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the
scene *would know what was going on and would have information to guide
him in making his own decisions* that were more or less independent, but
at the same time somewhat dependent on the action of other members of
the group. (Italics supplied.) (Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, p.
219.)"
If it be argued that these groups were loosely constituted and met
irregularly and informally and hence were not organizations in the
strict sense of the term [they met once a week at least and had other
irregular and additional meetings], it remains a fact that they existed
for the purposes described. Furthermore, if, owing to their loose
constitution, they did not discharge their duties efficiently, it also
remains a fact that the President had the power, and the corresponding
duty, to transform either or both of these groups into positive
organizations with positive obligations in respect of exchanging
information, making decisions, coordinating the civil and military
branches of the executive department, and framing orders to outpost
commanders. (See Conclusion No. 16.)
At all events, these groups had every opportunity to make sure that
identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war
went out to the Hawaiian commanders and the President had the power and
duty to see that this was done directly or through the agency of these
groups, especially the second-the "War Cabinet."
6. *Through the Army and Navy intelligence services extensive
information was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs, by
intercepted and decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the
growing danger of war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence
of a Japanese attack.*
With extraordinary skill, zeal, and watchfulness the intelligence
services of the Army Signal Corps and Navy Office of Naval
Communications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between the
Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors in all
parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Washington
reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, decisions, and
operations at home, in the United States, and in other countries.
Although there were delays in the translations of many intercepts, the
intelligence services had furnished to those high authorities a large
number of Japanese messages which clearly indicated the growing resolve
of the Japanese Government on war before December 7, 1941.
Incidentally, it was a matter of great imprudence for the State and War
Department to permit so large a number (200) of Japanese consular
representatives at so important a naval base as Hawaii. Much of the
espionage involved in the intercepts emanated from this consular group m
Hawaii.
Four volumes laid before the Committee contain hundreds of these
messages-including in some cases comment and interpretations:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 515
(l) *Pearl Harbor: Intercepted Diplomatic messages*. Ex. 1 (253 pp.);
(2) *Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship
Movements*, etc. (of the United States) (mimeograph, Ex. 2); and
(3) *Army Pearl Harbor Board: Top Secret Testimony, Report, and Official
Memoranda* (mimeograph).
(4) *The Navy Court of Inquiry Top Secret Testimony and Report*.
No person has any intellectual or moral right to pass judgment on the
question of responsibility for Pearl Harbor who has not read, compared,
studied, and interpreted all of these documents.
With regard to the volume, nature, and details of the information
respecting Japanese designs and operations supplied by the Army and Navy
intelligence services to high authorities in Washington, see below.
(Conclusion 20.)
The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages
in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely hat Japan
would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his
so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's
notes, the President stated: "That we were likely to be attacked perhaps
(as soon as) next Monday" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418)."
There was abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan
intended to attack the United States. Japan had fixed a dead-line date
of November 25 [ex. I, p. 100], extended to November 29 [ex. I, p. 165]
for reaching diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at
least six Japanese messages emphasizing this dead line. If the dead-line
date passed without agreement, the Japanese Government advised her
Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are automatically going to happen."
The necessity for agreement by the dead-line date was stressed by Japan
in these terms: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a
few days"; "We gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die"
(exhibit 1, p. 137, 93). On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced
"dead-line" date, the United States Government delivered to Japan a
diplomatic note, which the intercepted messages revealed Japan
considered to be a "humiliating proposal," impossible of acceptance
(exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further
revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United
States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1,
p. 204).
To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, Japan
instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing
negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (exhibit
1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in
Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated by the Navy
in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the
Japanese Ambassador was instructed to-
"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments * * *.
*Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may
come quicker than anyone dreams*. (Italic supplied.)
The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained
a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the
516 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
intercepted messages (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10887). On December 2, 1941,
elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise
detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals
in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States"
(exhibit 1, p. 198).
The probability that the Pacific Fleet would be attacked at Pearl Harbor
was clear from the "bomb plot" available in Washington as early as
October 9, 1941, and related Japanese messages. It will aid in obtaining
a clear understanding of these important messages if the principal
intercepted communications are set forth in full. They are:
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941
#83
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-
areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch. And the communicating water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in the docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.
If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)
ARMY 23260 Trans. 10/9/41 (S)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Washington
September 29, 1941.
Circular #041
Honolulu to Tokyo #178
Re your #083*
(Strictly secret)
The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location
vessels:
1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message
Washington #48**): KS.
2. Navy Dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.
4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be
differentiated by A and B respectively.)
Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.
* Not available
** Available dated 21 August
JD-1 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
November 15, 1941.
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your ships in harbor report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.
Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to
maintain secrecy.
JD 1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 517
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu November 18, 1941
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:
Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,[a] and the Areas Adjacent thereto.
(Make your investigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 25773 Trans 12.5.41 (S)
[a] Probably means Mamala May.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 20, 1941
#111 Strictly secret
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet-bases in the neighborhood
of the Hawaiian military reservation.
ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
November 29, 1941
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even where there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
#222.
1. The warship at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in
my #219 [a] on that day.
Area A [b]-A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker
left port.
Area C [c]-Three warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier
Enterprise, or some other vessel, was in area C. Two heavy cruisers of
the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS.
Four merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D [d].
3. At 10 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, eight destroyers were
observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single
file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour,
they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through
area B to the buoys in area C, to which they were moored, they changed
course five times, each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was 1
hour; however; one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the
water reservoir on the eastern side.
Relayed to-.
ARMY 25817 Trans 12-6-41.
In the "bomb plot" message of September 24, 1941, the Japanese
Government gave detailed instructions to its consul general in Hawaii as
to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl
Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five subareas. An
alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese Government
instructed the consul:
"With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate type and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there
are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)
[a] Available, dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.
518 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9,1941
(exhibit 2, p. 12)
On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii replied to his
government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating
the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch was
decoded and translated in Washington on October L0, 1941.
On November 15,18,20, and 29 the Japanese Government urgently called for
information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, p.
13-15). On November 15 the Japanese consul in Honolulu was directed to
make his "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a
week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in
specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September
(exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined because relations
between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical."
On November 18 the Japanese consul general reported to Tokyo the
locations of the ships in the various subareas of Pearl Harbor, giving
minute descriptions of the courses, speed, and distances apart of
destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 14). On November 29
reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships.
These despatches were intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington
on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.
The "bomb plot" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor
which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was
divided into subareas by Japan. And no other American harbor had such a
large share of the fleet to protect.
In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more
vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message
Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general
whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With the
"bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl
Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought
merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet. But as to the
presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the
period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even
when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. The
reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only
in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These
reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering
meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of
instructions emanating from the Government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers
of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that the "bomb
plot" message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the
Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 3026; Vol. 23, p. 4014;
Vol. 27, p. 4874; Vol. 12, p. 2100-2102; Vol. 59, p. 11313-11314; Vol.
35, p. 6390, 6394; Vol. 30, p. 5378).
On October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12), Lieutenant Commander Kramer of
Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor
"bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval
Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 519
Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr., Vol. 59 p. 11209). It bore the
location "interesting message" on a gist or flag (Tr., Vol. 59, p.
11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows:
"Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided
into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (Tr., Vol.
69, p. 11207)."
Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the "bomb plot"
message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the chief of
the War Plans Division (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12083). The message was
discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern
Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff,
with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 62, p.
12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as
implicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol.
62, p. 12105). In the course of these discussions officers in Naval
Intelligence stated that the Japanese were wasting their time in getting
such meticulous detail about the location of ship in Pearl Harbor
because the fleet would not be in Pearl Harbor when the emergency arose.
Simple reason in evaluating these bomb plot messages should have
discovered their significance.
1. Such meticulous detail was not needed to enable Japan to keep track
of the American fleet for general purposes.
2. The messages were sent to *Tokyo* obviously for use originating from
there-air or sea attack.
3. The messages couldn't be for sabotage. Sabotage is an on-the-spot
affair. Saboteurs have to be in Hawaii. They get their information
direct by local observation. Therefore, they needed no bomb plot.
4. The only purpose could be for air attack, submarine attack, direct
invasion-all external operations.
5. Had Washington so evaluated this bomb plot, it could have seen this
significance and warned the commanders at Hawaii. Washington authorities
failed to do so or if they did in fact evaluate it, they failed to pass
the information on to the Hawaiian commanders.
The commander of a fleet (in this case Admiral Kimmel) has custody of
the fleet; he is at all times materially interested in its safety. The
commander of a naval base (in this case General Short) has the duty of
protecting the fleet when it is at his base. Any information showing
specific hostile interest in that fleet or in the harbor where the fleet
is anchored is basic information for the commander of the fleet and the
commander of the naval base.
In Washington, long prior to December 7, 1941, Army and Navy
Intelligence officers, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army Chief of
Staff, and other high authorities gained vital information (the bomb-
plot messages) from intercepted Japanese communications affecting the
fleet and the defense of the naval base at Hawaii. They gained it from
sources of information not available to Admiral Kimmel and General
Short.
In these circumstances, it was the express duty of the Washington
authorities to pass this information in its original form on to Admiral
Kimmel and General Short. The information was of such a specific
character and so directly related to the fleet and naval
520 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
base that Washington authorities were not justified in keeping to
themselves or in evaluating it in any manner which would dilute or
generalize the significance of the messages in their original form.
Washington authorities failed in this, a prime responsibility in their
relations with the outpost commanders.
In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no effort to
conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in South East Asia
(Tr., Vol. 3, p. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-China at that
time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States
and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol.
II, p. 779). Yet the intercepts showed that some Japanese plan went into
effect automatically on November 29, from which Japan hoped to divert
American suspicion by a pretext of continued negotiations. The Pearl
Harbor "bomb plot" messages gave some hint of what might follow
"automatically."
Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this
information. Other messages intercepted later were even more revealing.
These were the intercepted Japanese messages distributed in Washington
on Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and several hours before
the blow fell on Sunday morning, December 7. These were:
1. The "Pilot message." This was a message from Japan to her Ambassadors
in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply to the American note
of November 26 was ready and being sent to them in 14 parts; that it was
to be treated with great secrecy pending instructions as to the time of
its delivery; and that the time for its delivery was to be fixed in a
separate message (Exhibit 1, p. 238).
2. The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply. This included all but the
last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of State on
December 7 (Exhibit 1, pp. 239-244).
3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and the
message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for delivery of
the Japanese note as 1 p. m Washington time, December 7 (Exhibit 1, p.
248).
Full details of the timing and significance of these messages, how they
were handled, and what was done about them is discussed in conclusion
20.
It is sufficient to say here that prior to December 7, 1941, a great
volume of secret information obtained by American and other intelligence
services from intercepted Japanese messages was available in Washington
with which to gage the designs, intentions, and operations of Japan
relative to the United States. This information was distributed to high
authorities in Washington and practically none of it was passed on to
the commanders in Hawaii although it bore directly on their
responsibilities in the defense of their outpost.
7. *Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war
was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national
preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations*.
The "magic" intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and
the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a
desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 521
were being broken. Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted
messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of
War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the
Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the
Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the
War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State
Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the
President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the
Army was responsible for distribution of magic within the War Department
and to the State Department; the Navy for distribution within the Navy
Department and to the White House.
The President requested the original raw messages in English examining
them personally and on December 6 had his naval aide on special night
duty to receive and deliver them to him.
The dissemination of magic materials did not include the commanders at
Hawaii, but on a few occasions material derived therefrom was dispatched
by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. The War Department did not
send the magic to the field. A large amount of other intelligence
obtained from various sources within and without the country was not
sent to either of the commanders in Hawaii.
8. *Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities
in Washington and the commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for
expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make a
surprise attack on the United States*.
There is no evidence in the record before the Committee that President
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and/or Secretary Knox
expected at any time prior to December 7 a formal declaration of war on
the United States by Japan in case the diplomatic negotiations came to a
break. Indeed, all the evidence bearing on expectations in Washington as
to Japan's probable methods of making war point to the belief of the
Administration that Japan would begin with a surprise attack.
For example, Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at a meeting
of "high officials," when he stated that the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, "expressed his
judgment that any plans for our military defense would include the
assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a
central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points
simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of
coordination for purposes thereof" (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144).
Speaking to Ambassador Halifax on November 29, Secretary Hull said that
it would be a-
"serious mistake * * * to make plans of resistance without including the
possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element
of surprise * * * that the Japanese recognize that their course of
unlimited conquest * * * is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost
boldness and risk. (Peace and War, 1943, pp. 144-145)."
Ambassador Grew reported to Hull on November 3-
"Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic suddenness to measures
which night make inevitable war with the United States. (Peace and War,
p. 775.)"
9. *Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other
information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of
522 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding
from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the
probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence
to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary
from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable, and that
President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account-before
December 7*.
The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor in a large measure, if not
entirely, for the purpose of exercising a deterring effect on the
aggressive propensities of the Japanese Government during the diplomatic
negotiations and of making the Government more likely to yield to the
diplomatic representations of the United States in matters of policy.
This was done contrary to the advice of the Commander in Chief of the U.
S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson (who was removed because of protest on that
issue), and with which Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval
Operations agreed. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 916). The fleet could produce this
effect only as an instrument of war that constituted a potential threat
to the Japanese; that is, a powerful instrument which could be used
effectively to strike Japanese armed forces if they moved too far
southward in the direction of British, Dutch, and/or American
possessions in that region.
Having determined to move far southward and having moved far on the way
early in December toward that region, the Japanese were warned by every
principle of sound naval strategy to destroy, if possible, the American
fleet at Hawaii on their left flank.
As Prime Minister Churchill said, in an address to the House of Commons
on January 27, 1942, with reference to the Atlantic Conference and
British strategic decisions as time went on after that Conference:
"It must also be remembered that over the whole Pacific scene brooded
the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It
seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of
the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the
Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great
American Fleet."
President Roosevelt recognized this strategic consideration as shown by
his message to Chiang Kai-shek as follows:
"Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard
to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented,
with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable
way possible. * * *
"Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval
defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily
increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along
the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-china,
are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are
the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved
by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to
Chiang Kai-shek)."
High authorities in Washington definitely knew from a message received
from Ambassador Winant in London at 10:40 a. m. December 6, 1941
(Washington time) that two large Japanese forces had been seen sailing
toward the Kra Peninsula and were distant only fourteen hours in time
(Ex. 21). Washington authorities should have known, therefore, that this
would bring the strategic principle of what to do
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 523
bout Hawaii into immediate military calculations. They took no steps to
alert Hawaii.
The Japanese were fully aware of this strategic principle in December
1941, as their attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated.
During the weeks preceding December 7, what was the attitude of high
authorities in Washington with regard to the probability of Japanese
action against Pearl Harbor in accordance with this strategic principle?
Some of those high authorities thought that the Japanese would not take
the risk of such an attack. Indeed those authorities were seriously
lacking in information respecting the progress and state of Japanese
military and naval preparedness and equipment, and they were unaware of
the degree to which the Japanese were equipped to attack the American
fleet and military installations at Pearl Harbor. The State Department
seemed to labor under the impression that the United States could defeat
Japan in a few weeks. (See also Secretary Knox Annual Navy Report of
June 30, 1941, released December 6, 1911.) Judging by the testimony and
documents before the Committee, most of the high authorities in
Washington, especially after the Atlantic conference in August 1941, so
concentrated their attention on American-British-Australian-Dutch plans
for combined actions against the Japanese in southeastern Asia that they
failed to give sufficient, if any, careful consideration to the
strategic principle which enjoined the Japanese to destroy, if they
could, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank before advancing
too deeply into southeastern waters.
Nevertheless the possibility, indeed the probability, of a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor had entered into the calculations of high
authorities in Washington and the commanders at Pearl Harbor for years,
months, and days before December 7, 1941.
The whole raison d' etre of the powerful naval and military
installations in Hawaii, as publicly announced, was *defense against a
Japanese attack*. (See testimony of Mr. Grew for discussion of this
point (Tr. 7 Vol. 9, p. 1586.) Preparations for defense against attack
necessarily implied the possibility of an attack.
American war plans and maneuvers in the Hawaiian area for years prior to
December 7, 1941, took into full account the probability of a Japanese
attack by air. (See Martin-Bellinger report, Ex. 44.)
None of the Army and Navy witnesses before the committee admitted they
had neglected the possibility-or the probability-of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor during the period prior to December. On the contrary, they
testified that they had consistently reckoned with the possibility, even
when they minimized the probability. (Tr., for example, Vol. 12, p.
2111, Vol. 13, pp. 2162, 2167, 2172, 2173, Vol. 14, p. 2341.)
Intercepts of Japanese messages made by the Army and Navy intelligence
services showed high authorities in Washington that the Japanese
Government had ordered its agents in Hawaii to report on American
military and naval installations and ship movements in that region. They
also required reports on "lack of movements." For example, September 24,
1941, it ordered an agent to subdivide the waters of Pearl Harbor into
five subareas, as well as to report on ship movements there. Prior to
and after this date Japanese agents were,
524 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
up to the Japanese attack, reporting on ship movements, installations,
and other matters of military and naval significance to the Japanese
government. (Japanese messages concerning Military installations, Ship
movements, etc., pp. 2-29. See conclusion 6.)
It is true that owing to neglect or delays in Washington some of these
messages were not translated prior to December 7, 1941, but enough
messages had been translated to provide copious information to high
authorities in Washington. Delays in translations were not due to lack
of congressional appropriations (General Marshall, Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3149).
Witnesses before the Committee, it may be noted, in extenuation of their
lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor, called
attention to the fact that Japanese agents were also reporting on the
military and naval installations of the United States at Panama, the
Philippines, the west coast, and other points. But to men, competent,
careful, and watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivisible
responsibility, this fact provided no excuse whatever for minimizing the
probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than at any other
American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure of Washington
authorities to note that far greater detail was being asked for by the
Japanese about Hawaii at a time when Japanese movements in the
Southeastern Pacific had to contend with the strategic position of
Hawaii where the real American striking force, the fleet, rested.
A full review of the testimony and documents before the Committee
confirms the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board (p. 107);
after its survey of relevant facts: "We must therefore conclude that the
responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Staff in Washington, down to the generals and admirals in Hawaii, *all
expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor* (that is December 7, 1941)."
As a general statement, when testifying *after* the Pearl Harbor attack,
they did not expect it. Apparently the only person who was not surprised
was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. Who testified: "Well, I was not
surprised!"
10. *The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of
the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at
least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few
days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having
reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and
Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their
armed forces on an all-out alert for war*.
Besides the knowledge of Japanese designs and operations which the
President and the Secretary of State acquired from their diplomatic
negotiations with Japan, they also had the knowledge of Japanese designs
and operations made available to them by the Army and Navy intelligence
services. This additional knowledge could only serve to fortify the
conviction already reached as early as November 25, namely, that a
Japanese attack was near at hand or to use President Roosevelt's own
words, "we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as Monday"
(December 1). (See above, conclusion 3.)
The nature of the additional information placed at the disposal of the
President and Secretary of State by the Army and Navy Intelligence
Service is indicated by the citations of Army and Navy intercepts of
Japanese messages. (See conclusion 20.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 525
Through intercept of Japanese messages extending over many months prior
to December 7, 1941, translated and laid before high authorities in
Washington by the Army and Navy Intelligence Services, these Washington
authorities learned that Japanese spies and agents, directed by the
Japanese Government, were collecting and transmitting to Tokyo an
immense amount of exact and detailed information respecting the military
and naval installations and the state of preparedness in the Hawaiian
Islands, as well as elsewhere, but more detailed in relation to Hawaii
than elsewhere. (See conclusion 6.)
As early as September 24, 1941, Washington authorities knew that
Japanese agents in Hawaii were instructed to divide the waters of Pearl
Harbor into five subareas and later to report to Tokyo regularly on
ships in the Harbor, ship movements and also to report even though there
were no ship movements. These and other Japanese messages requested
information also on military installations, and American preparedness
materiel, defensive practices, including air reconnaissance, and other
matters of vital importance to Japanese armed forces in case they made
an attack on Pearl Harbor. (See conclusion 6.) Owing to inexcusable
delays on the part of Army and Navy authorities in Washington in
translating the intercepts of Japanese messages, many of the most
critical and important messages intercepted on and after November 24,
1941, were unavailable for general distribution among high authorities
in Washington before the Japanese blow fell at Pearl Harbor on the
morning of December 7.
From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated and translated on
November 28, authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government regarded the American note of November 26 as "a humiliating
proposal," and that "Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations."
They further learned from this same Tokyo message that the Japanese
answer would be sent to the Japanese ambassadors in Washington in two or
three days, "*after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured."
[Italics supplied.]
From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated
December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the American
note of November 26 was considered by the Japanese Government as
"insulting" and that it was impossible for the Japanese Government to
find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations, and that, in
the Japanese Government's opinion, the United States regarded Japan,
along with Germany and Italy as an enemy.
From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated
December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government regarded negotiations with the United States as "ruptured-
broken," and that the Japanese Government had stated that "the time of
the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."
Although the knowledge gained from these and other items of information
was sufficient to warn high authorities in Washington that Japan was on
the verge of starting hostilities, reference should be made in this
connection to the so-called "winds" messages concerning which there had
been much dispute and no little mystery. The story, though long, may be
abbreviated here.
526 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel Otis Sadtler testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that
about November 20, 1941, a Japanese message was intercepted notifying
nationals that another message was to come indicating whether war, if
launched, would be against the United States, Great Britain, or Russia
or any combination of them. The first message stated that the second or
"activating" message to come would indicate by reference to the
directions of the winds and weather the names of the countries against
which war would be started. The Army Pearl Harbor Board also had
evidence to the effect that the second or "activating" message from
Japan had come and that it meant "War with England, War with America,
Peace with Russia." According to the Board's report:
"This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and
cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was
collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts commission.
Copies were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared
(Top secret p. 8)."
The evidence before this Committee bearing on the interception of the
activating message from Tokyo and on the contention that it indicated
hostilities between Japan and the Anglo-American combination covers
hundreds of pages. Admittedly the evidence is confusing and conflicting,
but after reviewing it; Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, deputy to Admiral
Harold Stark, testified before the Hart Inquiry to questions 68 and 69:
"68. Q. During November or December '41 were you cognizant of a special
code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform
their nationals concerning against what nations they would make
aggressive movements by means of a partial weather report?
"A. Yes; I do recall such messages.
"69. Q. Do you recall having seen on or about 4 December the broadcast
directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack
both Britain and the United States?
"A. Yes."
Admiral Ingersoll, Deputy to Admiral Harold Stark at Washington, and
Admiral Turner, Navy operations officer at Washington, both stated they
did not know until 1945 about the allegation that there had been no wind
execute message. Even if the wind execute message they saw was a false
one they believed it true at the time and should have acted accordingly.
If, however, the receipt of the activating "winds" message be wholly
discounted, such discounting in no way affects the other items of
unmistakable evidence which demonstrates that high authorities in
Washington had sufficient knowledge of Japanese designs to convince them
before the attack that war with Japan was an imminent certainty.
From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated December 2 and translated
December 3, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese
Government had ordered its Washington Embassy to destroy all codes
except one and all secret documents. (One code machine was to be kept
for use in the final negotiations which ended in the rupture of
relations on December 7.)
From a message dated December 6 and translated on December 6, sometime
in the afternoon, Washington authorities learned that the Japanese
Government had notified the Japanese Embassy in Washington that a
memorandum for the United States would be sent in 14 parts and to be
prepared to present it-the memorandum that would make a rupture in
relations with the United States.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 527
Messages serving as guides to procedure in the matter of this 14-part
message follow:
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Urgent-Very Important)
#907 To be handled in Government Code
Re my #902. [a]
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at
1:00 p. m., on the 7th, your time.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
Army 25850
[a] S.I.S. #25843-text of Japanese reply.
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
#904
Re my #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the
aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.
Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.
Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
Army 25844
JD: 7144
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
(Extremely Urgent)
#910
After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and 909
d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine
codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.
Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
The "pilot message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 *a. m*. Washington time
December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 a. m. Washington time
December 6, and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the
Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington
time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated, and
distributed about 3 p. m., Washington time, by the Army, to Mr. Hull,
Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the Far Plans Division,
General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Miles
(Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval
Intelligence-Admiral Wilkinson-received the so-called "pilot message"
prior to 6 p. m., Washington time, on December 6 (Tr., Vol. 26, p.
4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for
the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the
"pilot message" was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 26, p.
4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, received the "pilot message" in the
evening of December 6 (Tr., Vol.
528 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30, pp. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each denies that
on December 6 he had knowledge of the "pilot message" (Tr., Vol. 21, p.
3473, and Vol. 32, p. 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles
and Colonel Bratton that the "pilot message" was delivered to General
Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 21, pp.
3589-3590, and Vol. 62, pp. 12019-12050).
In late afternoon or early evening of December 6, American Naval
Communications intercepted, decoded, and translated the first 13 parts
of this memorandum from the Japanese Government to the State Department-
the answer to the United States note to Japan on November 26. The
translation of these 13 parts was presented to President Roosevelt
between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening. After he had read the 13 parts,
the President said in substance, "This means war."
The evidence indicated that the first 13 parts were read on the evening
of December 6 by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins,
Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson,
Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton.
Owing to the practice of making decisions by war cabinets, councils,
joint committees, and individuals, official responsibility of each man
was so blurred that each man became indifferent to his own individual
responsibility. A good example of this is Admiral Turner's assumption
that so long as Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox
had seen the 13-part message, "I did not believe it was my function to
take any action." No one took action that night; all waited for the next
day. [1]
When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull
and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning at 10 a. m. (Tr.,
Vol. 56, pp. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on
Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 a. m. Sunday morning the following
information:
"Compilation of men-of-war in Far East: British, American, Japanese,
Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific
Fleet*, with locations, with a *list* of American men-of-war in the
Atlantic without locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13,988; italics inserted)."
Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted
about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that
[1] On many occasions the obligation of an officer was weakened by
intermeddling of superiors. President Roosevelt, himself, often directed
detailed operations for which field commanders were responsible. An
example of this occurred in connection with an order on December 2,
1941, which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief
of the Asiatic Fleet, commencing as follows:
"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and
within 2 days if possible after receipt this despatch" (exhibit 37, p.
39).
The President's directions were that the Commander in Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a "defensive
information patrol." The minimum requirements to establish these ships
as United States men of war would suffice in manning them. These
requirements were command by a naval officer and the mounting of a small
gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the
minimum number naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe
and report by radio Japanese movements to the West China Sea and Gulf of
Siam. The President prescribed the point at which each vessel was to be
stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one
between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques, one off Pointe De Camau
(exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the
Japanese advance down the coast of Indochina, and toward the Gulf of
Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan (Tr., Vol. 60, p.
11351) The Navy Department would not have directed it to be done unless
the President had specifically ordered it (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351)
Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by
planes from Manila (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11350). So far as the Navy
Department was concerned, sufficient information was being received from
this air reconnaissance (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11351). Had the Japanese fired
upon any one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an
overt act on the part of Japan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11352). Interferences
such as these by superior officers, however, permitted by the line of
authority, breed indifference to responsibility on the part of the
officer who is superseded.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 529
the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday,
December 7, (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13989). This was done. The compilation
showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl
Harbor (Exhibit 176, p. 2).
In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 a. m. Washington time,
the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p.
m., Washington time, was available in the Navy Department in Washington
(Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10694-10701). This was 8 1/2 hours before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have
testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30
a. m. (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4675; Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148; Vol. 55, p.
10469). This was 5 1/2 hours after it had been received in the Navy
Department. It was about 3 hours before the attack.
The relation of 1 p. m. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was
pointed out to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148, 9154-9156,
9236-9254; Vol. 26, pp. 4679, 4685). It meant dawn in Hawaii-the
strategic time at which to launch an attack. Admiral Stark was urged by
the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the fleet (Tr.,
Vol. 26, p. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the
"1 p. m. message" by 9 a. m. Washington time, immediately appreciated
its significance, but did not succeed in bringing to General Marshall's
attention until nearly several hours later (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12077-
12078, 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding in Virginia. No
action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 p. m. message
and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short
which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl
Harbor attack (Tr., Vol. 18, pp. 2935-2939, Vol. 45, p. 8396). Admiral
Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the
inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short
to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (Tr., Vol. 32, pp. 5814-5816).
Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 p. m. message at their
conference about 10:30 a. M. Washington time, December 7 (Tr., Vol. 55,
p. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the
Philippines was brought to their attention (Tr., Vol. 5, pp. 10473-
10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference
state:
"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to
Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time
back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox
and I arranged conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole
matter over. Hull very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry
and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Tr., Vol. 70, p.
14428)."
The 1 p. m. message was delivered to the White House about 10:30 m.
Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10476).
On the morning of December 7, before 8 o'clock, Navy Intelligence had
ready for high authorities of the United States Government a translation
of its intercept of the fourteenth and final part of the Japanese
memorandum.
The fact that General Marshall decided on the basis of the intercepts of
Japanese messages made available on or before 11:25 o'clock on the
morning of December 7, to send an urgent war warning to the outpost
commanders is itself evidence that, despite previous messages to outpost
commanders, Washington authorities recognized that their
530 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
knowledge of these intercepts and their minute direction of affairs
placed an obligation on them to convey precise information to outpost
commanders and to make sure that they were on an all-out alert for war.
Owing to inexcusable delays in Washington this final warning to General
Short did not reach him until after the Japanese attack.
General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk to
call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, nearly 2
hours before the attack, and give him the same information which he sent
in the delayed telegram which reached General Short after the attack.
General Marshall testified that among the possible factors which may
have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the
possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was
alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act (Tr., Vol. 20, pp.
3389-3390).
"The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such
portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were
committing an act that forced action on their part (Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3193)."
This explanation is no excuse for the failure to put the Hawaiian
commanders on the full alert for defense. Such an alert could not be
considered a hostile or aggressive act on the part of the United States.
11. *The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to
await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by
Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington
to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a
full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December
7, 1941*.
The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese
hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack or
attacks (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) was recognized by the President and
his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare war was
vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Minister Churchill,
who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Conference (conclusion
1) again suggested to President Roosevelt, on November 30, 1941, that
the President inform the Japanese that further aggression on their part
would compel him "to place the gravest issues before Congress" (Tr.,
Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roosevelt must have given serious thought to
the constitutional difficulty during the several days prior to December
7, while he was considering plans for a special message to Congress
(conclusions 3 and 4).
After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress it
then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Secretary
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of
Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warning messages to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly formulated as to mean to
them an all-out alert of the forces under their command.
12. *Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and,
operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington
differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl
Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to
formulate instructions to the latter in language not open
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 531
to misinterpretations as to the obligations imposed on the commanders by
the instructions*.
Since Washington authorities knew that vital information in their
possession-diplomatic, military, and naval-was not being sent to General
Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that this was because of Washington's own
decision, it was obligatory for them to give particular care to the
formulation of messages to the commanders which revealed the growing war
tension, the menacing imminence of the breach in American-Japanese
relations, and the resolve of those high authorities to wait for an
attack, while still carrying on maneuvering (conclusions 1-5 and below,
conclusion 20).
The increasing assumption of the detailed direction of affairs by high
authorities in Washington added to the obligation of those high
authorities to give precise instructions to the outpost commanders.
For information in possession of Washington authorities not sent to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel, see Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry reports, top secret reports, and top
secret memoranda. It is true that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had a
great deal of information as to Japanese designs and operations which
was not in the messages sent to them by the War Department and the Navy
Department. It is also true that there were differences of opinion among
high authorities in Washington over the nature of the information
conveyed by certain intercepts; for example, the so-called "winds
message" and the activating "winds message." But it is beyond all
question that Washington authorities had a large volume of information,
particularly as to vital diplomatic decisions and Japanese intentions
which was not transmitted to the Hawaiian commanders. This withholding
of information from General Short and Admiral Kimmel was in part due to
general policy adopted in Washington.
General Sherman Miles, at the hearing of November 30, testified at
neither the intercepted messages nor essential information derived from
them had been sent to Hawaii, although in exceptional cases the
substance of some messages had been transmitted in naval code. The
exceptional practice of sending the substance in some messages was
stopped in July 1941 and General Miles testified that, so far as he
knew, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not notified of this change-
this discontinuance of sending even the substance of some intercepts.
(Tr., Vol. 13, pp. 2140-2142.)
Admiral Kimmel had requested all information and was assured by Admiral
Stark he would get it. A few messages were sent up until December 7, but
he had no notice that he was not getting all the information available.
From among the numerous items of crucial information in possession of
Navy Intelligence and Washington authorities and *not* transmitted to
General Short one may be selected as particularly pertinent to Pearl
Harbor. Through its intelligence sources in the Fourteenth Naval
District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, the Navy discovered the
presence at Jaluit, in the Marshall Islands, of a Japanese fleet
composed of aircraft carriers and other vessels, but lost track of it
about December 1. Jaluit is 1,500 miles nearer to Pearl Harbor than is
the mainland of Japan. The Japanese fleet there was a strong force
capable of attacking Hawaii. Information about this
532 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese fleet was delivered to the War Department, but it was not
transmitted to General Short. General Short testified during the Army
board hearings on Pearl Harbor that knowledge of the Japanese fleet at
Jaluit would have materially modified his point of view and actions
(Army Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 146-147).
Japan had fixed a dead-line date of November 25 (Exhibit 1, p. 100),
extended to November 29 (Exhibit 1, p. 165) (see Japanese messages), for
reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at
least six messages. If the dead-line date passed without agreement, the
Japanese Government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are
automatically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the dead-
line date was stressed by Japan in these terms:
"The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days; (and
also) we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die (Exhibit
1, p. 137, 93)."
On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "dead line" date, the United
States Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note which the
intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating
proposal," impossible of acceptance (Exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted
diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture"
negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American
note of November 26 (Exhibit 1, p. 195). To prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious Japan instructed her envoys in
Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this
Japanese reply was ready for delivery (Exhibit 1,p.208).
A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent
on November 30, was intercepted and translated to the Navy in Washington
on December 1 (Exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese
Ambassador was instructed to-
"immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and confidentially communicate to them a summary of development. * * *
Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may
come quicker than anyone dreams."
The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained
a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the intercepted
messages (Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).
On December 2, 1941, elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted
dealing in precise detail with the method of interment of American and
British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the
United States" (Exhibit 1, p. 198).
None of these messages showing the imminence of war was sent to Admiral
Kimmel or General Short.
13. *The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high
authorities in Washington during November were couched in such
conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to the
commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations
with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting
the particular actions to be taken-orders that were beyond all
reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard
the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 533
On this subject the Committee has before it hundreds of pages of
testimony, exhibits, and documents in which conflicting views are
expressed by men presumably of competence and understanding as to he
sufficiency or insufficiency of the war warnings to General Short and
Admiral Kimmel. According to the obligations conferred upon the
Committee by the joint resolution creating it, as explained by Senator
Barkley in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, the Committee
is bound to weigh all messages and information available to General
Short and Admiral Kimmel.
A full review of all the testimony, exhibits, and papers relative to the
so-called war-warning messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel
would fill a volume of at least 500 pages, so we content ourselves with
presenting the following facts in respect to the conflicting, imprecise,
and insufficient character of these messages.
It should be here observed that Washington had taken unto itself such a
minute direction of affairs as regards outposts that the usual
discretion of outpost commanders was narrowly limited.
First of all, it is to be noted that the four reports by the Army and
Navy boards created to investigate Pearl Harbor found the warning
messages insufficient to put the Hawaiian commanders on a full war
alert; and the President's Commission on Pearl Harbor, while finding the
commanders guilty of dereliction of duty, itself places neglect on the
part of the War Department, in respect to such orders, as among the
contributory causes of the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor; thus qualifying
its own conclusions.
The President's Commission, though limited by his instructions to a
search for derelictions of duty and errors of judgment on the part of
the Army and Navy personnel, made a point of declaring that the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy
had fulfilled their obligations with regard to matters bearing in the
situation at Pearl Harbor and that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations had fulfilled their command responsibilities in issuing
warning messages to the two commanders.
But the Commission includes among the grounds for charging General Short
and Admiral Kimmel with dereliction of duty their failure "to consult
and confer" with each other "*respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings*." Thus the Commission in effect concedes that the war warning
messages were couched in language so imprecise that the commanders would
have to consult and confer in order to discover what the messages meant.
Having made this statement, the Commission goes on to lay some of the
blame for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe on the War Department and the
Navy Department (that is, upon Secretary Stimson. Secretary Knox, and/or
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, whom the Commission had earlier in
its report exculpated). The Commission declared that among the-
"causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive
Japanese action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures. Failure
of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-
sabotage measures instituted by the commanding General Hawaiian
Department."
Had the Commission been in a mind to do so, it might have added: Failure
of the War and Navy Departments to mention in these messages the
probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
534 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary Stimson apparently was not considering the attack at Pearl
Harbor when the message of November 27 was prepared, for he said: "The
main question has been over the message that have shall send to
MacArthur" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14422). General MacArthur, having the magic
intercepts, was in a better position to judge the situation than was
Admiral Kimmel who had to rely upon the inadequate and ambiguous
information from Washington.
Finally, it is to be noted that the Commission also places among the
"contributory causes" the "non-receipt by the interested parties, prior
to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941." As a matter
of fact the "non-receipt" of this warning message was due to inexcusable
delays of high authorities in Washington (conclusion 20).
Hence, it appears that the President's Commission, by direct statements
and by implication, admits definitely that the war-warning messages to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel were imprecise, indefinite, and
constituted no sufficient warning for an all-out alert, particularly the
messages to General Short, whose primary duty it was to defend Pearl
Harbor and protect the fleet while in the harbor.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, after a careful examination and comparison
of the war-warning messages, concluded that the messages of November 27
were "conflicting" and that the statements in the message to General
Short were "inadequate" and "misleading" (APHB, pp. 229, 129-133). The
Army Board also criticized the War Department for failure to send
"specific directives" to outpost commanders (Ibid; p. 159).
Despite its conclusion that General Short had displayed lack of
judgment, the Army Board laid against him no charge of dereliction of
duty and made no recommendations in that respect. The Navy Court of
Inquiry likewise criticized the war-warning messages for lack of
directives as to actions at Pearl Harbor (1-34) and concluded that "no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of
any person or persons in the naval service." It recommended no further
proceedings be had in the matter (1-46,1-47).
In the testimony and other evidence presented to this Committee there is
no proof that warrants traversing the judgment reached by the
President's Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or the Navy Pearl
Harbor Court to the effect that the war-warning messages were not in
fact clear and unmistakable directives for an all-out alert against a
probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The fundamental messages in
the nature of "war warnings" were those of November 24 and 27.
On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message
marked for action:
"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL.
THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND
MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT
*A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON
PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS
DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY
OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO
COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION.
GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY (Ex. No. 37, p. 32)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 535
On the next day, November 2S, Admiral Stark confused the directions in
this message and diluted its effectiveness by sending a letter to
Admiral Kimmel in which Admiral Stark concluded "I won't go into the
pros and cons of what the United States may do. I'll be damned if I
know. I wish I did." The postscript of this letter read:
"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
Have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack. From any angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I
included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I
have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.
"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for; or we may do nothing-I think it is more likely to be "anything"
(Exhibit No. 106)."
If any candid person has doubt about their insufficiency to constitute
orders for an all-out alert to meet a probable Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, he can allay his doubt by examining carefully the messages of
November 27 to General Short and Admiral Kimmel printed below in
parallel columns: [1] [but not in the ASCII version, LWJ]
To General Short*
Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated *to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable* but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit
the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense.
Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary *but these
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken*. Should
hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far
as they pertain to Japan. *Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers.
To Admiral Kimmel*
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific *have ended*. Japan is
expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or
possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of their naval task forces*. You will
execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL-46 only. [2] *Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have
been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar
warning is being sent by the War Department*. Inform naval district and
Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.
*Italics supplied.
The use of the term "war warning" in constant reference to this message
of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel creates a wrong im-
[1] In addition to the above messages General Short was sent during the
last week in November two other messages relating solely to sabotage.
Admiral Kimmel also received several messages assigning his carriers to
the movement of planes to other islands.
[2] WPL 46 was an over-all plan of action to be placed in effect by
United States forces, in association with the British and Dutch, when
war finally broke out.
536 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pression. The entire message is of the utmost importance and should be
read as a whole rather than adopt two words from it which when taken
alone create the wrong impression.
In response to the message to him, General Short soon replied that he
had alerted his command against sabotage:
"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage Liaison with the Navy.
Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh (Exhibit 32, p. 12)."
The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army, General Leonard T.
Gerow, saw General Short's reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit 46).
General Marshall saw General Short's reply, initialed the document to
which it was appended, and routed it to the Secretary of War (exhibit
46) (Tr., Vol. 22, pp. 3722-3723). The Secretary of War saw, noted, and
initialed General Short's reply (Exhibit 46).
General Marshall had in May 1941 taken with him to the President an aide
memoire concerning the defense of Hawaii. It contained the following
sentence:
"In point of sequence sabotage is first to be expected and may within a
very limited time cause great damage. On this account and in order to
assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military
control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the
Far East. (Committee Exhibit No. 59.)"
To General Short's response, the War Department made no answer whatever.
The President's Commission on Pearl Harbor took note of this failure on
the part of the War Department and placed it among the contributory
causes of the catastrophe. In their testimony before this Committee,
General Marshall and General Gerow admitted that the failure to inform
General Short immediately as to the insufficiency of his anti-sabotage
alert was a mistake on their part and General Marshall took full
responsibility upon himself for this failure (Tr., Vol. 19, pp. 3126 and
3164). Reasonably conclusive evidence that the war warning messages
which had been sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel on November 27
were insufficient to constitute a proper and adequate war warning is
provided by General Marshall's decision to send another warning message
to General Short on the morning of December 7, despite the insistence of
other high authorities in Washington that the previous messages were
sufficient.
Two points in the message of November 27 to General Short deserve
special consideration. It informed him that "the United States desires
Japan to commit the first overt act," if hostilities cannot be avoided.
And it also informed him that such measures as he deemed necessary to
adopt "should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or
disclose intent." A limitation on dissemination was to "minimum
essential officers."
As to "overt act," it is to be emphasized that an all-out alert for
defense against a possible or probable attack by an enemy is not an
overt act of war. Nor did the Government of the United States regard it
as such, for, on the basis of reports respecting a probable Japanese
attack, General Marshall, on June 17, 1940, instructed General Herron,
the Commanding General in Hawaii, to order an all-out, full, war alert
and the armed forces were set in motion immediately and kept alerted for
six weeks (testimony Tr., Vol. 17, pp. 2775 ff.). This message reads:
"Immediately alert complete defense organization to deal with possible
trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating
public hysteria
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 537
or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest
maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for
secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you
shortly. Acknowledge."
No United States official then regarded this action as an overt act
against Japan. Moreover, when in this 1940 case Washington authorities
were worried about hostile Japanese action, they ordered the commanding
general at Hawaii to an immediate "complete defense organization to deal
with possible trans-Pacific raid" in language that was crystal clear.
The fact is that the War Department and Navy Department did not instruct
General Short and Admiral Kimmel to put into effect an all-out war
alert, and the War Department was informed by General Short that he had
actually put into effect the alert against sabotage. Furthermore, the
actions of the War Department in instructing General Short in November
and December as the Army Pearl Harbor Board correctly stated, showed "a
lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department
and to control its actions" (APHB, p. 240).
The War Department failed to reply to General Short's anti-sabotage
report. It failed to give him further instructions for a stronger alert.
These failures, it is reasonable to say, contributed heavily to the
unpreparedness existing at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck.
It could reasonably follow from this failure that the Army airplanes,
instead of being scattered, were bunched together wing to wing;
ammunition, except that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, was in
storehouses; antiaircraft artillery and two combat divisions were in
their permanent quarters and not in combat positions. As the Army Pearl
Harbor Board stated:
"Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti-
sabotage alert No. 1. This made them easy targets for an air attack. In
short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air
attack, and the Japanese took full advantage of it (APHB, Report, pp.
193-94). This was known to the War Department by General Short's reply
to the message of November 27, but the Department took no action. The
President's lack of power under the Constitution to meet the Japanese
menace by an attack without a declaration of war by Congress increased
the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost
care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on full alert for
defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. This
they did not do.
14. *High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to
the evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations
which indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and
they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the
Hawaiian commanders.
Washington authorities had before them prior to December 7 conclusive
evidence that the Japanese Government and its agents were giving minute
attention to American military and naval installations, ship movements,
and preparedness in the Hawaiian area, as well as in other areas. But
despite their knowledge of this fact, those authorities failed to
emphasize, in orders to the Hawaiian commanders, the perils of an attack
on Pearl Harbor. They did worse than fail in this respect. With poor
judgment as to the effect of their own words upon the com-
538 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
manders, they went out of their way to emphasize the probability of
attack elsewhere. The following passage in the war-warning message of
November 27 from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel reflected the
loose thinking that prevailed widely in Washington:
"Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days.
An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment
of Japanese troops and by the organization of their naval forces."
These words not only displayed the apparent ignorance of Washington
authorities respecting Japanese designs on Pearl Harbor but also
gratuitously conveyed to Admiral Kimmel a false impression. Although the
message of the War Department to General Short on the same day did not
contain these misleading words, General Short, in conferring with
Admiral Kimmel on "the meaning and intent" of their messages learned
about this expectation that the Japanese attack would occur in the Far
East.
Notwithstanding their apparent ignorance of the full meaning of Japanese
movements in the Southeastern Pacific, Washington authorities knew or
should have known from their understandings of parallel action with the
British and Dutch, that a Japanese attack on the Philippines, Thai, or
the Kra Peninsula meant war with America. It also meant, in view of the
strategic principle that the flank of an advancing force must be
guarded, that Japan would not leave the strong fleet at Hawaii on its
left flank without doing something about it. This was the meaning to
Washington of the Japanese move in the Southeastern Pacific. [1] Without
having the benefit of these diplomatic understandings, it did not have
the same meaning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Testimony and documents before the Committee lend support to-in no way
traverse-the Sixteenth Conclusion of the President's Commission which
found:
"The *opinion* prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles and
in the public press," was "that any immediate attack by Japan would be
in the Far East." [ Italics supplied.]
15. *The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and
consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and
sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in
considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation,
unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in.
Washington*.
The record before this Committee is crowded with items of evidence which
sustains this conclusion.
As to delays, take for example section 13 of *Japanese Messages
Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, Etc*. [Exhibit 2].
Pages 16-29 give "messages translated after December 7,1941." Here are
messages exchanged by the Japanese Government and its agents
[1] Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in
regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are
presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most
practicable way possible. * * *
Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval
defensive forces the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily
increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along
the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-China,
are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are
the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved
by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to
Chiang Kai-shek).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 539
which were intercepted by American intelligence services before December
7, *but not translated until after December 7. Special attention should
be drawn to the message from a Japanese agent in Honolulu to Tokyo on
December 6, 1941, listing the ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor on that
day and reporting to Tokyo:
"It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet
air arm-"
a fact with which high authorities in Washington were not acquainted, if
the testimony before this Committee is accepted as accurate and
comprehensive.
One of the great tragedies was that a message sent from Honolulu to
Tokyo December 6, 1941, was not translated until December 8, 1941, after
the attack. The following appeared in the message "at the present time
there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for
a surprise attack against these places" (Exhibit 2, p. 27)
Another message intercepted and translated in the rough and available on
the desk of a responsible officer in the Naval Intelligence on the
afternoon of December 6, 1941, provided for land-sea signals at Hawaii.
These signals were intended to disclose to Japanese the location of our
ships in Pearl Harbor-apparently nothing was done about the message
either in evaluating it in Washington or transmitting it to the
commanders in Hawaii (Exhibit 2, p. 22).
As to mismanagement, non-cooperation, unpreparedness, and negligence,
the evidence cited in the following pages is sufficient (Conclusions 8,
10, and 16).
Since President Roosevelt was convinced as early as the middle of August
that a clash with Japan was a matter of a few weeks, the responsible
officers of his administration had ample time to strengthen, organize,
and consolidate the agencies in Washington, especially the Army and Navy
communication and intelligence services, in such a manner to assure the
speedy translations of intercepts, prompt distribution to the
appropriate officials, swift evaluation, and proper decisions based on
such information and evaluation. Lack of time cannot be pleaded as an
excuse for this failure, despite the difficulties involved in securing
competent and reliable specialists.
General Miles admitted at the hearing on December 3, 1945, that there
had been no meeting of the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee
between October 11 and December 8 or 9, 1941, and declared:
"I regret to say, Mr. Congressman there were still discussions and
difficulties going on between the war and Navy Departments as to just
what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what
rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetra."
There was lack of cooperation between the Army and the Navy regarding
the fourteen parts of the Japanese final message between 9:30 p. m. on
December 6 and the morning of December 7 about 10:30. The existence of
the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message, which President
Roosevelt received between 9 and 10 o'clock on Saturday evening and
interpreted as meaning war, was known more or less accidentally to
certain high Army and Navy authorities about the same time. But Admiral
Stark testified before this Committee at the hearing on January 1, 1946,
that the first thirteen parts and the di-
540 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rective for delivery to Secretary Hull at one o'clock Sunday, did not
come to his attention until late on the morning of December 7. Admiral
Stark *thought* that he went to his office between 10:30 and 11 o'clock
that morning and that as nearly as he could remember he did not see the
directive message for one o'clock delivery until about 10:40 that
morning. It was the final part of the Japanese message, and the one
o'clock directive that convinced General Marshall that war was
immediately at hand and led him to send the warning dispatch which
reached General Short after the Japanese attack.
For this non-cooperation and mismanagement, high authorities in
Washington were fully responsible. The President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General
Marshall, and Admiral Stark were all in Washington or environs. It is
true that General Marshall and Admiral Stark-when they appeared before
this Committee-could not remember where they were during the evening and
night of December 6 but they were at least accessible to officers of the
Army and Navy Departments, or should have been; hence, there was no
excuse for the failure of these high authorities to assemble on the
evening of December 6, inquire into the defensive preparedness of
outpost Commanders, and send peremptory directives to them.
The setting up of so many councils and committees, and the intermeddling
of so many men created such a state of confusion in Washington that the
high principle of *individual responsibility* was apparently lost to
sight. The result was that no one among the President's chief
subordinates was enough concerned on the night of December 6 to do
anything about the 13 parts which indicated a crucial stage in Japanese-
American relations. (See Conclusion No. 10.)
In the lower, operating echelons of the Army and Navy, on the other
hand, men seemed to see or to sense the gathering crisis and even the
immediate danger to Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet it but were
discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident in the
testimony of Captain Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section
of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on December 4, 1941, he
prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific. He tried
to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended by Admiral
Stark, Ingersoll, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discouraged from doing
so on the ground that the messages of November 24 and 27 to Admiral
Kimmel was sufficient. He protested that it was not sufficient and that
he would like to send his December 4 dispatch anyway. The dispatch he
prepared and wanted to send was never sent, and the result was tragic.
(See testimony of Captain McCollum, Tr., Vol. No. 49, p. 9132 ff.)
Finally, there is no excuse for the failure of General Marshall and
Admiral Stark to be on the alert early Sunday morning or for their
failure, after they did meet near the middle of the morning, to reach
the outpost Commanders with a definite war-warning message before the
Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor. This failure was all the more
inexcusable for the reason that some time in July 1941, the practice of
sending intercepts to General Short and Admiral Kimmel had been
abandoned.
16. *The President of the United States was responsible for the failure
to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 541
and the Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and
dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as
events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and
laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief
Executive and Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested
this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility
to the people of the United States*.
As to the power, and therefore of necessity, the responsibility of the
President in relation to the chain of events leading to the catastrophe
at Pearl Harbor, there can be no doubt. The terms of the Constitution
and the laws in this respect are clear beyond all cavil.
The Constitution vests in the President the whole and indivisible
executive power subject to provisions for the approval of appointments
and treaties by the Senate.
The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoints high officers, civil and military.
He is Chief Magistrate in all civil affairs, including those related to
the maintenance and operation of the Military and Naval Establishments.
Under the law he conducts all diplomatic negotiations on behalf the
United States, assigning to his appointee, the Secretary of State, such
duties connected therewith as he sees fit, always subject to his own
instructions and authorizations.
Under the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief of the armed
forces of the United States, and with the approval of the Senate he
appoints all high military and naval officers. He assigns them to their
duties in his discretion except in the case of the Chief Staff and Chief
of Naval Operations-these appointments must approved by the Senate.
And why did the framers of the Constitution vest these immense powers in
one magistrate-not in a directory or a single official checked by a
council, as was proposed in the Convention of 1787?
The answer to this question is to be found in No. 70 of *The
Federalist*. The purpose of establishing a single rather than a plural
executive was to assure "energy in the Executive," "a due dependence the
people," and "a due responsibility." A plural Executive, it is there
argued, "tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they
can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, *first*, the
restraints of public opinion * * *; and, *secondly*, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct persons they
trust * * *."
The acts of Congress providing for the organization, operations, powers,
and duties of the Military Establishments under the President
particularized the powers and duties of the President in relation them;
in brief, they empowered him to issue orders and instructions the civil
Secretaries and also directly to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Such are the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the
Chief Executive.
From March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt was
President and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United
States and in him was vested all Executive powers under the Constitution
and the laws.
542 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He appointed Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in 1933 and retained him
in that office during this period.
He appointed all the Secretaries of War and of the Navy during this
period.
He selected, or approved the choice of, all Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs
of Naval Operations during this period.
He selected, or approved the choice of, all the men who served as
military and naval commanders in charge of the Hawaiian area and he
assigned them to their posts of duty.
In support of the doctrine that the President is entrusted with supreme
Executive responsibility and cannot divest himself of it, we have more
recent authority. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940,
on a subject of administrative actions, President Roosevelt aid: "There
were two or three cardinal principles; and one of them is the fact that
you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the
United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is
responsible. Now that man can delegate, surely, but in the delegation he
does not delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate
responsibility that rests on him" (Public Papers, 1940 volume, p. 623).
Although there were two departments for the administration of military
and naval affairs during this period, they were both under the supreme
direction of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in
all matters relative to separate and joint planning or defense and war,
to disposition of forces and materiel, to preparedness for operation in
case of an attack. In respect of the President's power, the two
departments were one agency for over-all planning and operational
purposes.
The President had power to issue directions and orders to the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy and also directly and indirectly to
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and on occasions
used this power.
Furthermore, under the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt
had enjoyed the power, by grant of Congress, to reorganize the
Department of War and the Department of the Navy if he deemed it
necessary in the interest of efficiency and more effective cooperation
between the Departments. Since he did not reorganize the two Departments
under that act, he must have deemed them properly constructed as they
were.
By virtue of the powers vested in him the President had, during this
period, the responsibility for determining the reciprocal relations of
diplomatic decisions and war plans.
In fine, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General
Marshall, Admiral Stark, General Short, and Admiral Kimmel were all men
of President Roosevelt's own choice-not hang-over appointees from
another administration to which incompetence may be ascribed-and the
President had ample power to direct them, coordinate their activities,
and bring about a concentration of their talents and energies in the
defense of the United States.
Thus endowed with power and in full charge of diplomatic negotiations,
the President decided long before December 7, at least as early as the
Atlantic Conference in August, that war with Japan was a
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 543
matter of a few weeks or months, was so highly probable and so imminent
as to warrant a dedication of his abilities to preparation or that war.
Having decided against an appeal to Congress for a declaration of war
and having resolved that he would avoid even the appearance of an overt
act against Japan, the President chose the alternative of waiting for an
overt act by Japan-an attack on territory of the United States.
Possessing full power to prepare for meeting attack and for countering
it with the armed forces under his command, he had supreme
responsibility for making sure that the measures, plans, orders, and
dispositions necessary to that end were taken.
During the weeks and days preceding the Japanese attack on December 7,
1941, the President and his chief subordinates held many meetings,
discussed the practical certainty of an attack, and, jointly or
severally, made decisions and plans in relation to the coming of that
attack-or overt act. Yet when the Japanese attack came at Pearl Harbor
the armed forces of the United States failed to cope with the attack
effectively.
In view of all the evidence cited in support of the preceding
conclusions and more of the same kind that could be cited. This failure
cannot all be ascribed to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, nor to their
immediate superiors, civil and military. Those authorities had their
powers and corresponding responsibilities but the ultimate power and
responsibility under the Constitution and the laws were vested in the
President of the United States.
This does demonstrate the weakness of dependence on the political head
of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the
operating activities of the military branches, particularly in the areas
of intelligence. The major lesson to be learned is that this
coordination should be done in advance of a crisis.
17. *High authorities in, Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian
commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary
to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in
the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities or their failures in
this respect*.
The first part of this conclusion calls for no special citations of
authority. In reports of the President's Commission, of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and of the Navy Court of Inquiry, three points in this
respect are accepted as plain facts: (1) The ultimate power to allocate
arms, ammunition, implements of war, and other supplies was vested in
the President and his aide, Harry Hopkins, subject to the advice of
General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (2) General Short and Admiral Kimmel
made repeated demands upon their respective Departments or additional
material, which they represented as necessary to the effective defense
of Pearl Harbor; and (3) Washington authorities, having full discretion
in this regard, made decisions against General Short and Admiral Kimmel
and allocated to the Atlantic theater, where the United States was at
least nominally at peace, materiel, specially bombing and reconnaissance
planes, which were known to be absolutely indispensable to efficient
defense of Pearl Harbor. (See exhibits 106 and 53, request for
materials.)
The decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made by the President
in March 1940, over the protest of Admiral Richardson.
544 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The second part of this conclusion may be arguable from the point of
view of some high world strategy, but it is not arguable under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The President it is true had
powers and obligations under the Lease-Lend Act of March 1941. But his
first and inescapable duty under the Constitution and laws was to care
for the defense and security of the United States against a Japanese
attack, which he knew was imminent; and, in the allocations of materiel,
especially bombing and reconnaissance planes, he made or authorized
decisions which deprived the Hawaiian commanders of indispensable
materiel they could otherwise have had and thus reduced their defensive
forces to a degree known to be dangerous by high officials in Washington
and Hawaii.
When this decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made certain
definite facts in relation to such base must be presumed to have been
fully known and appreciated by the responsible command at Washington.
The base is a shallow-water bass with limited base mobility, with no
chance for concealment or camouflage and without enough air beaches to
properly park the necessary defensive air equipment. Entrance to the
base is by a narrow winding channel requiring sorties at reduced speed,
and in single file, and presenting the possibility of a blockade of the
base by an air or submarine attack on the entrance.
The base is surrounded by high land immediately adjacent to the city of
Honolulu, thereby affording full public familiarity with installations
and movements within the base at all times.
The base is located on an island where the population was heavily
Japanese, and where, as was well known, Japanese espionage was rampant,
and making it probable that any defensive insufficiency of any kind or
nature would be open to Japanese information.
All of the fuel for the base must be transported, by tanker, from the
mainland more than 2,000 miles away, thus intensifying the necessity for
complete defensive equipment and supplies for the base.
The waters about Oahu are of a depth facilitating the concealed movement
of submarines, and the near approach of submarines to the shore, thereby
favoring such methods of hostile attack.
The approaches to Oahu cover a full circle of 360 , with open sea
available on all sides.
The situation thus confronting the Pacific Fleet upon reaching its Pearl
Harbor base seems entirely clear. Before the base could be a safe base,
it must be supplied with adequate defense facilities, which facilities
must be in kind and amount in relation to the physical characteristics
of the base above referred to. An absence of adequate defensive
facilities directly increased the peril of the fleet. Since the decision
to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor was made at Washington, the
responsibility for providing proper base defense for the fleet rested
primarily upon Washington. (See Stark letter, November 22, 1940, Tr.,
Vol. 5, p. 706 ff.) It becomes important, therefore, to consider what
defensive equipment was essential to protect the Pearl Harbor base,
whether such defensive equipment was supplied, and, if not, the reasons
for such failure.
The character of the defensive equipment necessary for the defense of
the Pearl Harbor base is not seriously in dispute. The base most
essential, being located on an island, approachable from all directions,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 545
the first protective equipment necessary was a sufficient number of
long-distance patrol planes to permit proper distance reconnaissance
covering a 360 perimeter. The evidence indicates that to supply such
reconnaissance program would require approximately 200 patrol planes,
with a sufficient supply of spare parts to keep the planes in operation,
and a sufficient number of available crews to permit a continuous
patrol.
Base defense also required sufficient fighter planes to meet any attack
which might be considered possible. This would require approximately 175
planes.
The second class of essential defense equipment was a suitable number of
antiaircraft batteries with suitable and sufficient ammunition and
sufficient experienced crews for ready operation.
The third class of defense equipment were torpedo nets and baffles. It
would be necessary for a considerable portion of the fleet to be in
Pearl Harbor at all times, fueling and relaxation of men together with
ship repairs requiring the ships in the fleet to have constant recourse
to the base at more or less regular intervals. The mobility of the Pearl
Harbor base was limited, and ships using the base were in a more or less
defenseless situation except for the defense power of their own ship
batteries. The British attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, Italy,
brought the question of torpedo bomber defense to the fore. Admiral
Stark wrote on November 22, 1940-expressing fear of a "sudden attack in
Hawaiian waters" on the fleet, and asking about torpedo net protection.
(Tr., Vol. 5, p. 707.) Admiral Richardson, then in command, expressed no
anxiety about the security of the fleet, and thought torpedo nets
unnecessary, but thought security to the fleet must be carried out, even
at the expense of fleet training and extra discomfort. Approximately
four-fifths of the damage to the fleet upon the attack was the result of
torpedoes fired by torpedo-bombing planes tacking the base at low
altitudes. Against such an attack, anti-torpedo baffles and nets would
have been of extraordinary value.
The fourth class of defense equipment for the base lay in the newly
discovered device known as radar, which before December 7 had been
sufficiently perfected to permit the discovery of approaching planes
more than 100 miles away.
It seems to be agreed that it is not the duty of the fleet, ordinarily,
to furnish its own base defense. That duty is supposed to be performed
by the base defense itself, usually in the hands of the Army. The fleet,
however, is always to be expected to furnish every available defensive
effort it has, in event of an attack upon a base. The record discloses
that with full knowledge of the defense necessities inherent in the
defense of the Pearl Harbor base, and with full knowledge of the dangers
and peril imposed upon the fleet while based at the Pearl Harbor base,
and with full knowledge of the equipment essential to a proper
protection of the fleet at such base, it was decided by President
Roosevelt to remove the fleet from the mainland bases and base it at
Pearl Harbor.
The record discloses that from the time the fleet arrived at Pearl
Harbor until the attack on December 7, the high command at Hawaii, both
in the Army and the Navy, frequently advised the military authorities at
Washington of the particular defense equipment needs at the Pearl Harbor
base (Exhibits 53 and 106). Nowhere in the record
546 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
does any dissent appear as to the reasonableness, or the propriety, of
the requests for defense equipment made by the high command in Hawaii.
On the contrary, the necessity for such equipment was expressly
recognized and the only explanation given for a failure to provide the
equipment was that by reason of unavoidable shortages, the requested
defense equipment at Hawaii could not be supplied.
It was asserted that more equipment had been provided for Hawaii than
for any other base, and this is probably correct. The trouble with such
an explanation is that Hawaii was the only non-mainland base charged
with the defense of a major part of our Pacific Fleet, and the equipment
supplied to Hawaii was admittedly insufficient. The Philippines received
much equipment which might well have gone to Hawaii, because Hawaii
could have been defended, whereas no one expected the Philippines to be
able to stand a direct Japanese onslaught. General Marshall reported to
the President in March 1941 (Exhibit 59) that "Oahu was believed to be
the strongest fortress in the world" and practically invulnerable to
attack and that sabotage was considered the first danger and might cause
great damage.
The Government made the Atlantic theater the primary theater and the
Pacific theater a secondary and a defense theater. We raise no issue as
to the propriety of such decision, but we cannot fail to point out that
such decision resulted in the failure of the military authorities in
Washington to supply the Pearl Harbor base with military defense
equipment which everyone agreed was essential and necessary for the
defense of the base and the fleet while in the base. As we have said,
such a more or less defenseless condition imposed increased peril upon
the Pacific Fleet, so long as it was based at Pearl Harbor. We are
forced to conclude, therefore, that in view of the obligations assumed
by the Government in other military theaters, and to which we have just
referred, and the consequent inability of the Government to properly
contribute to the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, that the only
alternative left which might have relieved the fleet from the resultant
peril would have been to have changed the original decision to base the
fleet at Pearl Harbor, and *thereupon return the fleet to its several
mainland bases*. It appears obvious that the safety of the fleet would
have been helped by such removal. The perimeter of a defense at a
mainland base would only be 180 instead of 360 , thus permitting
distant patrol reconnaissance by one-half as many planes. The
transportation and supply facilities to the mainland base would be
immensely improved, as would all necessary communication facilities. The
mobility of the fleet at a mainland base would have been improved and
the concentration of the fleet in a single limited base would have been
avoided. *We therefore are of the opinion that the fleet should not have
been based at Pearl Harbor unless proper base defenses were assured*.
Since no such change in policy was approved, and the fleet remained
based at Pearl Harbor without the necessary defense equipment to which
we have referred-plus the fact that the precise status of the defense
weakness must be assumed to have been open to the unusual Japanese
espionage operating in Hawaii, and therefore that the Tokyo war office
must be assumed to have been cognizant of the status of affairs at Pearl
Harbor, we are forced to conclude that the failure to remove the fleet
from Pearl Harbor to the mainland must be viewed
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 547
as an important relevant factor necessarily involved in the success of
the Japanese attack on December 7.
The record discloses that the Army and Navy had available, between
February 1 and December 1, 1941, an abundance of long-distance patrol
planes suitable for reconnaissance purposes. Exhibit 172 shows that the
Army received between February 1 and December 1, 1941, approximately 600
long-distance bombers capable of flying loaded, missions, of 1,200 miles
or more. Of these 12 went to Hawaii and 35 went to the Philippines.
During the same period the Navy received approximately 560 similar long-
distance bombers, of which approximately 175 were assigned to carriers
in the Pacific. During the same period the Army received approximately
5,500 antiaircraft guns, of which 7 went to Hawaii and 100 to the
Philippines. If it be true that it was found necessary to send this
equipment elsewhere, as we assume, still it would seem that Hawaii
instead of having high priority, occupied a subordinate position.
We have referred to the unavoidable vulnerabilities of the Pearl Harbor
base, together with the identification of the essential defense
equipment necessary for its proper defense. We likewise noted the
demands made by the high command at Hawaii for such equipment, the
agreement that such equipment was proper and necessary, and the
continued and increased peril imposed upon the fleet by the failure to
provide such equipment.
It seems proper here to note the extent to which the Pearl Harbor base
was deprived of needed and essential equipment.
(1) We have pointed out that the perimeter of Oahu defense covered 360 .
Full defense reconnaissance would likewise be required for the full
360 . The evidence discloses that it would take approximately 200 patrol
planes to furnish such reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance would require
flights of not less than 750 miles from Oahu. The evidence shows that
the wear and tear upon patrol planes engaged in such distant operations
would be heavy, that a certain proportion of available planes would have
to be under repair and adjustment, and that only about one-third of the
assigned planes would be available for a particular day's patrol. In a
similar way, in connection with the overhaul and repair of planes, a
proper store of repair parts would be essential and of even greater
importance, spare crews for the operation of the planes would be
required, since the same crew could not fly such patrol missions daily.
The record seems to establish that there were available at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, approximately 85 patrol planes suitable for distant
patrol, of which not to exceed 55 were in operable condition. The supply
of spare parts was not ample, nor were there sufficient extra crews for
a continuous operation.
With reference to fighter planes, the situation was not so acute. An
estimate appears in the record that 185 fighter planes would be
necessary to defend the base, and there were, on December 7, 105
available fighter planes, which, if properly alerted, would have been
available for base defense.
The fleet itself had been depleted by assignments to the Atlantic
theater, and the man supply for plane service had likewise been used as
a reservoir from which to supply reserve demands for that theater.
548 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We agree that Admiral Kimmel was faced with a sharp dilemma. He was the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Under WPL-46 he was given
specific duties which required him to have his fleet ready for action
promptly upon the breaking out of war. He had available 50 or 60 patrol
planes, and he would need these planes in aid of fleet movements if his
fleet was to take the offensive against the enemy. If he used these
patrol planes for base defense, such heavy duty would reduce their
efficiency and ultimately put them up for repair in event the distance
patrol duty should cover an extended period. In such an event his fleet
could not sail against the enemy as required by WPL-46 because his
patrol planes would be out of commission. He had therefore to make a
choice between fleet training and preparation and base defense. He says
his decision not to carry on distant reconnaissance was based upon his
belief, in common with his staff, that Pearl Harbor was not in danger
from a Japanese attack. We think in making such a decision Admiral
Kimmel was unjustified in concluding, first, that there was no danger of
attack at Pearl Harbor, and, second, that such a decision did not
violate the fundamental proposition that no disposition should be taken
which unnecessarily increased fleet peril. The absence of distant
reconnaissance immediately imperiled fleet safety. We therefore think
the abandonment of distance reconnaissance was unjustified.
(2) The fuel reserves were insufficient, limiting full use of the fleet
at sea, required constant augmentation from the mainland, and the
location of such fuel supplies was such as to make them vulnerable to
any raiding attack. The fleet was required to come into the base at
frequent intervals to refuel. The facilities at the base made such
refueling slow. The fleet was without a sufficient supply of fast
tankers to permit refueling at sea, and there was ever present the
inescapable fact that a destruction of the fuel supply would necessarily
immobilize the entire fleet.
(3) It is difficult to reach a conclusion with respect to the
sufficiency of the antiaircraft batteries and supplies available at
Pearl Harbor on December 7. General Short testified as to the number of
guns available on December 7, 1941, as compared with the number
available in December 1942. It is apparent that the antiaircraft gun
equipment had been much augmented during the year following the Pearl
Harbor attack. The difficulty we have with respect to the antiaircraft
batteries situation, as with the available force of fighter planes, is
that practically none of these guns were alerted on December 7, and
ammunition was not readily available, the crews serving them were not in
attendance, and the only seeming excuse for such conditions was the
common belief that there was no danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor and
therefore no reason for any battery alert. Even if there had been twice
as many batteries (or fighter planes) available, there is no reason to
believe the condition of alert would have been different.
The ships in the harbor were not provided with proper torpedo
protection. The letter of June 13, 1941, with respect to the use of
aerial torpedoes, seems to demonstrate the responsibility of the high
command at Washington to provide a torpedo defense. Such a defense was
well known and could have been provided and, if provided,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 549
might have obviated the greatest source of damage suffered by the fleet
during the raid, even though Admiral Richardson in 1940 thought such
defense unnecessary. But it could not have been provided at Hawaii; it
had to come from Washington. Washington's advices on the subject did
more harm than good, because they intimated that an attack was possible
even in shallow water, but at the same time, negatived the probability
of attack. (See letter of June 13, 1941, Ex. No. 116, letter from Chief
of Naval Operations (R. E. Ingersoll) to the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, among others.)
The installation of the radar in Hawaii was inexcusably delayed. It was
a method of defense peculiarly essential in Hawaii. It was known that
there were insufficient planes and insufficient guns to protect the
base, and this made the availability of radar all the more necessary. It
seems we could have priority for radar protection in New York and other
mainland points, where no attack was probable; but none in Hawaii, where
radar information was essential. The result was that fixed radio
installations were not accomplished at all prior to the Pearl Harbor
attack, and such fixed installations would have furnished the most
distant services. The mobile sets available had, by reason of the delay,
been operating only on a short experimental basis. There was a scarcity
of trained operators. The operators were trying to learn and operate at
the same time. The selected hours of operation, which proved of vast
importance, were not wisely fixed. Service stopped at 7 a. m., the very
time when the danger was acute.
No suitable information center had been established, and it is conceded
that such a center was essential to radar information. This was
particularly true at Hawaii, because radar had not yet been developed
the point where the nationality of approaching planes could be
ascertained. The information as to whether approaching planes were,
therefore, friendly or enemy, depended upon the constant presence at an
information center of representatives of the military services who could
instantly advise as to location of friendly planes. No such information
center was established, and no assignment of trained operators to such
stations was ever made. Thus, there was no one on duty who could have
known whether the approaching planes were enemy planes, or, instead, our
own B-17's, en route from the mainland.
The lack of material does not appear to be the fault of a failure of
appropriations by Congress to the Army and Navy. A table showing these
appropriations as requested by the President in his budget estimates and
as finally passed by Congress follows:
[Pages 550, 551, and 552 are tables. They have been uploaded as
separate, zipped, .tif files, as 550.zip, 551.zip, and 552.zip]
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 553
The fatal error of Washington authorities in this matter was to
undertake a world campaign and world responsibilities without first
making provision for the security of the United States, which was their
prime constitutional obligation.
18. *Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and
whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for a Japanese
attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military
administration requires taking note of the fact that they were
designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington-all of whom
were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of
subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed
forces of the United States*.
This conclusion is self-evident, especially in view of all that goes
before, and needs no comment.
19. *The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its
intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence
information, direction of affairs, and constitutional duty to plan the
defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the
commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet
essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do
those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost.
Washington authorities failed in (1) and the commanding officers of
Hawaii failed in (2)*.
In the discharge of these responsibilities neither the high authorities
in Washington nor the commanders in Hawaii acted upon the assumption or
belief that Hawaii could or would be the point of any hostile attack.
Therefore, in discharging their respective responsibilities neither the
Washington authorities nor the field commanders interpreted those
responsibilities in the terms of danger to Hawaii. Many of the failures
of performance can be attributed to this cardinal fact. The question
presented to this committee is: "Were they justified in such an
assumption or belief ?" And the answer is emphatically, "No."
Evidence set forth in this report in detail is ample to show that in the
period approximately from May 1940 to December 7, 1941, the high
authorities at Washington assumed so much of the direction of affairs at
Hawaii as to remove many of the basic responsibilities from the
commanders in the field. The result was to reduce the discretion of the
commanders in the field by those things which they were ordered to do by
directions from Washington and not to do certain things unless they were
so ordered from Washington. Another result of this practice was to lull
the commanders in the field into awaiting instructions from Washington.
Being charged with the responsibility attaching to the highest command
in Washington and having taken so much of the responsibility and
direction of affairs away from the commanders in the field, the high
authorities in Washington themselves failed in the performance of their
responsibilities, as the evidence in the conclusions of this report
clearly shows.
Nevertheless the commanders in the field were left with sufficient
responsibility which they were under obligation to discharge as field
commanders of the major outpost in the Pacific defense of the United
554 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
States. There is adequate and sufficient evidence to show that they
failed to discharge that responsibility.
While great emphasis and analysis has been made of such warning messages
sent to Admiral Kimmel as those of November 24, 1941 November 27,1941,
and November 28, 1941 (see Conclusion No. 13), attention should be
directed to many other messages reflecting the nature of the diplomatic
and naval relations between Japan and the United States immediately
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Among these is the message of December 3, 1941, sent from the Washington
Office of Naval Operations for action to Admiral Kimmel. This message
informed him that Japanese diplomatic posts at Hongkong, Singapore,
Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been instructed "to destroy
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn confidential and
secret documents". A second message on the same day sent from Washington
to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet and marked as information to
Admiral Kimmel gave further data on destruction of code machines and
secret documents at various places including "all but one copy of other
systems" at Washington.
On December 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was informed by
Washington Naval Operations that Guam was to destroy all secret and
confidential publications, retaining only minimum secret code channels
for essential communications and was to be ready instantly to destroy
all classified matter retained.
While none of these messages placed Hawaii at the prime center of
danger, they certainly reflected the last critical stages in diplomatic
relations. It is well known in diplomatic and military circles that
destruction of codes, code machines, and secret documents is usually the
last step before breaking off relations between governments. War does
not necessarily have to follow, but it may follow either simultaneously
or close on the heels of the destruction of codes. Other messages and
events, supplemented by daily reports of the crisis in Honolulu
newspapers, should have raised the significance of the information in
the hands of Admiral Kimmel. Yet he testified that he "didn't consider
that of any vital importance." (Tr. Vol. 39, p. 7477.)
General Short did not receive copies of these messages sent from
Washington Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel regarding the destruction
of codes. Admiral Kimmel had the express responsibility, as part of his
duty to effect liaison with General Short, to communicate this vital
information to General Short. He failed to do so.
Admiral Kimmel should have been aware of the meaning of code destruction
and of the Japanese reputation for surprise action. He should have been
vigilant. He owed this to his position as commander of the fleet which
was closely related to the scene of expected hostilities.
Admiral Kimmel failed in the performance of this obligation.
While General Short did not receive the information from Admiral Kimmel
that the Japanese were destroying codes and secret papers, he did have
partial notice about these developments. At a staff conference on the
morning of December 6, in the presence of the Chief of Staff for General
Short, Col. George W. Bicknell had reported that Japanese consuls were
burning their papers (Exhibit 148). General Fielder testified that he
was present at the staff conference and informed General Short that the
Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers (Exhibit
148).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 555
Before the Roberts Commission General Short testified that he did not
know that these consular records were being burned (Roberts Commission
Record, p. 1620). Later, before our Joint Committee, he corrected this
earlier testimony to say that he had been advised on the morning of
December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers (Tr. Vol. 45,
pp. 8398, 8399). The evidence on this point is not decisive and it is
certainly an open question, not determined by the testimony, whether he
also knew that the codes were being destroyed.
The evidence as to General Short's knowledge of the burning of papers
and the destruction of codes is therefore much less clear and precise
than in the ease of Admiral Kimmel. As a contributing fact or in the
circumstances bearing upon General Short's failure to be prepared to
meet the Japanese attack, this evidence must be discounted.
The contribution of the Hawaiian commanders to the Pearl Harbor disaster
was the failure of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures
designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect state of
readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at and, and to
employ every facility at their command in preparing for the Japanese
attack, even though these facilities were inadequate. The attack came as
an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic surprise to the commanders
at Hawaii. They realized that air attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at
least a possibility. Specifically, they failed-
(a) To appreciate fully the character of their responsibilities as
commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and Commander in Chief of
the Pacific Fleet, even though such warnings as they had received from
Washington had been inadequate. They failed to carry out the principle
of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and tighten
up their defenses.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each with the
operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security and
to exchange fully all significant intelligence.
(d) To institute reconnaissance with such limited forces at their
disposal on a basis expected to detect an attack from without
(e) Their radar was in an experimental stage and vital information
revealed by it was improperly evaluated; their planes were grouped wing
to wing on the field; a large number of officers and men were not at
their posts; their ammunition was not immediately at hand for action.
(f) To effect a state of readiness throughout their commands consonant
with the character of the warnings sent them and designed to meet an
attack from without.
(g) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command,
which, although limited, were adequate at least to minimize the force of
the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence available at Hawaii
affecting the performance of their duties as outpost commanders.
(h) The significance of Japanese submarines sighted early on the morning
of December 6, was not properly weighed and information
556 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
about such submarines was not diligently transmitted to responsible,
authorities for action.
The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular responsibility for
the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. This
responsibility they failed to discharge. The failure of the Washington
authorities to perform their responsibilities provides extenuating
circumstances for the failures of these commanders in the field.
These failures in Washington were:
(a) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short adequate information of diplomatic negotiations and of
intercepted diplomatic intelligence which, if communicated to them,
would have informed them of the imminent menace of a Japanese attack in
time for them to fully alert and prepare the defense of Pearl Harbor.
(b) High Washington authorities did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short such vital intercepted Japanese intelligence
information as the "bomb plot" messages and the "dead-line messages"
which, if so communicated, would have served as specific warnings of
impending hostile attack. In particular, the "bomb plot" messages
directly concerned the safety of the fleet and security of the naval
base at Pearl Harbor (and at no other place) and if communicated to the
Hawaiian commanders would have informed them of specific Japanese
designs affecting Pearl Harbor in time for them to alert and prepare
their defense.
(c) By conflicting and imprecise messages and orders high Washington
authorities created such a condition of confusion relative to what the
Hawaiian commanders were to do and were not to do about alerting and
preparing for defense at Pearl Harbor, as to remove from such commanders
that clear responsibility which would have otherwise attached to them by
reason of their positions.
(d) High Washington authorities positively misled the commanders at
Hawaii by indicating in messages sent to Hawaii the probability that
Japanese hostile actions were likely to take place at points in the
Southwestern Pacific without mentioning the danger of attack at Hawaii.
From their superior information of Japanese designs and intentions the
high Washington authorities were in a better position to evaluate
Japanese actions than were the Hawaiian commanders. Having directed the
attention of the Hawaiian commanders to probable Japanese action at
points other than Pearl Harbor, the high Washington authorities misled
the Hawaiian commanders and so contributed to their unpreparedness in
the defense of Pearl Harbor.
(e) High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed
direction of affairs respecting operations of the Pacific Fleet and of
the Hawaiian naval base as to limit narrowly the discretion and freedom
allowed to the Hawaiian commanders. Having thus weakened the individual
obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and having failed correspondingly
to provide them with clear and adequate orders, high Washington
authorities reduced the responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders in the
defense of Pearl Harbor.
(f) Having failed to provide the Hawaiian commanders with sufficient,
adequate, and appropriate materiel and equipment for the defense of
Hawaii, high Washington authorities compelled the Hawaiian commanders to
make choices of action jeopardizing their defense
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 557
which they would not have made on their own responsibility had they had
the needed materiel and equipment; and this failure in Washington was a
strong factor in the failure of the defense at Hawaii.
(g) The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further reduced by
explicit orders from Washington not to do anything to alarm the civil
population and that the high authorities in Washington: desired Japan to
commit the first overt act.
(h) Having assumed so much of the detailed direction of affairs relating
to Hawaiian defense, Washington authorities had the obligation to
correct all wrongful decisions at Hawaii which had been made in response
to Washington orders. A crucial decision of this kind was made by
General Short when he alerted his command only against sabotage in
response to orders in the message of November 27, 1941. With superior
knowledge of impending danger and having the immediate obligation to
correct General Short's error of judgment, Washington authorities,
particularly Gen. George C. Marshall and Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, did not
do so but permitted General Short to assume that he had done all that
had been required of him. This error, as later proved, left the defenses
at Hawaii particularly vulnerable to external attack.
(i) In the critical hours from the afternoon of December 6 to 10:30 a.
m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the instant
action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese messages on
those days which would have placed the Hawaiian commanders on the
specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii.
The conclusion that "everybody" in the chain of authority "from the
higher officials here in Washington down through the lieutenant who
disregarded the radar message at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning,
December 7, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them," was
expressed by Representative Clark in the form of a question put to
Admiral Kimmel (Tr., Vol. 39, p. 7331). Admiral Kimmel replied: "I think
you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me." Mr. Clark then
said "That is all I have, Mr. Chairman."
The word "muffed" is colloquial and rhetorical, not precisely
descriptive; and the word "situation" is as vague as it is general. But
Representative Clark's idea translated into plain English fairly
describes events and actions from November 25 to December T. "Everybody
from the higher officials here in Washington down through the
lieutenant" at Pearl Harbor failed to take many actions that in the very
nature of things were to be expected of him, failed to discharge
obligations necessarily attached to his office, and must bear a share of
the responsibility for the catastrophe according to the extent of his
powers and duties.
In extenuation of failures on the part of high authorities in Washington
two statements were often made by witnesses who appeared before the
Committee. First, it is easy to see *now* the mistakes and failures made
by high authorities but this is merely "hindsight." Second, those high
authorities were busy men carrying heavy burdens in their respective
offices-burdens so heavy that many failures on their part must be
excused.
Undoubtedly, hindsight is often easier and better than foresight. But
the exercise of prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in
his possession is a bounden duty imposed on every high authority
458 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the Government of the United States by the powers and obligations of
his office. For every failure to exercise prudence and foresight with
reference to knowledge in his possession he must bear a corresponding
burden of responsibility for the consequences that flow from that
failure. By virtue of his office he is presumed to have special
competence and knowledge; to act upon his special knowledge, and to be
informed and alert in the discharge of his duties in the situation
before him.
The introduction of hindsight in extenuation of responsibility is,
therefore, irrelevant to the determination of responsibility for the
catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.
The question before this Committee is: What did high authorities in
Washington know about Japanese designs and intentions; what decisions
did they make on the basis of their knowledge; and what actions did they
take to safeguard the security of the American outposts?
With regard to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they were certainly
carrying heavy burdens in preparing the armed forces of the United
States for war; in making war plans; in building up an Army and Navy
(which they knew were not yet ready for war), and in struggling for a
postponement of the war until the Army and Navy were better prepared to
cope with the foe. With regard to the President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, it may be said
Justly that they were carrying heavy burdens also. But all these
officials, as Secretary Stimson's diary demonstrates, spent many days
before December 7 in general discussions which led to no decisions. This
they did at a time when they possessed special knowledge of Japanese
designs and were acquainted with their own intentions and resolves and
certainly had the leisure to do the one obvious duty dictated by common
sense-that is-draw up a brief plan for telling the outpost commanders
just what to do in a certain contingency on receipt of orders from
Washington.
That contingency was a Japanese attack on American possessions
somewhere. Secretary Stimson records that "the question (during those
days) was how we (the President, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson,
Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark) should maneuver
them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot without
allowing too much damage to ourselves." In any event, inasmuch as the
President decided against appealing to Congress for a declaration of war
on Japan, they were all waiting for the Japanese to fire the first shot!
And in those circumstances it was their duty to prepare definite plans
and procedures for action in meeting that attack.
This is exactly what they did not do at any time before December 7. They
had plans for action or actions by the armed forces of the United States
*if* Congress declared war or *if* by some process the United States got
into or entered the war. War plans (for example, Rainbow No. 5 which was
WPL-6) were to go into operation only after war had begun and were not
intended for preparation in meeting surprise attack.
They prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions about
the measures they were to take in preparing for and meeting a Japanese
attack on American possessions when and if it came. This plan could have
been drawn up in a few hours at most and set down
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 559
in two or three typewritten pages at most. With modifications
appropriate to the various outposts this plan could have been sent to
the respective commanders by couriers or swifter means of communication.
And a procedure could have been adopted for instructing the commanders
by one word in code, or a few words, to put plans for meeting Japanese
attack into effect. No such plan was drawn up or at all events no such
plan was sent to the commanders. No procedure for giving them the code
word or words for action under any plan or procedure was ever adopted by
the authorities in Washington whose official duty it was to prepare,
with all the resources at their command, for meeting the Japanese attack
which they privately recognized as an imminent menace.
Of particular infractions of duty in Washington, which were numerous and
are written large in the evidence before the Committee, a few
illustrations may be given in summary form:
Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull were in a substantial measure
responsible for the confusion that resulted in equivocal form of the so-
called warning message to General Short on November 27.
Secretary Stimson called up Secretary Hull early in the morning of
November 27 and Secretary Hull declared positively:
"I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and
Knox-the Army and the Navy."
Secretary Stimson then called up President Roosevelt and the President
gave him "a little different view." But from the President, that day,
Secretary Stimson got the President's approval-
"that we should send the final alert namely that he (General Short along
with other Commanders) should be on the qui vive for any attack."
Secretary Stimson and General Gerow started the draft of the warning
message with the words: "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated."
Secretary Stimson, after a conversation with Secretary Hull over the
telephone, altered this definite statement to read:
"Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
*might* come back to continue,"
thus introducing confusion into a sentence of crucial importance.
(Stimson, Diary: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, pp. 120 ff.)
General Marshall and General Gerow admitted to the Committee that they
made a mistake in failing to reply to General Short's report to the War
Department on November 27, that he put into effect the alert against
sabotage. This reply referred to the message of November 27 by number so
there could be no mistake as to what it answered. It was in reply to the
words of the message to Short on November 27 and the words "report
measures taken." They also assumed full responsibility for that mistake
(Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3126-3164).
General Marshall could not recall that he had made, after November 27,
any inquiries as to the measures taken by General Short in Hawaii (Tr.,
Vol. 17, p. 2905). In other words, he apparently had no information
about the steps taken for the defense of Pearl Harbor during the ten
critical days of mounting war tension, when Washington authorities were,
through intercepts of Japanese messages, becoming increasingly certain
about Japan's steps toward war, except General Short was alerted to
sabotage and had liaison with the Navy. Alerted
560 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to sabotage meant the planes were bunched on the field and in no
position to take to the air quickly.
Responsible officers in the War Department told the Committee they
failed to reach General Marshall after the receipt of the first thirteen
parts of the Japanese memorandum had been intercepted late in the
afternoon of December 6. General Marshall testified that he had an
orderly at his home to receive calls when he was away at night and hence
he could have been reached (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2941). He also testified
that he was unaware of any effort to locate him at his home or elsewhere
by messenger or telephone during the evening of December 6-or the
morning of December 7-until he was taking his shower after a ride in the
park.
Secretary Stimson interfered with efforts of General Marshall and
General Gerow to postpone the breach with Japan until the Army and Navy
were ready to meet a Japanese attack with better prospects of success.
The Secretary insisted that in asking for the delay no recommendation
should be made to the President advising a reopening of conversations
with the Japanese representatives. In fact, conversations had not been
formally closed on November 26 (Tr., Vol. 20, p. 3325; Vol. 22, p. 3668-
69).
Secretary Hull made "several general statements" to General Marshall on
diplomatic matters but did not read to him or give him a copy of the
November 26 memorandum to Japan in advance of delivery (Tr., Vol. 19, p.
3076). Secretary Hull gave confused and conflicting statements to
Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark
and, so far as the evidence before the Committee goes, Secretary Hull
did not at any time tell them definitely that relations with Japan were
ipso facto ruptured, as he had learned from intercepted Japanese
messages. In other words, Secretary Hull's words and actions during the
last few weeks of tension added to the uncertainty that reigned in the
War and Navy Departments. Despite all his conferences with
representatives of the two Departments, he went ahead changing his plans
and notions without giving them information respecting his crucial
decisions.
It was with sufficient reason that Admiral Stark, on November 2S, wrote
a letter to Admiral Kimmel, saying:
"I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I know is that we
may do most anything, and that the only thing to be prepared for; or we
may do nothing-I think it more likely to be anything (Tr., Vol. 36, p.
6713)."
This letter reached Admiral Kimmel on December 3, adding to the
confusion already created by the war-warning message of November 27.
This message to Admiral Kimmel differed in one respect from the message
sent by the War Department to General Short: it stated definitely that
"the negotiations with Japan * * * have ended." But not content with
that, the Navy Department, two days later, sent to Admiral Kimmel
another dispatch quoting the War Department's message to General Short
as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated with only the barest
possibility of resumption (Tr., Vol. 36, p. 6729)."
After stating in its message of November 27 that "Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days," the Navy De-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 561
partment immediately added: "An amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is possibly
indicated * * *." Since there was not a line in the message about a
possible expedition against Hawaii, these words, according to legal and
common-sense usage, warranted Admiral Kimmel in concluding that an
attack on Pearl Harbor was not expected by the Navy Department and that
he was not to expect such an attack.
In explaining to Representative Keefe how he expected Admiral Kimmel to
expect an attack on Pearl Harbor in view of the fact that the Navy
Department's message mentioned only points in the Far East as possible
points of attack, Admiral Stark gave probably the best explanation
available to him:
"That is true, but the attack we envisaged down there we stated that the
makeup and so forth of this amphibious expedition (in the Far East), not
a raiding force or a carrier force, but an amphibious expedition and the
points of that amphibious expedition might be so and so. There was no
question, there had not been in my mind at any time, of an amphibious
expedition against the Hawaiian Island * * * (Tr., Vol. 35, p. 6521)."
Of the many instances showing failures of Washington authorities to
cooperate and keep one another duly informed when such acts of duty were
vital to the interests of the United States, none was more fateful than
actions on the so-called modus vivendi proposed by Japan on November 20,
1941.
Item 1 of the Japanese proposal read:
"Both the Governments of Japan and the United states undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
and Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where
Japanese troops are stationed."
Item 2 read:
"The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan
and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific
area."
Wholly apart from the merits or demerits of these and other items in the
Japanese proposal of November 20, here was an opportunity at least to
prolong "the breathing spell" for which General Marshall and Admiral
Stark were pleading in their efforts to strengthen the armed forces of
the United States for war. On November 5, General Marshall and Admiral
Stark presented a strong plea to the President begging for time in which
to make the Army and Navy ready for war. While the Japanese proposal for
a modus vivendi was under consideration by the President and Secretary
Hull, General Marshall and Admiral Stark prepared another plea for the
postponement of the breach with Japan so that the Army and Navy could be
made stronger in striking or defensive power. They did not ask for any
surrender of American principles; they merely called for delay.
The Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi offered an opportunity to stop
for a few weeks the advance of Japanese armed forces into the
Southeastern and Southern area-the advance which, according to American
war plans, made in cooperation with British and Dutch officers, provided
for American action against Japan or American participation in a war
against Japan. It is true that President Roosevelt had not committed the
United States officially to these plans but, according to the testimony
of Admiral Stark, "the President except officially, approved of" the
basic principles of these plans. (Tr., Vol.
562 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
35, pp. 6370-72.) American official War Plan WPL-46 was based on them.
Whether written in binding agreements or not, American, British, and
Dutch authorities acted in concert just as if binding pacts had been
made. The Japanese, as Washington clearly learned from the intercepts,
also acted upon the assumption that American, British, and Dutch
agreements for concerted action existed.
President Roosevelt evidently deemed it both feasible and desirable to
reach some kind of modus vivendi with Japan with a view to a possible
settlement in general or in any event a prolongation of negotiations
with Japan until American armed forces were better prepared for war.
Proof of this was found in a penciled memorandum written by the
President for the Secretary of State "not dated but probably written
shortly after November 20, 1941," that is, after the receipt of the
Japanese proposal (Exhibit 18).
President Roosevelt's memorandum for Secretary Hull with regard to the
possible terms of the modus vivendi with Japan read:
"6 MONTHS
"1. U. S. to resume economic relations-some oil and rice now-more later.
"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or
any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
"3. Japan not to invoke tripartite pact even if the U. S. gets into
European war.
"4. U. S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to
take no part in their conversation.
* * * * * * *
"Later in Pacific agreements."
Besides the President's instructions or suggestions, Secretary Hull had
before him the "outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the
United States and Japan," which had been carefully prepared by Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Henry Morgenthau's "outline"
with a covering note, dated November 19, 1941, was presented to
Secretary Hull, initialled M. M. H. (Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs). The covering note informed Secretary
Hull that all the senior officers of the Division concurred with Mr.
Hamilton in the view that "the proposal is the most constructive one I
have seen." Mr. Hamilton urged Secretary Hull to give most careful
consideration to the proposal promptly, and suggested that the Secretary
make copies of the proposed "outline" available to Admiral Stark and
General Marshall and arrange to confer with them as soon as they had had
an opportunity to examine the "outline" (Exhibits 18; 168).
With the President's instructions or suggestions and Secretary
Morgenthau's "outline" before him, Secretary Hull considered the terms
of a possible agreement with Japan as the basis of a general settlement
or an indefinite continuation of negotiations in connection with the
Japanese proposal for a modus vivendi. This is no place to give a fifty-
page summary of the record of the events connected with Secretary Hull's
operations. Nor is it necessary to discuss the merits of the case. But
the following recital of facts illustrates the confusion and lack of
cooperation that prevailed in Administration circles.
Secretary Hull drafted a memorandum for at least a kind of truce with
Japan.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 563
Secretary Hull discussed his proposals with British, Dutch, and
Australian representatives in Washington.
Secretary Hull had a conference on the proposals with Secretary Stimson
and Secretary Knox at his office on November 25. Of this conference
Secretary Stimson noted in his Diary:
"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was
going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately
safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but I don't think
there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so
drastic. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14417)."
The next day, November 26, Secretary Hull told Secretary Stimson over
the telephone that he had about made up his mind not to give the
proposal for the three months' truce to the Japanese but "to kick the
whole thing over." Under pressure coming from Chiang Kai-shek, Winston
Churchill and others, relative to the modus vivendi Secretary Hull
refrained from making an independent decision on this important step and
it appears he was led to decide it without thought of the military
capacities necessary to back up our diplomatic position. On that day,
November 26, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt,
kicked the whole thing over and sent to the Japanese the now famous
memorandum which Japan treated as an ultimatum. In taking this action
Secretary Hull gave no advance notice to General Marshall and Admiral
Stark, who were then preparing their second careful memorandum to the
President begging for a postponement of war with Japan until the Army
and Navy could make better preparation for waging it. Moreover, it
should be noted that Secretary Hull did not give to the British and
Australian representatives any advance information about his sudden
decision "to kick the whole thing over."
When Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, made this
decision on November 26 and handed his memorandum to the Japanese
ambassadors on November 26, he was practically certain that the Japanese
government would reject his proposals and that a break in relations
would be a highly probable consequence of his action.
For this statement there is sufficient evidence from Secretary Hull
himself. In his account of the meeting with the Japanese
representatives, when he presented the memorandum to them, Secretary
Hull reported that, after reading the document, Mr. Kurusu said "that
when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese
Government, that Government would be likely to 'throw up its hands';
that this response to the Japanese proposal (the so-called modus vivendi
proposal from Tokyo) could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of
the negotiations." So certain was Secretary Hull of the coming breach
that, according to his account, he declared on November 25 and November
28 at a meeting of "high officials" that "the matter of safeguarding our
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy" (Peace and War,
1931-1941, [1943, p. 144]). Some exchanges with the Japanese occurred
after November 27, 1941, but none of these exchanges altered in any
respect the situation created by Secretary Hull's memorandum of November
26 to Japan.
If Secretary Hull or any other high authority in Washington had any
doubt whether the Japanese would treat the memorandum of November 26 to
Japan as an ultimatum, that doubt must have been
564 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entirely cleared up 2 days later. On November 28, the Army intercepted a
message from Tokyo to the two Japanese Ambassadors in Washington which
expressed the views of the Japanese Government on Secretary Hull's
document. The Japanese message characterized it as "this humiliating
proposal" and as "quite unexpected and extremely I regrettable." The
Japanese message also informed the Ambassadors that the reply of the
Japanese Government would come in 2 or 3 days and that "the negotiations
will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable." Washington also knew
that the deadline had been fixed for November 29, and that after that
"things would automatically happen." The Japanese Ambassadors were
instructed not to give the impression that "the negotiations are broken
off" and told: "From now on do the best you can."
In short, on November 28, 1941, Washington authorities had available to
them definite and conclusive information that the breach with Japan was
near at hand and that the reply from Tokyo would signalize that breach.
More definitely than the first 13 parts of the Japanese message
intercepted on the evening of December 6, this notice from Tokyo to its
representatives in Washington on November 28 meant a rupture of
relations with the United States. If the 13 parts meant war to the
President, the Japanese message on November 28 also meant war. Hawaii
knew nothing of these intercepts of December 6 and 7 until after the
attack.
These instances of failure on the part of high authorities in Washington
to perform acts of duty and judgment required by their respective
offices, and many others that could be cited, merely point to the
greatest failure of all, namely, the failure of those authorities to
organize for the war they regarded as immediately imminent. Here the
conclusions reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to the War
Department apply to the whole executive department of which it was a
part:
"A few men, without organization in a true sense, were attempting to
conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions
that should have been the result of carefully directed commands, instead
of actions taken by conference. We were preparing for war by the
conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference
method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method,
and arriving at their content by compromise instead of by command * * *
(Report, pp. 12-13)."
To this comment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board should have added that
powerful individuals among these authorities were reaching decisions on
their own motion and taking actions of a dangerous nature on their own
motion, despite all the conferring, talking, and compromising, were
proceeding as if there was no organization in the Government of the
United States that was charged with preparing for and waging war.
Nor is this confusion and pulling at cross purposes to be explained away
by any such vague assertion as the Army Pearl Harbor Board offered:
"that it was a product of the time and conditions due to the transition
from peace to war in a democracy." Failures to perform duties
commensurate with the powers vested in officials by the Constitution and
the law cannot be justified by appeals to any overriding requirements of
democracy. Provisions for organizing the executive department and the
supreme command of the armed forces of the United States were
incorporated in the Constitution and the laws, and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 565
adequate powers to *organize and unify for operating purposes* all
subsidiary agencies were vested in the President of the United States.
(See Conclusion 16.)
Going down the line along the chain of authority to the commanders in
Hawaii, it must be said that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were as
negligent in certain respects as their superiors in Washington. They
were aware that a Japanese attack at some point was impending and,
despite any general expectation that the attack would come in the Far
East, they were under obligations to be intently on guard themselves.
But they failed to affect the close cooperation, especially between
December 3 and December 7, that was required by their special knowledge
and official duties. Each of them showed an unwarranted indifference to
what the other was doing in the way of scanning the horizon, watching
for signs of trouble, and preparing for the worst. Finally, they failed
to make the best and most efficient disposition and use of the material
they possessed in the discharge of grave responsibilities imposed on
them.
20. *In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting the
American outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6 and Sunday
morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take
that quick and instant executive action which was required by the
occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship
rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the
establishment of the Republic to our own times*.
Before noon on Saturday of December 6, 1941, the President was aware
that a situation had been established which, by a unanimous decision of
himself and his War Cabinet reached 8 days before, made an American-
Japanese war a matter of a very few hours. He and his Secretaries of
State, War, and Navy, and his Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval
Operations, had discussed on November 28 the presence of a Japanese
expeditionary force at sea. It was their decision that if this
expeditionary force got around the southern point of Indo-China, it
would be a terrific blow to the British, Dutch, and Americans. "This
must not be allowed." It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the
Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight and if the British fought we
would have to fight. "And it now seems clear that if this expedition
were allowed to round the southern point of Indo-China, this whole chain
of disastrous events would be set on foot * * *" (Tr. Col. [sic] 70, p.
14, 425). At 10:40 on the morning of December 6, the State Department
was advised by Ambassador Winant that the British had sighted a Japanese
task force in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam headed for the Kra
Peninsula or Thailand. The Japanese had passed the southern point of
Indo-China.
In testifying before the Joint Committee as to the significance of this
information Under Secretary Welles said:
"I should say that the chances had diminished from one in a thousand to
one in a million that war could then be avoided (Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1324)."
No word of this situation went to the American commanders at Pearl
Harbor.
Although the War Cabinet, as early as November 28, had anticipated the
situation of noon of December 6 as making war inevitable, the Chief of
Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations not only did not
566 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
advise the commanders in the field as to this situation, but also
exhibited so little concern approximately 20 hours later that the Chief
of Staff went horseback riding on the morning of December 7 and the
Chief of Naval Operations, having spent the evening at a theater, got to
his office late on the morning of the 7th. Each of these officers knew
on the morning of December 7 that a Pacific war would start within a few
hours and, by their own judgment and that of the President, that such
war must involve the United States. In the light of the situation known
to them and to the president and his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
on the morning of December 7, and in view of the decisions reached in
anticipation of such a situation, an alert should have been sent to
Hawaii prior to the alert sent by commercial able by General Marshall on
December 7 at 11:50 a. m., which alert did not reach the Hawaiian
commanders prior to the attack-the November 27 and all prior alerts
having been confusing, misleading, and imprecise.
Before 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6, 1941, President
Roosevelt had reached a great decision as to the immediate imminence of
the war which he had long expected. He had then finished reading the
first 13 parts of the intercepted memorandum which was to be presented
to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador and special agent on the
next day, and had said to his aide, Harry Hopkins, in substance, "This
means war." In reply to a comment by Mr. Hopkins, the President had also
indicated that the United States could not strike the first blow for the
purpose of preventing any sort of surprise (Tr., Vol. 63, pp. 12441-
12443).
The President's evaluation of the intelligence before him as to the
probable day, hour, and place of the coming Japanese attack is nowhere
in the evidence before this Committee. But, given all the information
that had come to him during the preceding days, he had every reason for
assuming that the day and hour could not be far off (conclusions 3 and
10). The place on which the first Japanese blow would fall was within
the territory and possessions of the United State where outpost
commanders were on guard.
Between 10 o'clock on the evening of December 6 and the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor 16 hours were to pass. The President had at his disposal
at least 15 hours in which to inform those outpost commanders of
impending danger, to add new and urgent warning to the indefinite
warnings that had been sent out during previous days and weeks.
The President's acquaintance with the nature of warfare, and it was by
no means elementary, must have convinced him that the consequences of
the first magnitude would flow from the success or failure of the United
States armed forces in meeting the Japanese attack when it came.
Unqualified success on the part of the American forces could wreck
Japanese war plans and cripple Japanese armed forces. Disaster to the
armed forces of the United States could, and probably would, prolong the
war for months or years, with all that was entailed in American blood
and treasure.
In this situation, having decided about 10 p. m. December 6, that the
intercepted message meant war, the most imperative duty that confronted
the President was that of alerting his immediate subordinates in
Washington and, either directly or through them, the outpost commanders.
This duty was imposed upon him by the circumstances and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 567
by the obligations of his office as Chief Executive and Commander in
Chief of the armed forces of the United States-in peace and war. Of all
the men in the branches of civil and military administration responsible
for the security and defense of the United States, the President alone
was endowed with ultimate power under the Constitution and the laws.
Means of swift communication were at his elbow. Willing aides-civil and
military and naval-were at his beck and call
The most powerful men next to the President in authority-men bound to
obey his orders and serve without stint, were not far from the
President's side; and anyone of them, if so instructed, could have found
and alerted all the others. Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary
Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark were nearby. They could be
reached quickly by means of communication at the President's command.
Indeed, Capt. Alwin D. Kramer, who had carried the 13-part intercept to
the White House for delivery to President Roosevelt by Commander Schulz
(Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10665 ff.; Vol. 63, p. 12437), immediately turned his
attention to the task of alerting the President's chief subordinates.
Captain Kramer tried to reach Admiral Stark by telephone and failed; he
likewise failed to reach Admiral Turner (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10149; Vol.
56, pp. 10667-10673).
Thereupon Captain Kramer telephoned to Secretary Knox, found him at
home, and took to Secretary Knox the intercepted message and other
documents. After the receipt of the papers, Secretary Knox, realizing at
once their significant nature, called up Secretary Hull and Secretary
Stimson and arranged with them for a meeting at the State Department on
Sunday morning at 10 o'clock. Having completed this arrangement
Secretary Knox instructed Captain Kramer to bring all the important
messages in question to the State Department at 10 o'clock Sunday
morning (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10467). Thus, as Captain Kramer testified, on
Saturday night he had reached the top man in the White House and the top
man in the Navy (Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10681).
According to the testimony of Col. Rufus Bratton, chief of the Far
Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, of the War Department,
the 13-part message was sent to the State Department on Saturday night.
Colonel Bratton stated:
"So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in
this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a
message that he had gent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his
folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch, and personally delivered
it to the night duty officer in the State Department sometime after 10
o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have
forgotten, that this was a highly important message as far as the
Secretary of State was concerned, and that I would like to have it sent
out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with
him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him (Tr., Vol. 62,
pp. 12052-12053)."
Thus it is evident that about 10 o'clock Saturday night President
Roosevelt could have reached Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and
Secretary Knox in a few minutes, had he chosen to do so.
What about General Marshall and Admiral Stark, to whom the President
under the law could go directly with orders for operations? If not at
home, they should have been in places known to their orderlies or
assistants, for the War and Navy Departments had been alerted, lights
were burning all night in offices of those Departments; and
568 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
responsible officers were there waiting for news and orders. News of the
intercepted Japanese messages had been delivered to Army authorities
about nine o'clock that night-before it had been delivered to Secretary
Knox, head of the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10765).
The White House was alerted. The President's naval aid was standing by
at the White House on the evening of December 6.
Within less than an hour President Roosevelt, convinced that the 13-part
message meant war, could have brought to his side one or more of the
four men immediately responsible for war action under his direction,
could have taken council with them, and could decide upon the orders
necessary to alert all the outpost commanders before midnight.
In this situation with these powers and obligations entrusted to him,
what did the President do? Recognizing the gravity of the hour and the
occasion, he was moved to act-at first. He tried to reach by telephone,
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and at the first attempt
failed. Apparently it was reported to the President that Admiral Stark
was at a theater. What then? According to the testimony of Commander
Schulz, who had brought the 13-part message to the President's room in
the White House, the President said in the presences of the commander,
that he did not want to cause any undue alarm by having Admiral Stark
paged or otherwise notified in the theater, "because he (the President)
could get him (Admiral Stark) within perhaps another half hour" (Tr.,
Vol. 63, pp. 12443-44).
Apparently the President did communicate with Admiral Stark later that
evening. But the evidence before the Committee is indirect, for Admiral
Stark's mind seems to be a complete blank as to his whereabouts and
doings on the evening of December 6, 1941. When he testified before the
Committee at its regular hearings, the admiral was under the firm
impression that he did not talk with the President over the telephone on
that evening, but then confessed that he might be mistaken. Later
however, at a special session of the Committee on May 31, 1946, Admiral
Stark testified that a friend, Capt. H. D. Krick, had recently given him
some information on the point. Captain Krick had informed Admiral Stark
that they had been together on the evening of December 6, 1941 and that
the admiral had been in communication with the President over the
telephone. But this recent information did not refresh the admiral's
memory, for he declared at the special session of the Committee that he
still had "no recollection whatever of any events of that evening" (Tr.,
Vol. 71, p. 14723 ff.).
With regard to anything that passed between the President and Admiral
Stark that evening, assuming that Captain Krick's memory is good, the
record before this Committee is as empty as Admiral Stark's mind.
What did the President do on Sunday morning between his rising hour and
about 1:25 p. m. (Eastern standard time, 7:55 Honolulu time) when the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began?
During this lapse of hours, additional news of Japanese designs was in
Washington.
About 5 o'clock in the morning of December 7, the fourteenth part of the
Japanese message reached the Navy Department. Although it could have
been decoded in less than half an hour, that
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 569
operation was delayed in the office and this fourteenth part did not
come into the hands of Captain Kramer until about 7:30 a. m. Another
inexplicable delay occurred. Captain Kramer did not deliver this message
to the White House until 10 or 15 minutes before 10 on Sunday morning
(Tr., Vol. 56, p. 10718). But 2 hours or more then remained in which to
put the outpost commanders of full defensive war alert.
On or about 10:30 on Sunday morning, two other highly informative
messages were delivered at the White House (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10743 ff.).
The first was the intercepted Japanese government message instructing
the Japanese ambassador to deliver the fourteen-part reply to the
Secretary of State at 1 P. m. December 7 (Washington time).
(Secret)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941.
#904
Re my #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the
aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.
Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.
Army 25844
JD: 7144 Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
The second was a message from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in
Washington, marked "extremely urgent." It ordered Japanese agents, after
deciphering the fourteenth part, the notice as to delivery, at 1
o'clock, and two other messages to destroy at once the remaining cipher
machines and all machine codes (Ex. 1, pp. 248-249)-A notice that
carried a war warning to high authorities in Washington.
Meanwhile General Marshall, who testified that he did not see President
Roosevelt between November 28 and the afternoon of December, reached his
post in the War Department. Before him lay the final 14-part message and
the message stating that the delivery to Secretary Hull was to be at 1
o'clock. On the basis of this and other information, in his possession,
General Marshall concluded that war was at hand, that the hour "one
o'clock" was indicative of "some very definite action" by the Japanese
at 1 o'clock, and that a new and definite warning message should go to
General Short-the message that did not reach General Short until the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was over (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 2926 ff.)
During the hours from 10 o'clock Saturday night to 11 o'clock Sunday
morning, President Roosevelt had at his command not only the latest
intercepts and his own knowledge of diplomatic negotiations with Great
Britain and Japan but also special knowledge that had come to him
*before* the evening of December 6; for example:
(1) The message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin telling
him to see Hitler and Ribbentrop and-
"say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war
may come quicker an anyone dreams (Ex. 1, p. 204)."
570 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This message, received in Washington on November 30, so moved President
Roosevelt that he expressed a desire to retain or have a copy of it
(Tr., Vol. 57, pp. 10887-10888).
(2) The message transmitted at 10:40 o'clock in the morning of December
6 by Ambassador Winant in London from the British Admiralty, stating
that large Japanese expeditionary forces were moving swiftly toward Kra-
a threat which was to bring into play American-British war plans for
combined action against Japan unless the President refused to give
official sanction to the plans he had approved "except officially."
Knowing all these things and more besides, including the zero hour of 1
o'clock fixed by the Japanese Government for the delivery of the message
that meant a de facto rupture of relations, unable under the
Constitution to commit the overt act of striking Japan at once, waiting
for the Japanese to fire "the first shot without allowing too much
danger to ourselves," President Roosevelt was under direct and immediate
obligation to make certain that urgent messages be sent to the outpost
commanders, including General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and sent not
later than 11 o'clock on Sunday morning by the swiftest possible means
of communication.
For his failure to take this action Saturday night, December 6, or early
Sunday morning, December 7, President Roosevelt must bear a
responsibility commensurate with his powers and duties under the
Constitution, with his position as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy, and with the trust vested in him as the Chief Executive by the
people of the United States.
21. *The contention committing from so high an authority as President
Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any
individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor,"
cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation
whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken*.
How could the desire of the American people in the months before
December 7, 1941, to keep out of war be responsible for the *specific
failures* of Washington and Hawaii in the defense of Pearl Harbor?
How could Congress be to blame for unpreparedness when it enacted into
law greater defense appropriations than the President and his Budget
Bureau recommended? (See Conclusion No. 17.)
How could the American people be held responsible for the secret
diplomacy of Washington authorities? They were never advised of the many
secret undertakings by Washington authorities. Indeed, the high
authorities in Washington seemed to be acting upon some long-range plan
which was never disclosed to Congress or to the American people.
A nation in mortal danger is entitled to know the truth about its peril.
If foreign policy and diplomatic representations are treated as the
exclusive secret information of the President and his advisors, public
opinion will not be enlightened. A people left in the dark by their
leaders cannot be held responsible for the consequences of their
leader's actions.
On December 1, 1941, it was known to the Secretary of War and to the
President and his close advisors that Japan had informed Hitler on
December 1 that war was imminent. They knew this by intercepting the
following message from Tokyo to Berlin:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 571
[Secret]
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
#985. (Part 1 Of 3) [a]
Re my Circular #2387. [b]
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April
during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere
efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured-broken. (I am
sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c]). In
the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
determination. Will Your Honor therefore, immediately interview
Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially
communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that
lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude,
both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into
various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter
by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme
danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations
and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the
breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
Army 25552 JD: 6943 Translated 12-141 (NR)
(Source: Exhibit No. 1, page 204.)
The Secretary of War, the President and his advisors also were fully
aware that Japanese military movements were under way and that these
movements would involve the United States in war.
Notwithstanding this intimate knowledge of the imminence of war the
Secretary of War told the American people as late as December 5 that the
negotiations with Japan were still in progress. Also, despite the
extreme gravity of the situation, known fully to the "War Cabinet," the
President permitted the Senate and the House of Representatives to
adjourn on December 4 and 5 respectively until noon of December 8
without having informed them of the impending danger to the country.
(See Conclusion 20.) This seems to follow consistently the understanding
observed by Mr. Hull when he gave to the President a proposed draft of a
message to Congress which was never used. Mr. Hull said: "I think we
agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of
our relations, relating to actual hostilities." (Exhibit 19; see also
Conclusion No. 2.)
How could the American people be responsible for the warlike operations
conducted from Washington over which the people had no control and about
which they were never informed?
In the future the people and their Congress must know how close American
diplomacy is moving to war so that they may check its advance if
imprudent and support its position if sound. A diplomacy which relies
upon the enemy's first overt act to insure effective popular support for
the Nation's final war decision is both outmoded and dangerous in the
atomic age. To prevent any future Pearl Harbor more tragic and damaging
than that of December 7, 1941, there must be constant close coordination
between American public opinion and American diplomacy.
Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty even in the atomic era.
Whether or not the Pearl Harbor tragedy could have been avoided
[a] Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.
[b] Not available.
[c] See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.
572 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
by diplomatic means is a most appropriate matter for consideration by
all concerned with the 3,000 American boys who there lost their lives.
Exhaustive attention has been given to the military aspects of the
events leading up to Pearl Harbor and an invaluable record has been
compiled for future students of the situation.
A far less complete record has been written of its diplomatic aspects
and here there is the most urgent need of further exploration in justice
to the future generations of Americans who may learn here a little of
the lessons for which America has paid so great a price.
How to avoid war and how to turn war-if it finally comes-to serve the
cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy today as
yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding all the petty
episodes that finally add up to war. No war comes in a moment. War is
the sum of many minor decisions and some that are major. In this
diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor investigation has sadly failed to
live up to the lofty prospectus with which it was launched
In the light of these facts and of the foregoing conclusions, the charge
that the "country" is to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor cannot
be sustained.
Conclusion:
In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates that the
tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men and not of laws
or powers to do the necessary things, and carry out the vested
responsibilities. No legislation could have cured such defects of
official judgment, management, cooperation, and action as were displayed
by authorities and agents of the United States in connection with the
events that culminated in the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941.
This demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political head of the
Government to bring about the necessary coordination of the activities
of the military branches, particularly in the area of intelligence, and
unification of command. The major lesson to be learned is that this
coordination should be accomplished in advance of a crisis.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSIBILITIES
Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and
having analyzed the same in the foregoing Conclusions of Fact and
Responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and
ultimate conclusion:
The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense
rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of *interdependent*
responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in
Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field
in charge of the fleet and of the naval base. (See Conclusion No. 19.)
The evidence clearly shows that these two areas of responsibilities were
inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The
commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready
successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable
information, materiel, trained manpower and clear orders from
Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 573
readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders the
spot.
The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential the
defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military
authorities:
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT-President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON-Secretary of War.
FRANK KNOX-Secretary of the Navy.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL-General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
HAROLD R. STARK-Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.
LEONARD T. GEROW-Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans
Division.
The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the
military commanders:
WALTER C. SHORT-Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL-Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious
failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform
their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too
numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.
Secretary of State, CORDELL HULL, who was at the center of Japanese-
American negotiations bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic
conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no
duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility
stemming from the Commander in Chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the
defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic
phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.
HOMER FERGUSON.
OWEN BREWSTER.
574 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 575
MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
INDEX
Page
American-British-Dutch:
Conversations 506-508
Modus vivendi 511, 561 ff.
Parallel action 538, 561 ff.
American people:
Not to blame for Pearl Harbor 570 ff.
Must be informed 571
Army-Navy intelligence services:
Intercepts 504, 514, 515, 524
Distribution of information 520, 524, 525
Uncovers Japanese reaction to November 26 note 525, 532, 564
Destruction of Japanese codes 526
On December 6-7 messages 520, 526 530
Information withheld from Hawaii 531, 532
Dead-line messages 515, 532
Delays in translating secret information 539
Army Pearl Harbor Board [APB] 495
Report on intercepts 515
Expectation of Hawaiian attack 524
"Winds messages" 526
Reports information withheld from Hawaii 531
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient 533, 537
Finds "war warnings" conflicting 534
Notes failure to prepare Hawaii 543
Stimson diary 559
Notes Washington failures 564
Atlantic Conference: Roosevelt-Churchill discussion 508-509
Barkley, Senator Alben W.: Expounds resolution for investigation
495-496, 533
Beardall, Admiral John R.: December 6-7 messages 528
Bellinger, Martin: Report on Hawaii 523
Bicknell, Lt. Col. George W.: Reports burning of Japanese papers 554
Bomb-plot messages:
Indicate Hawaiian attack 516 ff.; 523, 524, 556
Washington aware of 525
Bratton, Col. Rufus S.:
Distributes bomb-plot messages 519
December 6-7 messages 528, 567
Brewster, Senator Owen:
Dissent with majority 493
Duty of Joint committee 496
British Embassy: Messages 501
Chiang Kai-shek:
Modus vivendi 512, 563
Roosevelt message regarding Japanese 522
Chief of Naval Operations (see Stark): Receives secret information
504
Chief of Staff (see Marshall): Receives secret information 504
Churchill, Winston:
Roosevelt-Churchill messages 501, 502
Atlantic conference discussions 508, 509
On Roosevelt appeal to Congress 510, 530
On fleet at Hawaii 522
On modus vivendi 563
576 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Congress:
Appeal to 510, 512, 513, 530, 558
Appropriations for military operations 524, 549, 550, 570
Power to declare war 530
Powers conferred on President by 541-542
Permitted to adjoin at crucial time 571
Constitution 496-497
Duties of President under 541
Coolidge Calvin: Enforces freedom of investigation 499
Dead-line messages 515, 532
December 6-7, 1941: Intercepted Japanese messages 520, 526-530
Federalist, The: On nature of Federal executive 541
Ferguson, Senator Homer:
Dissent with majority 493
Duty of joint committee 496
Written questions to Stimson 500-501
Fielder, Lt. Col. K. J.: Informs General Short on Japanese codes and
papers 554
Gerow, Gen. Leonard T.:
December 6-7 messages 527
Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message 536, 557, 559
On "war warning" message 559
Found responsible 573
Great Britain:
United States cooperation with 508-509
"Winds messages" 526
Grew, Joseph C.:
Diary denied 501
Letter on war strategy 506
Urges Roosevelt-Konoye conference 509
Warns of surprise attack 521
On position of Hawaii 523
Halifax, Lord:
Modus vivendi 502
Warned of surprise attack 521
Hamilton, Maxwell M.: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement 562
Hart, Admiral Thomas C.: Inquiry on "winds messages" 526
Hawaii:
Defense 505, 544 ff., 553
Bomb plot messages concerning 516 ff.
As fleet base 545 ff.
Failures at 555, 572
Herron, General: 1940 alert to 536
Hitler, Chancellor: Warned of Japanese-American war
615, 525, 532, 569, 570
Hopkins, Harry:
Unavailable to committee 497
December 6-7 messages 528, 566
Hull, Cordell:
Illness prevents cross-examination of 497, 501
Modus vivendi 501-502, 510, 511, 561 ff.
Conference of November 25, 503, 511
Diplomatic duties of 506
Roosevelt-Konoye conference 509
Turns war problem over to Army-Navy 510
Draft message to Congress 511, 571
On American neutrality 512
Receives secret information 520
Aware of surprise attack 521
Expected war with Japan 524
December 6-7 messages 527-530, 567
On "war warning" message 559
Fails to inform General Marshall 560
Fails to inform Cabinet officials 560
Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E.:
Testimony on "winds messages" 526
December 6-7 messages 528
Consulted on fleet data 528
On warning Hawaii 540
On defense of Hawaii 549
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 577
Page
Jaluit: Japanese fleet at 531-532
Japan:
Surprise attacks 504; 521, 534, 539
Warned by Roosevelt 509
Intent to attack United States 515, 569
Dead-line dates 515, 531
Message to Berlin 515, 571
Bomb plot messages 516 ff.
Rupture of relations with United States 532, 564
Modus vivendi 561 ff.
Aware of American-British-Dutch parallel action 561 ff.
Japanese Emperor: Message to 513
Joint Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee:
Duty 495 496, 497, 533
Difficulties of 497-502
Partisan character 498, 500
Form of report 502-503
Conclusions of fact and responsibility 503 ff.
Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers 555
Diplomacy not thoroughly investigated (see also Table of contents)
572
Keefe, Representative Frank B.: On expectation of attack 561
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E 496
Confusing orders to 504, 532, 533, 560
Entitled to bomb plot messages 519
Not adequately informed 521, 531, 532, 534, 538
Not warned December 6-7 529
November 24 message 534
November 27 message 535, 537
On Hawaiian defense 548, 553
Messages sent to 554
Liaison with General Short 554
Failures at Hawaii 555, 565, 573
Failures in Washington concerning 556
Letter from Admiral Stark on United States plans 535, 560
Knox, Frank:
Unavailable to committee 497
Modus vivendi 501, 561 ff.
Conference of November 25 503, 511
Receives bomb plot messages 518
Receives secret information 520
Attitude toward Japanese war 523
December 6-7 messages 528-530, 567
Duty to alert Hawaii 530, 558
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Prime responsibility 573
Konoye, Premier: Conference proposal to Roosevelt 509
Kramer, Commander A. D.:
Distributes bomb plot messages 518
December 6-7 messages 528, 567, 569
Krick, Capt. H. D.: Refreshes Stark's memory about December 6 568
Kurusu, Mr.: On Secretary Hull's message 563
Leahy, Admiral William D.: Concerning fleet at Hawaii 522
Lend-Lease Act: President's powers under 544
MacArthur, General: Secret information available to 534
Marshall, George C.:
Modus vivendi 502
Conference of November 25 503, 511
American-British-Dutch conversations 507-509
Appeals for time 512, 561
Receives bomb plot messages 519
Receives secret information 520
December 6-7 messages 527-530, 540, 560, 569
Duty to alert Hawaii 530, 559, 565, 566
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Failure to correct Short's anti-sabotage message 536, 537, 559
Duty to prepare Hawaii 543, 546
Prime responsibility 573
578 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
Marshall Islands: Japanese fleet at 531
McCollum, Capt. Arthur N.: Attempts to alert Kimmel 540
Miles, General Sherman:
December 6-7, messages 527-528
Testimony on information withheld from Hawaii 531
Admits difficulties in Army-Navy intelligence 539
Morgenthau, Jr., Henry: Proposals for American-Japanese agreement 562
Navy Court of Inquiry 495
Report on intercepts 515
Reports information withheld from Hawaii 531
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient 533
Criticizes "war warning" message 534
Recommendations 534
Notes failure to prepare Hawaii 543
Navy Department (see Knox, Stark) 498
Notice of end of negotiations 510, 511
Requested to furnish fleet data 528
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Confusing messages to Hawaii 533, 536, 560, 561
November 24 messages to Kimmel 534
November 27 message to Kimmel 535-537
On Hawaiian defense 543 ff.
Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister: Warned of Japanese-American War
515, 525, 532, 569
Richardson, Admiral J. O.:
Inquiry about Japanese war 506
Protest against fleet at Hawaii 522, 543
Fleet defense 545, 549
Roberts commission 495
Shortcomings of 497
Finds information to Hawaii insufficient 533, 534
Exonerates Washington officials 533
Notes War Department failure 536
Expectation of war in Far East 538
Short's testimony on Japanese codes and papers 555
Roberts, Justice Owen: Failure to gather evidence 497
Roosevelt, Franklin D.:
Unavailable to committee 497
Papers unavailable 501
War tactics 503, 558
Conference with Cabinet 503
Aware of probable attack on Hawaii 504, 521, 522, 524, 538, note
Postpones address to Congress 504, 530, 558
Responsibility for coordinatio 505, 514, 539, 540 ff.
Fails at crucial time 505, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570
Diplomatic duties of 506
War strategy 506, 558
American-British-Dutch conversations 507, 538
Atlantic conference discussions 508-509
Roosevelt ultimatum of August 17 509
Tactics pending Japanese war 510, 511, 513, 558
Conference on imminence of war 511, 515
Hampered by neutrality laws 512
Interest in Japanese message to Berlin 515, 532, 571
Receives bomb-plot messages 518
Messages of December 6-7 520, 528-530, 565
Receives secret information 521
On fleet at Hawaii 522
Duty to alert Hawaii 524, 530, 558
Detailed direction of fleet operations 528, note, 543, 544
On modus vivendi 561 ff.
Permits Senate and House to adjourn at crucial time: 571
Prime responsibility 573
Russia:
"Winds messages" 526
Possible attack by Japan 535
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 579
Page
Sadtler, Col. Otis K.: On "winds messages" 526
Schulz, Commander L. R.:
Testimony 511
Delivery of December 6 message to Roosevelt 567
Short, Walter C 496
Confusing orders to 504, 532
Entitled to bomb-plot messages 519
Receives Marshall warning too late 529-530
Not adequately informed 531, 532, 533, 534, 538
November 27 message 535, 537
On Hawaiian defense 548, 553
Testimony before Roberts Commission 555
Failures at Hawaii 555, 565, 573
Failures in Washington concerning 556, 557
Singapore conversations. (See American-British-Dutch conversations.)
Stark, Harold R.:
Conference of November 25 503, 511
American-British-Dutch conversations 507-509
Appeals for time 512, 561
Receives bomb-plot messages 518
Receives secret information 520
December 6-7 messages 527-530, 539, 540, 568
Consulted on fleet data 528
Duty to alert Hawaii 530, 540, 565, 566
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Letter to Kimmel on United States action 535, 560
Duty to prepare Hawaii 543, 545
Reply to Keefe on expectation of attack 561
Prime responsibility 573
State Department (see also Hull, Welles) 498
Views on neutrality laws 512
Permits Japanese consuls at Hawaii 514
Attitude toward Japanese war 523
Stimson, Henry L.:
Illness prevents testimony of 497, 500
Diary 500, 512, 559
Fails to answer questions 500-501
Modus vivendi 502, 561 ff.
Conference of November 25 503, 511
Seeks end of Japanese negotiations 512, 560
On appeal to Congress 513
Receives bomb-plot messages 519
Receives secret information 520
Aware of surprise attack 521, 524
December 6-7 messages 527-530, 567
Requests Pacific Fleet data 528
Duty to alert Hawaii 530, 536, 558, 559
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Neglect of Hawaii 534
On "war warning" message 559
Aware of Japanese message to Berlin 571
Prime responsibility 573
Truman (Mead) committee: Procedure 499-500
Truman, Harry:
Executive orders dealing with evidence 497
Truman committee procedure 499
Blame of American people not sustained 506, 570
Tully, Grace: Control over Roosevelt papers 501
Turner, Admiral R. K.:
Testimony on winds messages 526
December 6-7 messages 527-528
On warning Hawaii 540
Walsh, Senator Thomas: Teapot Dome investigation 499
War Cabinet 513-515, 528, 540
War Council 513-515, 528, 540
580 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page
War Department (see also Stimson, Marshall) 498
Notice of end of negotiations 510-511
Information withheld from General Short 532
Blamed by President's Commission 533
Conflicting messages to Hawaii 533, 535, 536
November 27 message to Short 535, 537
On Hawaiian defense 543 ff.
War-warning messages 532-537, 559
Washington authorities:
Responsibilities and failures of
504-505, 510, 522, 523, 530, 538, 539, 540, 553, 555, 559, 572
Attitude toward Japan 513
Knowledge of bomb-plot messages 516 ff.
Expectation of attack on Hawaii 524
Knowledge of Japanese intentions 525, 537, 565
Duty to alert Hawaii 530-531, 534, 536, 558
Sends confusing orders 532, 536
Undertakes detailed direction of affairs 533, 553
Exonerated by President's Commission 533
Directs attention away from Pearl Harbor 537-538
Failure to prepare Hawaii 543
Responsible for Hawaiian defense 553
Modus vivendi 561 ff.
Secret diplomacy 570
Welles, Sumner:
Modus vivendi 502
Memorandum on Atlantic Conference 509
On avoidance of war 565
Wheeler, Senator Burton K.:
Freedom to investigate 499
Daugherty investigation 499
Wilkinson, Admiral T. S.:
December 6-7 messages 527-528
On warning Hawaii 540
Winant, Ambassador: Message on Japanese movements 522, 565, 570
Winds message 525-526
WPL-46: Meaning 535 note, 548, 558
Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr.: No investigation of 501
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/11/96 Updated: 12/11/96
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