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Fbi change stories { June 2 2002 } Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
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FBI'S SHIFTING VERSIONS ON MISSED 9/11 WARNINGS
Author(s): THOMAS OLIPHANT Date: June 2, 2002 Page: E7 Section: Op-Ed
WASHINGTON
IT IS A regrettable fact of life around here that self-criticism and confession of error are options, not imperatives.
That is a generic reason for remaining skeptical about FBI director Robert Mueller's tardy and modified mea culpa on the bureau's and his pre- and post-Sept. 11 behavior. A more direct reason may be found in Colleen Rowley's remarkable letter of May 21, in which the Minneapolis field office's legal counsel notes with dry wit that this is the director's third public position on the FBI's relationship to the tragedy, not exactly a credibility booster.
The first line, she notes, emerged almost immediately after the attacks. The assertion was made that if only the FBI had some form of warning, it might have been able to take preventive action.
Rowley discloses in her letter that she and her colleagues at once began trying to reach his office in case he was unaware of the arrest and mishandling of the possible 20th hijacker, Zaccarias Moussaoui, in the weeks before the tragedy. When the public line kept getting repeated, she wrote, her office came to the "sad realization that the remarks indicated someone, possibly with your approval, had decided to circle the wagons . . . in an apparent effort to protect the FBI from embarrassment and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny. Everything I have seen and heard about the FBI's official stance and the FBI's internal preparations in anticipation of further congressional inquiry had unfortunately confirmed my worst suspicions in this regard."
As details about the bungling of the Moussaoui matter began to emerge, as well as the earlier report about "Middle Eastern men" at flight school around Phoenix, the story line changed. This spring, Mueller began claiming that even if the Phoenix tip had been acted on, and even if the French-Algerian terrorist's belongings and laptop hard drive had been searched, the attacks would almost certainly still have occurred on Sept. 11.
Rowley expressed surprise that the press never noticed the inherent contradiction between statement one and statement two, but of course this distinction has now been superseded by a fresh Mueller statement that the proper handling of the Minneapolis office's diligent work might indeed have lead to a breakthrough.
Mueller didn't say so, but that is what Colleen Rowley's letter says. Back on May 21, Rowley said that just as Moussaoui himself was discovered, one or more of the actual hijackers could also have been found. As it was, she is correct that it is reasonable to theorize that if he was indeed to be the 20th, his absence may have helped the brave passengers on United Flight 93 overcome their captors; or, if he wasn't, his arrest may have blocked Al Qaeda plans for him to pilot some other aircraft.
The Rowley letter also shows how FBI officials warped truth in order to suggest in news leaks that she concurred in the decision to deny permission for agents to seek a search warrant shortly after Moussaoui's arrest because probable cause was supposedly lacking.
The opposite is true, she says and documents. In fact, Rowley recommended to the FBI's legal unit that a normal criminal warrant not be sought, but that the bureau instead seek a warrant available in intelligence cases.
Rowley's letter has been characterized a great deal, quoted from briefly, but almost ignored in its detail. In addition to the PR and search warrant points, it makes six others, embellished by additional notes at the end. It is a model of clarity and rewards a visit to Time Magazine's Web site, where the text is available. Its impact on the pending congressional probe has been large, and it helps make the case for a deeper look later by an independent commission.
In part, this is so because while her focus is on the higher-ups in the FBI, the Rowley letter raises obvious questions about the entire government. Given the almost desperate nature of the agents' bypassing of channels to tell the CIA's counter-terrorism center about the Moussaoui case, why didn't this coordinating group coordinate anything? And what explains the rise and fall of activity at the White House's similar operation, especially given the concerns at the time by this unit's director and CIA officials.
As Rowley's letter makes clear, the agents in her office were not fooling around with this guy. In her words, they "identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point." As more and more information about him accumulated following his detention on Aug. 15, including some from French intelligence sources, these "reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into probable cause."
The refusal to act, she caustically assumes, stems from a fear of getting cited for a mistaken action by "careerists" in the bureau - using the Webster's definition of "the policy or practice of advancing one's career often at the cost of one's integrity."
"The issues are fundamentally ones of integrity," she told Mueller, adding later that "you have also not been completely honest about some of the true reasons for the FBI's pre-September failures."
Thomas Oliphant's e-mail address is oliphant@globe.com.
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