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2002 dia report questions intelligence for war { November 6 2005 }

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http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051106/NEWS06/511060499/1012/NEWS06

November 6, 2005

2002 report questioned info used to push Iraq war
White House cited al-Qaida agent's claims even after agency said he was not credible

By Walter Pincus
The Washington Post

WASHINGTON -- In February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency questioned the reliability of a captured top al-Qaida operative whose allegations became the basis of Bush administration claims that terrorists had been trained in the use of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, according to declassified material released by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich.

Referring to the first interrogation report of al-Qaida senior military trainer Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, the Defense Intelligence Agency took note that the Libyan terrorist could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used or where the training occurred. As a result, "it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers," an agency report said.


In fact, in January 2004, al-Libi recanted his claims, and in February 2004 the CIA withdrew all intelligence reports based on his information. By the time of the withdrawal of the reports, the United States and its coalition partners had invaded Iraq.

Al-Libi was not alone among intelligence sources later determined to have been fabricating accounts. Among others, an Iraqi exile whose code name was Curveball was the primary source for what proved to be false information about Iraq and mobile biological weapons labs. And American military officials cultivated ties with Ahmad Chalabi -- the head of the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group -- who has been accused of feeding the Pentagon misleading information in urging war.

A report issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee in July 2004 questioned whether some versions of an intelligence report prepared by the CIA in late 2002 and early 2003 raised sufficient questions about the reliability of al-Libi's claims.

But neither that report nor another issued by the 9/11 commission made any reference to the existence of the earlier and more skeptical 2002 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which supplies intelligence to military commanders and national security policymakers. As an official intelligence report, labeled DITSUM No. 044-02, the document would have circulated widely within the government, and it would have been available to the CIA, the White House, the Pentagon and other agencies. It remains unclear whether the document was provided to the Senate panel.

Levin, ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he arranged for the material to be declassified last month.

Levin said he was releasing it to illustrate what he called another case in which the administration had made unqualified assertions about the threat from Iraq in the run-up to the war. At the same time that the administration was linking Baghdad to al-Qaida, he said, intelligence agencies were privately raising questions about the sources underlying the claims.
Since then, Levin said Friday, almost all government intelligence on whether Iraq pursued or possessed weapons of mass destruction has proved faulty.

Levin noted in a prepared statement that beginning in September 2002, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, then-CIA Director George Tenet, and then-Secretary of State Colin Powell used the alleged chemical and biological training by Baghdad as valid intelligence in speeches and appearances to gather support for the Iraq war.

In none of the speeches or appearances was reference made to the Defense Intelligence Agency questioning the reliability of the source of the claims, Levin said.

"Just imagine," he said, "the public impact of that DIA conclusion if it had been disclosed at the time. It surely could have made a difference in the congressional vote authorizing the war."
Levin also pointed out that before the war, the CIA had its own reservations about al-Libi, although the agency did not point them out in its publicly distributed unclassified statements. In those, Levin said, it described the source -- without naming al-Libi -- as "credible." In the classified version, however, the CIA added that the source "was not in a position to know if any training had taken place."

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is now conducting its second-phase investigation of the use of Iraq intelligence, one part of which is to compare prewar public statements by officials and members of Congress with the information known at the time.


The New York Times contributed to this report.

Copyright 2005 IndyStar.com. All rights reserved


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