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Iraq un resolution { November 8 2002 } Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
http://www.accuracy.org/un2/http://www.accuracy.org/un2/
Institude for Public Accuracy
An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
as Adopted on November 8, 2002
The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,
Phyllis Bennis, fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and author of the new book Before and After: U.S. Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis: "According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'if Iraq violates this resolution and fails to comply, then the Council has to take into immediate consideration what should be done about that, while the United States and other like-minded nations might take a judgment about what we might do about it if the Council chooses not to act.' In other words, if the Council decision does not match what the Bush administration has unilaterally decided, Washington will implement its own decision regardless. This represents a thoroughly instrumentalized view of the United Nations that its relevance and authority are defined by and limited to its proximity to Washington's positions."
Denis Halliday, a former UN Assistant Secretary General who headed of the UN's food-for-oil program in Iraq: "Have we really bought the fiction, the Washington propaganda, that Iraq is a threat? We all know -- the issue is oil, oil and more oil. And U.S. control thereof. The new resolution of the UN Security Council is a charade, a device to obscure. Nevertheless it is transparent enough that one can point out the trip wires, hoops and hurdles (combined with dangerous ambiguity) placed so that Iraq must inevitably fail to avoid material breach. Then the Bush war can begin nicely covered in UN respectability -- although of course it has already begun, what with the 12 years of deadly embargo, the no-fly zone bombings and now placement of army, navy and air force resources on the ground in the Gulf, Kuwait, etc. Just as in the U.S. military preparations in advance of the 1990 Kuwait invasion, the U.S. is again in training and ready to go -- having set up Baghdad yet again. The resolution is little more than a sop to other member states and a response to the domestic pressures that took Bush to the General Assembly in September when he outrageously threatened the entire membership. Pressure on Baghdad to comply will not prevent war -- only intense pressure on the Bush regime might. To pretend this resolution represents progress, or is hopeful, or a move in the right direction strikes me as naive and dangerous."
James Paul, executive director of the Global Policy Forum which monitors global policy-making at the United Nations, is the author of a series of papers including "Iraq: the Struggle for Oil": "This resolution takes a hard-line approach that will almost certainly lead to war. Thirteen members of the Security Council were opposed to this resolution or deeply skeptical, but Washington used intense pressure and eventually bent them to its will. The U.S. used hardball diplomacy of the type deployed to gain the first Gulf War resolution in 1990. The Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, later described in his autobiography how he lined up votes for resolution 678: 'I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.'" [For other recent quotes from Paul, see: www.accuracy.org/press_releases/PR092402.htm, www.accuracy.org/press_releases/PR100202.htm]
Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law: "In 1990, France, the Soviet Union and China all sold Iraq out at the Security Council…. Russia can be bought by getting admitted to the WTO and being given a free hand on Georgia and Chechnya, as well as having its oil interests guaranteed in Iraq. China wants an end to proposed high-tech U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. France wants its oil interests in Iraq protected, as well as its sphere of influence in Francophone Africa respected. The serious bargaining has yet to begin. Meanwhile, Kofi Annan plays the role of Pontius Pilate. Remember that under the UN Charter, the UN Secretary General is not supposed to be an errand boy for the Permanent 5. And yet he is. The bottom line here is that the Bush Jr. administration originally sought and has now failed to obtain the same language from the UN Security Council that the Bush Sr. administration obtained in resolution 679 (1990), authorizing UN Member States 'to use all necessary means' to expel Iraq from Kuwait. So a unilateral attack by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq without further authorization from the Security Council would still remain illegal and therefore constitute aggression. In recognition of this fact, British government officials are already reportedly fearful of prosecution by the International Criminal Court. And the Bush Jr. administration is doing everything humanly possible to sabotage the ICC in order to avoid any prospect of ICC prosecution of high-level U.S. government officials over a war against Iraq. Lawyers call this 'consciousness of guilt.'"
Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,
Glen Rangwala, lecturer in politics at Cambridge University, UK: "The new reference to 1382, the only resolution mentioned in this paragraph and unmentioned in the previous drafts, is puzzling. Its renewal of the oil-for-food program expired in May 2002 and has been supplanted by 1409 (2002), so the implementation clause is not a commitment to continue the oil-for-food program. Resolution 1382 does not commit the Council to lift economic sanctions -- either the import or the export prohibition -- upon Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations: preambular paragraph 2 of 1382 only lists compliance in disarmament as a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the lifting of sanctions. It is possible that Council members have been mis-sold this part of the resolution. According to reports, certain Council members wanted to relink Iraq's effective and verifiable disarmament to the lifting of sanctions. The U.S. and U.K. may present this preambular paragraph as a concession to this argument, but in reality it is no concession at all." [Resolution 687 called for economic sanctions to be lifted when Iraq complied with weapons inspector, but the U.S. government has repeatedly stated it would not abide by this, see: www.accuracy.org/iraq]
Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,
Jim Jennings, president of Conscience International, a humanitarian aid organization that has worked in Iraq since 1991: "The preamble alone provides several possible reasons to attack Iraq irrespective of the operative articles in the body of the resolution. It refers to previous war powers resolutions and reiterates the use of 'all necessary means' to achieve Security Council objectives. It assumes that Iraq is already guilty of proliferation of WMD and has developed prohibited classes of long-range missiles, without reference to UNSCOM's having dealt effectively with these issues in the past. It is illogical to assume the truth of allegations UNMOVIC was designed to investigate, when the new inspection regime has not yet taken the field."
Rahul Mahajan, author of The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism: "Claims of a threat posed by Iraq to international peace and security are entirely untenable. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet refuted Bush's claims in a letter to the Senate, where he said clearly the threat of an Iraqi WMD attack was virtually nonexistent, except possibly in the eventuality of a U.S. war for 'regime change.' Nobody claims Iraq has nuclear weapons, nobody has produced any evidence that Iraq is capable of weaponizing biological agents, and it's quite clear that Iraq can have no more than a nominal chemical weapons capability. When Tony Blair produced a dossier purporting to establish the Iraqi threat, the Labor Party produced a counter-dossier and Glen Rangwala produced notes further to the counter-dossier. Blair is nominally of the Labor Party, and the CIA is part of the Executive Branch, so Bush and Blair can't even get their own people to back up this absurd claim. Even if Iraq had any WMD capacity, nobody has explained why it would risk certain, massive retribution if it either attacked directly or gave weapons to any terrorist organization." [More about this is available at: www.accuracy.org/bush]
Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,
Rangwala: "This paragraph is a clear attempt to provide post hoc legal justification for the bombing of Iraq since 1991. It suggests that resolution 678 authorized the use of force to implement all resolutions on Iraq from 1990 to the present day. This is clearly untrue: 678 only justifies the use of force to implement resolutions on Iraq passed between 2 August and 29 November 1990. This is a position that has been repeated by Council members ad nauseum since 1991, with no state but the U.K. and U.S. holding anything other than a literal and meaningful construction of 678."
Mahajan: "The invocation of resolution 678 here is another step in the absurd attempt to claim that 678 somehow justified all use of force against Iraq for all time, if it's in aid of enforcing Security Council resolutions. This would include a claim that 678 justified the imposition of the 'no-fly zones,' a novel claim that no previous administration managed to come up with. Although 678 authorized 'all necessary means' to uphold 660 and 'all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660,' the only reasonable interpretation of the language is to mean all subsequent resolutions up to the time that 678 was passed, not all resolutions for all time to come."
Ratner: "It makes no sense, legal or otherwise, to claim that an earlier resolution can authorize the use of force to enforce subsequent resolutions"
Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,
Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
Jennings: "The preamble deplores the fact that Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM, but does not indicate why this happened, i.e. confirmed cases of intrusive espionage, which surely would be of concern if the Security Council were genuinely interested in establishing a level playing field for UNMOVIC's operations."
Sam Husseini, communications director of the Institute for Public Accuracy: "UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq by issuing a trumped-up report which provided a pretext for the U.S. bombing campaign Desert Fox in December 1998. Some may recall this occurred on the eve of President Clinton's scheduled impeachment vote. UNSCOM was not only used for espionage, but also as an excuse for bombing. It delegitimized itself as an instrument of weapons inspections. For the Security Council to now one-sidedly blame Iraq for not cooperating with UNSCOM is absurd." [See: www.accuracy.org/articles/twisted-policy.html]
Mahajan: "Although it's true that Iraq has repeatedly restricted access, its degree of compliance is very high -- far higher than the compliance of most nations with regard to binding decisions like Security Council resolutions or judgments of the International Court of Justice. Israel, for example, is in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions with no attempt at progress toward compliance [www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0210unres.html]. The United States vetoes Security Council resolutions directed against it, as it did with a resolution against its invasion of Panama, and it completely ignored a ruling by the International Court of Justice to cease its terrorist operations against Nicaragua and to pay $17 billion in restitution."
Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Husseini: "This is fundamentally false. It implies that the suffering of the Iraqi people is because of Iraq's non-compliance with the weapons inspectors. That is not true. Contrary to what is stipulated in 687, the U.S. government has repeatedly stated that it would continue the economic sanctions even if Iraq were to fully comply with the weapons inspectors. This means the U.S. policy over the last decade gave a disincentive for Iraqi compliance with the weapons inspectors and ensured an indefinite continuation of the devastating economic sanctions with no legitimate cause." [See: "Autopsy of a Disaster: The U.S. Sanctions Policy on Iraq"]
Rangwala: "This is a pure fabrication: the Council has not made 'repeated demands' that Iraq comply with UNMOVIC, it has only made one such demand, in resolution 1284 (1999). No resolution subsequent to its creation even mentions UNMOVIC."
Jennings: "The document goes on record as 'regretting the suffering of the Iraqi people.' One would think that the authors of the resolution were declining attendance at an afternoon tea party rather than admitting complicity in draconian sanctions which have caused the unnecessary death of hundreds of thousands of human beings."
Ratner: "To blame the suffering of the Iraqi people on Iraq is to rewrite history and let the U.S. off the hook. The United States has repeatedly refused to modify the embargo despite efforts by Russia and France to step down the embargo as a result of Iraqi compliance with the inspections of its alleged nuclear weapons research."
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,
Rangwala: "By incorporating mention of 688 and regarding Iraq 'ending repression of its civilian population' into a resolution setting out the new standard for Iraqi compliance, the U.S. and U.K. may be leaving the way open to claim that Iraq is not in compliance with the new resolution, even if there is full progress on the disarmament agenda. It is worth noting that the Council has not made reference to 688 in its previous resolutions on Iraq's disarmament -- for example, 1284, establishing UNMOVIC, does not mention 688. That there has now been a change of U.S.-UK policy in this regard is an immediate cause for concern."
Jennings: "The allegation of involvement in unspecified 'terrorism' is in itself a possible pretext for war in the current tense political and military climate. If the claim has any substance, it should be detailed in full. If not, it should be abandoned. Perhaps the U.S. Department of State should read the CIA's report, which downplayed this charge against Iraq. The claim that Iraq has 'failed to comply ... in providing access by international humanitarian organizations to all of those in need of assistance in Iraq' is not strictly true. International assistance agencies have had remarkable access to the entire country for years and a high degree of cooperation from Iraqi officialdom. The word 'all' apparently refers to internally displaced persons, and to prisoners. It would be more accurate to say that certain international organizations, such as the Red Cross, have not been granted access to certain groups of persons, such as prisoners, who may need humanitarian assistance. However, it is not clear that this right is granted to international organizations under the UN Charter or existing resolutions, or that any entity other than the government of Iraq has the mandate or responsibility to help 'all' those in need of assistance within the country. In fact, the UN and other agencies have expressly not been able to help everybody who needs help, even if they wanted to, because of budget restraints and the vast amount of need. Iraq's recent wholesale release of prisoners may have been an attempt to address this issue and remove it as a pretext for war."
Mahajan: "Iraq has made numerous significant moves to return Kuwaiti property, recently concluding an agreement to return part of the Kuwaiti National Archives. There is no evidence that Iraq has not fully complied with obligations to account for Kuwaiti and third country nationals. It's quite likely that at least some of them were charred beyond recognition by U.S. forces in the so-called 'Highway of Death' massacre, and that Iraq would have no way of accounting for them…. Most serious is the insertion of a claim that Iraq has not complied with its 687 commitments to end support for international terrorism. Without more specifics, this is just more innuendo of the kind the Bush administration has repeatedly used to try to connect Iraq with the 9/11 attacks even in the absence of any evidence. One of the few concrete claims made is that Iraq was involved in a supposed plot to assassinate ex-President Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993. This claim has been thoroughly debunked, by Seymour Hersh among others. The evidence for it was so poor that U.S. officials were reduced to claiming that certain electronic components found in a bomb had a unique signature showing they were Iraqi in origin, while experts said the same construction was widely available in mass-produced transistor radios and similar products."
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,
Rangwala: "This is an even more egregious re-writing of history than those cited above: the draft resolution simply misquotes the Security Council's earlier resolution. The ceasefire was not based on Iraq's acceptance of the provisions of resolution 687: it was based on 'official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance' of that resolution (resolution 687, para. 33). The difference is highly significant: the U.S.-U.K. draft text implies that the ceasefire would no longer be operative if Iraq is taken by them as no longer accepting its full disarmament obligations, thus leaving open the justification to use force against Iraq without further Council authorization. The ceasefire is thus portrayed as continually conditional upon Iraqi compliance. This is contrary to the position of every other Council member since 1991: this consistent position has been that the ceasefire can only be terminated if there is new Council authorization to use force. Through this paragraph, the U.S.-U.K. are attempting to award themselves the legal right to use force if they alone perceive Iraq as non-compliant; the abandonment of the specific authorization to use force that was in earlier drafts is thus resuscitated in an oblique but legally equivalent form here."
Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,
Jennings: "The resolution leaves no room for mistakes or errors of any kind in its implementation. This approach is unrealistic and unlikely to achieve the Council's wishes, unless the desired result is war."
Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,
Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,
Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,
Commending the Secretary General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary General for their efforts in this regard,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);
Michael Ratner, President of the Center for Constitutional Rights : "Stating that Iraq 'has been and remains' in material breach of prior UN resolutions including 687, the cease fire resolution gives the U.S. government what it wants. It can then argue that because of this 'material breach' the cease fire is no longer in effect, and that 678, the 1990 use of force resolution, governs."
Rangwala: "Iraq, through the letter of its Foreign Minister of 16 September 2002, has made an unconditional offer to allow inspectors into Iraq in order to fulfill all their tasks in line with existing resolutions. Iraq simply does not 'remain' in breach -- material or otherwise -- of any obligations relating to cooperation with weapons inspectors, as it has fully accepted the existing terms for the re-entry of inspectors. By labeling compliance as violation, the message from the Council to Iraq is that acting in accordance with the terms of the Council's resolutions is a purposeless and unproductive activity."
Mahajan: "Iraq is certainly technically in 'material breach' of the obligations stated in 687 and other resolutions. Its compliance or lack thereof cannot be considered in a vacuum, however -- the United States has from the beginning breached both the spirit and the letter of the resolutions creating the inspection regime and of international law. These breaches include its original declaration (affirmed throughout the past decade by officials like Madeleine Albright, Bill Richardson, and even by Bill Clinton) that it would not be bound by 687, but would keep the sanctions on until Saddam was removed from power -- the resolution says clearly that sanctions will be lifted after the weapons inspectors are satisfied. Next, the establishment of the 'no-fly zones' violated Iraq's sovereignty, something explicitly guaranteed by every Security Council resolution on Iraq. The infiltration of spies into UNSCOM, the previous weapons inspection commission (openly admitted now by Rolf Ekeus, its first head), was a further violation of the inspections process -- and among the information they collected was anything that could help target Saddam Hussein for assassination, in violation of both international law and domestic executive order. With Richard Butler as head of UNSCOM, the U.S. used inspections explicitly to provoke crises, and colluded with him to present a rather innocuous report in December 1998 as a justification for armed attack. Ekeus has noted a pattern of bombing attacks on sites visited by UNSCOM, more evidence that the United States is illegitimately using inspections for its own national purposes. Without a declaration of all these material breaches, it's impossible to put Iraq's comparatively trivial breaches in proper perspective."
2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;
Rangwala: "This recognizes that the new resolution is creating a different inspections regime from that agreed in 1991. As such, the resolution is explicitly imposing new obligations on Iraq, in addition to those already accepted. Therefore, the U.S. and U.K. can no longer claim that they are trying to ensure Iraq's compliance with resolutions dating back to 1991."
Ratner: "The resolution arguably does limit the right of the U.S. to go to war immediately by 'afford[ing]' Iraq 'a final opportunity' to comply with the disarmament resolutions and sets up an enhanced inspection regime to achieve this. But, and it is a big but, the resolution goes on in numbered paragraph (4) to state that any 'false statement' or 'omission' in Iraqi declarations or failure to comply with the new resolution constitutes a further 'material breach' and will be reported to the Security Council. Thus, even the most minor omission or disagreement with the inspectors is considered a material breach. Once that is the case, the U.S. can argue not only that Iraq has materially breached the new resolution, but that there is no longer any 'final opportunity' for Iraq to cure its alleged past breaches of resolutions. This then opens the way for the U.S. to make the argument referred to above."
3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;
Paul: "This list could be interpreted to mean any chemical or biological product that could be used in a modern economy. Can you imagine the U.S. government being able to producing a list of this type of its holdings in 30 days? The next paragraph of the resolution, which says that any omissions constitute 'material breach,' puts Iraq in a ridiculous bind. Also, according to press reports, the U.S. government will be coming forward with its own lists of what weapons Iraq has. It's possible that we could have a very short inspections process, where the 'evidence' against Iraq's statement is not a finding of the inspectors, but a document from the U.S. government -- or possibly planted 'evidence' somewhere in Iraq, which the U.S. government will know the precise location of."
Susan Wright, co-author of "Preventing a Biological Arms Race and editor of Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives": "Will we now see the UN inspections being used for 'regime change' through the back door of some claimed failure of the inspections? Since no clear end game was ever defined by 687 and since it is impossible to prove definitively that Iraq does not have any weapons of mass destruction, this is certainly a grim possibility."
Rangwala: "This paragraph, firstly, raises the barrier for Iraqi compliance; and secondly, may make compliance impossible to achieve at all. It raises the barrier by including items in the list of weapons open to disclosure that were not previously regarded as prohibited. Iraq has not been prohibited from developing aerial vehicles or dispersal systems. The draft resolution compels Iraq now to disclose not only these items but also sub-components and 'related material' of these items. It may make compliance impossible because it, if read literally, is asking for Iraq to provide a full 'declaration of all aspects of its programs' in the chemical field, including those activities not relating to weapons issues.... Iraq would be compelled to produce within 30 days a full inventory of all the activities of all the chemical facilities throughout the country, including those engaged in relatively trivial and harmless activities. It is difficult to see how any country could possibly compile and guarantee the validity of such a declaration. Any inaccuracies in this declaration would, in accordance with OP4, constitute a 'material breach' by Iraq of this resolution. As such, this paragraph ensures that the resolution cannot be complied with."
Bennis: "This seems to be an effort to ensure Iraq's inability -- regardless of intent -- to comply with these very stringent terms. This is asking Iraq to essentially do the initial work of the inspection team itself, cataloguing its entire WMD programs as well as programs never included in the earlier demands. The original inspections mandated in resolution 687 did not include, for example, 'delivery systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons' etc. Resolution 687 also included only long-range missiles, with a range over 150 km, not 'all' ballistic missiles. The terms are significantly stricter here."
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
Ratner: "This will be used by the United States as an authorization by it, acting alone and without further UN approval, to go to war with Iraq. It will not, according to the U.S., require another resolution by the UN to go to war. By labeling alleged past violations of the inspection regime as 'material breaches,' by deeming any further omissions or non-cooperation by Iraq with any of the new inspection regime as 'material breaches' and by repeating the warning of 'serious consequences' for past failures, the U.S. will interpret this resolution as a green-light for war.... The U.S. has basically put a gun to the UN and said if you don't approve, we will do it anyway. That is not approval the UN Charter requires; it is coercion."
Bennis: "This sets Iraq up with a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' situation. If they claim they have no WMD material to declare, Washington will find that evidence of the 'continuing breach' based on the [unproved but functionally unchallenged] U.S. assertion that Iraq does have viable WMD programs. If Iraq actually declares viable WMD programs, it similarly proves the U.S. claim of continuing breach of resolution 687."
Jennings: "Articles 1 and 2 contain language more or less certain to guarantee a new war if anything goes wrong with the UNMOVIC mission. Language finding Iraq already in 'material breach' and being given 'a final opportunity' to come clean is a rather ominous way of predetermining the outcome, especially when linked with articles 3 and 4 demanding a full and complete accounting and forbidding any misstatement. This opens the possibility that any missing document page or any evasive statement by any official could trigger a war."
John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy: "As interpreted by the United States government, this assumes that any Iraqi non-compliance with the demand for a declaration of its weapons, materials, equipment, etc., or with the requirements of the inspection regime, would amount to a material breach justifying war by the United States. This is contrary to basic principles of law. In an ordinary contract, if there has been a material breach, the injured party has the option of declaring the contract void. Here the injured party would be the Security Council, not the United States. And under the UN Charter, it is the Security Council that is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council that is charged with determining whether there is a threat to international peace and security, and the Security Council that is charged with deciding whether use of force is necessary and appropriate to respond to such a threat…. It is for the Security Council to decide, unambiguously and specifically, that force is required for enforcement of its requirements. In the weeks and months to come, the burden is on those who claim use of force is necessary. It is fundamental that the UN Charter gives priority to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force. The Security Council has never authorized force based on a potential, non-imminent threat such as that the United States contends is posed by alleged Iraqi development of nuclear weapons. All past authorizations have been in reponse to actual invasion, large-scale violence, or humanitarian emergency (Korea, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia)."
5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;
Rangwala: "This accords to UNMOVIC and the IAEA the right to transport anyone -- seemingly without his or her permission -- outside the country. For example, the resolution would allow UNMOVIC the right to order senior governmental officials, including the Iraqi leader, to leave the country at their discretion. This accords to UNMOVIC the legal right to abduct individuals with their families, and to take them abroad. It would be wholly implausible to expect cooperation with such an unchecked range of powers. Even if UNMOVIC does use this power in a responsible way, the resolution would enable the U.S. to encourage senior Iraqi scientists to defect once they have been taken outside the country. To expect open-ended cooperation from the Iraqi government in such a matter is not plausible. The only way to reach a resolution to the conflict, and to reach the verifiable disarmament of Iraq of its non-conventional weapons, is to set reasonable and achievable standards for cooperation. This is impossible to reconcile with provisions for taking Iraqi individuals outside the country."
Bennis: "The effect of moving scientists and their families outside of Iraq would be to have UN arms inspectors acting as asylum officers. Certainly many, perhaps most scientists would jump at the opportunity right now to leave Iraq with their families and be granted asylum somewhere else. They are living, after all, in a country not only devastated by 12 years of crippling economic sanctions and the ravages of a repressive political regime, but also facing the likely possibility of imminent war. There are certainly legitimate reasons why many Iraqi scientists would want to live and work somewhere with greater safety and political freedom. There is also, however, the consequent and understandable likelihood of scientists exaggerating the level of Iraq's military or WMD programs as well as their own role in those programs, in the hope of persuading international immigration officials of their importance."
Jennings: "Enforced capture and transport of Iraqi citizens and their families, meaning if necessary without their consent, as in the Afghan War's Guantanamo Bay detention camp, violates both the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The U.S. is bound by treaty to uphold these agreements as part of its international obligations."
Majahan: "Depriving Iraq of its scientifically and technically-trained people is what this amounts to -- once they have been seized, removed from the country, and debriefed, they will not feel safe in Iraq. Iraq has already suffered massive 'brain drain' since the Gulf War -- the four million expatriates are disproportionately educated and technical people. It has had a 'lost decade' in terms of education as well - the sanctions are responsible for the fact that Iraq, unlike any other country in the world, actually experienced a decrease in literacy in the 1990's. Any more and Iraq's ability to redevelop and reconstruct may be impaired for another generation."
6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;
Bennis: "This letter asserts a set of arrangements allegedly agreed to by Iraq, without confirmation from Iraq that it did indeed accept those arrangements."
7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:
Bennis: "In general, sidelining existing resolutions and agreements made between Iraq and the United Nations undermines the legitimacy, consistency and coherence of UN resolutions."
Jennings: "Article 7 adds several new and important grants of authority to UNMOVIC, all of which seem perfectly designed not to work. For example, 'immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access' to any site is unrealistic in an operational sense, given conditions on the ground in Iraq. The same article cancels presidential sites immunity previously granted in SCR 1154 (1998). The issue of the number of UN guards is not addressed in the resolution, perhaps deliberately, meaning that a creeping military occupation could be the outcome, with any resistance leading to war. The size of 'exclusion zones' is left undefined, possibly leaving another opening for an outbreak of conflict. The open-ended range and extent of searches of 'subsystems, records, and materials' may further complicate UNMOVIC's relationships with Iraqi officialdom. If UNMOVIC searches are conducted in a more aggressive manner than UNSCOM's searches (as the U.S. and Britain insist, and which Iraq claimed were often unreasonable), then trouble is bound to ensue. This sampling of items raises the question of whether this resolution was designed to succeed or to fail."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;
Mahajan: "The restrictions on UNMOVIC personnel put in place by Security Council Resolution 1284 were placed because so many UNSCOM personnel were essentially employed by the intelligence agencies of the English bloc (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and acting as their agents, illegitimately transmitting all collected data back to those governments. The clear, and obviously fair, remedy was to require participation from a much broader group of countries and to require lack of any overt links to domestic intelligence agencies of any government."
-- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA ;
Bennis: "Sidelining the existing terms of 1154 (which set special arrangements, including diplomatic accompaniment, for inspection of the eight designated 'presidential sites') undermines the legitimacy of UN decision-making."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);
Rangwala: "This provision does away with resolution 1154, which endorsed the memorandum of understanding that created special procedures for the inspection of eight defined and delineated Presidential sites. It firstly causes a new and unnecessary arena for conflict between the UN and the government of Iraq. Secondly it demonstrates that agreements with the UN are without legitimacy, in that one party to the agreement has acquired a habit of nullifying them when it no longer suits its interests. For the UN to abandon the standards of legality in its own resolutions would be to cast a grave aspersion on the United Nations and the fabric of international law."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;
-- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards;
Rangwala: "There is no description of the number or composition of these 'guards.' Iraq is being asked to accept a resolution that permits a foreign military presence on its soil, without knowing the nature of that military presence."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
Mahajan: "Because the U.S. has gotten so much Security Council opposition, an initial draft that was tailored to be a Rambouillet-style demand for effectively unlimited military occupation, which neither Iraq nor any other sovereign nation could accept, has been dramatically watered down. The provision for ground and air 'exclusion zones' was one of the key elements of that approach, and it has been retained. If UNMOVIC construes this power broadly enough, it will be an intolerable imposition of the kind that Iraq could not accept. Since Hans Blix has been cooperating closely with the United States, even allowing the U.S. to keep him from sending inspectors back to Iraq, it's not clear the UNMOVIC will be any more independent of U.S. policy considerations than UNSCOM was."
Rangwala: "With this provision UNMOVIC could declare large areas of Iraq to be 'exclusion zones' for an indefinite period of time. Limitations on the authority of inspectors need to be worked into the resolution to preserve a sense of the inspectors' legitimate role, with an obligation imposed on the inspectorate to limit the use of this measure to the environs of specific buildings and only for the duration of a specific inspection. Without such a provision, long-term cooperation between the parties is likely to be subject to periodic crises that would threaten to derail the on-going work of the inspectorate."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;
Bennis: "The clear language, as written, would allow inspectors to seize and 'export' anything they come across in the course of doing inspections -- trucks, computers, carpets -- whether or not it has anything to do with prohibited materials or prohibited WMD or missile programs."
Mahajan: "One of the problems with UNSCOM is that it committed espionage, often involving leaving monitoring equipment behind in places that had been inspected. This provision seems like a way to make sure that UNMOVIC inspectors could also smuggle such equipment into inspected sites."
8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;
Jennings: "Article 8 in effect demands unconditional surrender of Iraq, a demand not pressed on Iraq during the 1991 post-war cease fire negotiations conducted at Safwan by Gen. Schwarzkopf. Iraq must 'not threaten hostile acts.' The presence of armed guards at any site, or merely slowing or stopping vehicles for normal checks, might be taken as such a threat. This language places the entire UNMOVIC process in Iraq on a hair trigger war alert. It is difficult to see how conflicts can be avoided under these circumstances."
Bennis: "This language is aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called 'no-fly' zones. Neither creation or military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned 'no-fly' zones. This section would serve to legitimize the 11-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of 'no-fly' zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to 'enforce' UN resolutions -- specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead. While not specifying what would constitute 'any member state taking action to uphold any Security Council resolution,' it clearly demands that Iraq allow any action -- including illegal military actions -- that the U.S. or another country claim is designed to enforce a resolution. It also denies the reality that not all Council resolutions may be enforced with military force at all, even if the Council itself makes the decision. Only resolutions specifically passed under the terms of Chapter VII can lead to the use of force. Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII; quite the contrary, it reaffirms 'the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.'"
9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
Bennis: "Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay, it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language."
10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
Jennings: "Article 10 blandly invites member states to contribute intelligence and suggest locations for inspections. In addition to potentially causing the process to continue endlessly, the provision can be construed as formalizing another open season for spying on Iraq by its enemies, which is exactly how UNSCOM got in trouble earlier."
Bennis: "This implies that UNMOVIC must share its actual findings and raw data with 'the Council,' meaning intelligence operatives from Council member states, including those pledged to overthrow the Iraqi regime (such as the U.S.). When UNMOVIC was created, its director made clear that his view of intelligence sharing was that it could only be 'one way' -- meaning member states could provide UNMOVIC with information to assist their inspection work, but UNMOVIC would not provide reciprocity to national intelligence agencies. That would, he rightly recognized, repeat the disaster of UNSCOM's unauthorized sharing of intelligence material with U.S. intelligence agencies. Calling here for UNMOVIC to report 'the results' of its interviews and data to the Council indicates a clear U.S. intention to gain access to UNMOVIC and IAEA data."
11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
Jennings: "Article 11 fails to explain what constitutes 'any interference,' leading to the possibility that a misunderstanding could become a reason for going to war.
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;
Ratner: "It could be argued that this is the second-stage meeting France and Russia desired and that the consequences of a breach are to be decided by the Security Council. But, by this time, such a meeting may not have any efficacy in stopping the U.S. from making unilateral war. Suppose the Council decides it does not think force is appropriate or reaches no decision -- deciding, for example, that Iraq has sufficiently complied. The U.S. might still go to war. It will argue that the Council has already decided that Iraq was in material breach of past resolutions and that any infraction of the current resolution was a 'material breach.' This gives the U.S. all the ammunition it claims it needs for the authority to go to war against Iraq under its theory that the ceasefire is no longer in effect and that the 1990 use of force resolution governs."
Jennings: "Article 12 is actually the war empowerment part of the resolution. It does say that the Council will convene. In the absence of 'full compliance,' the wording directly [in the next paragraph] mentions 'serious consequences.' If such a meeting is held, the Security Council will in effect have a gun to its head, since the U.S. administration has already stated that if the UN fails to act, the U.S. will act unilaterally."
Bennis: "This clear language should prohibit any country -- including the United States -- from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. However, given Bush administration officials' consistent claim that they need 'no further' UN resolutions to authorize the use of force 'to enforce' UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language. The inclusion of the reference 'in order to restore international peace and security' is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new 'consideration of the situation.' It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The fact that they specifically do not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council, and do not call for a new resolution or new decision, but only the informal call 'to convene' implies a lack of seriousness about the right of the Council alone to determine sufficiency of compliance and possible consequences."
13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;
Bennis: "The problem is how to define the consequences. Washington uses the term to refer explicitly to military force; for this reason, France and Russia have objected to the use of the term in the new Council resolution. In 1998, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing Kofi Annan's negotiated stand-down with Iraq, the resolution called for 'severest consequences.' At that time, every Council ambassador except that of the U.S. said explicitly that use of the term did not constitute an automatic authorization of the use of force for any country or group of countries. It did not, they said, include what the Russian ambassador called 'automaticity.' The U.S. ambassador, Bill Richardson, alone of all the Council, said, 'we think it does' authorize immediate unilateral use of force."
Jennings: "The word 'consequences' used in this paragraph is a code word for war. It is not at all clear that war is warranted over major or minor disputes that may arise over interpretations of Security Council resolutions. This paragraph prejudges the outcome. It would be better for the international community to wait and see if any degree of non-cooperation by Iraq warrants even thinking of going to war. It is eminently possible that such a drastic step, which the U.S. President claims is the last thing he wants to do, would not be desirable or necessary in any case."
Paul: "The multi-speak coming from Washington allows the allied leaders, and especially the P-5 [Permanent 5] governments, to put a good face on the deal they are striking with Washington. They don't want it to appear that war is 'automatic.' But everyone understands that war is very probable if not inevitable and that the new resolution paves the way for Washington. If it is not so, why are there emergency plans already in full gear to evacuate non-Iraqis from Iraq, to set up refugee camps for those displaced by the fighting, to rush in food to the starving Iraqi population and (most importantly) to seize and administer the Iraqi oil fields under a U.S. military government. Studies about the legal implications of this latter have been made and it appears that the U.S. will be able to pay for its war and occupation out of the seized oil production, according to sympathetic interpretations of relevant international law. Washington ran a 'profit' on the 1991 war, as they extracted more in 'contributions' from Kuwait, Saudi, Japan, Germany and others than they actually spent (the term 'profit' was used humorously in Washington at the time). Now perhaps they are going to run a 'profit' again! But, obviously, George is not talking about that aspect of things!"
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Bennis: "This is a fundamental point of principle -- it means that the issue of Iraqi requirements and Iraqi compliance remains on the Security Council's agenda, and only the Council itself can make decisions as to future interpretation or enforcement."
Ratner: "We must not forget what this resolution does not do. It does not authorize the United States to go to war against Iraq. Despite claims to the contrary by the United States, that can only happen by means of a second resolution. The U.N. Charter requires specific and unambiguous authorization for the use of force; it is for the Security Council and not the United States to decide the consequences of any failure to implement resolutions."
Majahan: "This makes it unequivocally clear that this resolution would not give the United States the right of unilateral military action. In the past, the U.S. has claimed that 688, which calls on states to help in humanitarian efforts to aid 'minority' groups in Iraq (the Shia are actually a majority) and is not a Chapter VII resolution (i.e. cannot authorize use of force), authorized it to create the 'no-fly zones' and carry out its regular bombing attacks in the course of enforcing those zones. Once again, it's likely that the U.S. will claim this resolution does provide authorization for war, and it will be important to point out that it does not."
[This analysis was compiled by the Institute for Public Accuracy on November 13, 2002.]
Click here for an analysis of the draft UN Security Council resolution on Iraq proposed by the U.S. government on October 23, 2002
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