News and Document archive source
copyrighted material disclaimer at bottom of page

NewsMinewar-on-terroriraqinsurgencycivil-war — Viewing Item


Baghdad areas inhabited by mixture sunnis and shiites { June 6 2007 }

Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
   http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10749835

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10749835

Iraq
Ambassador to Iraq Sees No 'End Game' in Sight

Morning Edition, June 6, 2007 • U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker has been on the job now since the beginning of the year. Since taking the most dangerous diplomatic post in the world, he has established a routine. He says the first thing he checks on when he wakes up in the morning is what happened to U.S. troops. The ambassador then turns to Iraq's political problems, in tandem with Gen. David Petreaus who is trying to solve Iraq's security problems.

In an interview Tuesday at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, NPR's Renee Montagne asked Ambassador Crocker about progress in Iraq. Crocker says he sees no so-called "end game" in sight and suggests that violence in Iraq would get worse if the U.S. suddenly disengaged from the war-torn country.


---------------------------------


When you start your day there in Baghdad, what is the first thing that you want to know?

If my day starts with the alarm going off rather than an overnight phone call, the fact that it is the alarm that wakes me tells me that nothing really, really bad has happened overnight. The first thing I always check on is what has gone on in terms of the security situation. And my first thought every morning is how are our guys doing out there, did we have casualties? And then from that, I reconstruct the political map for the day. But the first thought in my mind is what has happened in security terms overnight. Did it involve us, did we have any losses?

This month, I'm sorry to say, talking just less than a week into it, the news about casualties has been pretty bad.

Yes, it has. It's a very hard fight out there. I have said, Gen. Petraeus has said, others have. We are taking a fight into areas where we haven't been before or where we haven't been for a long time. And our enemies know that we're not coming for a visit; we're coming to secure that particular area over the longer term. So we have expected resistance and, as we have seen over the last few days, we have got it; we just have to continue pushing the fight.


There are reports that beginning this month, and that would be now, there is to be a new strategic plan there in Iraq. Is that true, and if so, what are its most critical elements?

Well, there has been a lot of things in the Western media over the last few days. The plan we're working on is the plan that President Bush announced in January. The surge effort is, of course, under way militarily. That is paralleled by a push on the political level to try to see greater progress toward national reconciliation. That is the plan it's, if you will, an Iraqi plan, that the U.S. is supporting. But all of the stuff we have seen over the last week or so, I'm not sure what it's based on; it's certainly not based on the plan I'm working from, which is one the president set forth.


Well, let me then put it to you in a different way. At this moment in time, what is the plan for the next few months? What are the top priorities that you have in trying to bring about some sort of political reconciliation, which is, in fact, what you're doing?

I think the way ahead has been fairly clearly set out. The Iraqis are involved in a national reconciliation process, and we're certainly trying to use our good offices and best efforts to further that. I think we're all familiar with what have come to be known as the basic benchmarks. These are issues that the Iraqis want to move forward on. So what we would like to see in the months ahead is progress on the hydrocarbon legislation. And there have been very intensive negotiations over the last two weeks and substantial progress made I think.

We would like to see the constitutional review process move forward. And I have just come from a meeting with the Iraqi Parliament's Constitutional Review Committee to take stock of where they are. We would like to see preparations move ahead for provincial elections that could correct some of the imbalances in provincial assemblies that was created by the boycott of the last round of elections by many Sunni voters. And we would like to see progress on de-Baathification reform.

But in all of these specific areas, it's important to keep an eye on the real goal, and that is the furtherance of national reconciliation. That is what security plan is intended to buy time and space for, by reducing violence so that people can turn to political issues. And there are some things there that I see that I find encouraging.

Throughout this whole process, Sunnis, Shias, Kurds have always managed to find ways to meet together, to talk together, to air differences, and to try and find common ways forward. And we're certainly seeing that now. This is not a situation in which divisions are so deep and so profound that there isn't very active engagement at just a variety of levels. So that is what we're trying to move forward on. And, again, I think it's something that is vitally important for Iraq, also vitally important for America's long-term interests in this region.


Ambassador, though, while the U.S.'s security plan is aimed at buying time, as you put it, the Iraqis might seem to be wasting that time with what we understand to be a two-month recess over the next three months, during which you'll be following progress and in September looking to report back to the president and Congress.

We discussed the parliamentary calendar, both with the executive branch — Prime Minister Maliki and his colleagues — and directly with leaders in the parliament. And I have heard from all of them that the parliament will be there to do the nation's important work.


Does that mean, though, that it will be convened, or that parliament will be there in some general sense, but everybody is out at home?

Well, again, parliament sets its own calendar just as Congress does; it's not determined by the executive branch. They have made no decisions on what their schedule is for the rest of the summer. The normal practice is that July and August, the parliament does not meet. That doesn't mean parliamentarians don't work. They have constituencies to attend to just as our members of Congress do. What they do this year, they tell me, is going to be conditioned by what they have in front of them. And I have been told by parliamentary leaders that they would in no way support a two-month suspension of sessions if these critical legislative packages are waiting to be moved through the system. And obviously we'll continue to keep engaged on that.


Well, let's talk about those very critical parliamentary packages, all of which more or less are the U.S. benchmarks for progress in Iraq. Begin with the oil law – likely to be an oil law in the next three months?

Well, it is always hard to handicap prospects for legislation in anyone's system, including our own. There certainly is a will on the part I think of all of those involved in this, that of hydrocarbon negotiations to wrap up a package and have it presented to parliament as soon as possible. Again, we have been through a period of about two weeks' worth of very intensive negotiations, I mean, the senior levels of government in Iraq, and representatives from the Kurdish regional government to work through a revenue-sharing arrangement. Not all of the details are ironed out, but they did make substantial progress.

So, again, I can't predict the future on anything, but certainly what I have seen over the last few weeks in terms of commitment and progress leaves me feeling encouraged that this is something that very much is doable.


Well, of the sort of basic benchmarks — the new oil law, provincial elections, revising law that banned so many Sunni Baathists from jobs, changes in the constitution to give Sunnis more power — is there any one of them that you feel pretty comfortable about it being met at the end – by the end of the summer, any of them?

Well, again, it's awfully hard to handicap these things. A lot of work has been done on the hydrocarbon package, and again with a big caveat in there. But these are hard to predict. I would feel that this is fairly close to the point now where it could be finalized, put to the Cabinet and then moved on to the parliament.


I want to play you something here for a moment, which we may use on the air or may not; it may just be for your information. But to get a feel for who these bad actors might be, let me play for you, of course, Anne Garrels, part of a report she made on this show yesterday. And then you will have heard that, those sort of rattled off things. The U.S. has handed the prime minister lists of officials to get rid of and it appears that really nothing has happened. Do you think that these people can be purged?

Again, this is an enormously complex situation out here. One thing that struck me powerfully when I returned to Iraq in March after an absence of about three-and-a-half years was how much damage had been done by sectarian conflict, not only physical damage in the city, although that is extensive, but damage to relationships, damage to how individuals in communities look at each other. And as we move ahead now, this something that Iraqis are going to have to work very hard to overcome. It is fairly easy in this kind of climate to perceive any challenge or obstacle as perhaps sectarian-related. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't.

I think the focus that is needed right now — and especially by the Iraqis — is less in developing lists of individuals, who, as you put it, need to be purged, but more on how people in positions of influence, be that in government or in security forces, carry out their duties in an even-handed way for the good of all people. I think we can lose a lot of focus and a lot of momentum if the emphasis now is on saying, 'He is bad and he is bad and he is bad; let's find him and get rid of him,' instead of being on 'Let's move ahead as a national team for the national good and overcome the scars and damage of the past, because it's been a pretty rough year out here.'

And I think the escalation of violence through the beginning of this year has pushed an awful lot of people in sectarian directions. Now is the time to come back from that. I think that's where our emphasis needs to be.


But can you move ahead without getting rid of these layers of what's been called bad actors?

Well, I think, again, it's a question as to how people carry out functions; that really needs to be the judge, what we judge on. If individuals about whom there may have been issues in the past are now moving ahead in an effective and even-handed manner, that's what's important. If they are not, then they need to go. But I think it's a question of what people are doing from positions of responsibility that counts right now, as we move ahead with this complicated and ambitious security and political agenda. You know, that's what the focus needs to be. If they're carrying out functions in an efficient and even-handed manner, that's good. If they're not, then they need to go. But the test needs to be what they're actually doing now, today, to fulfill their responsibilities.


Ambassador, whole areas of Baghdad have been ethnically cleansed, turned entirely Shia or entirely Sunni, and the U.N.'s Agency for Refugees estimates there are nearly 2 million Iraqis displaced internally and about 2 million in neighboring states, but what about those fighting on all sides? Is there any indication that those fighting are tired of this war – earlier – this war? Last week on this show, former Gen. Barry McCaffrey told us that the stakes are higher than ever before because every side is positioning itself for the end game. Is he right?

Well, that is – there is a series of questions there, actually. And I'll just start with the last one, the notion of an end game. You have heard a number of U.S. officials talk about different clocks, an American clock and an Iraqi clock, and an American clock that is moving much faster than an Iraqi clock.

I give you one other image, particularly when people start talking about end games. Sometimes I think that in the U.S. we're looking at Iraq right now as though it were the last half of a three-reel movie. I think for Iraqis, it's a five-reel movie and they are still in the first half of it. So I don't see an end game, as it were, in sight. And that is why I get a little bit concerned when Americans talk about, well, we have got a couple of more months, and then we have to make final decisions. I think we have to be careful what we decide that affects another reality.

I think it's also important when you look, say, at Baghdad to understand that much of Baghdad remains communally mixed. In spite of all of the violence, large swaths of the city continue to be inhabited by both Sunnis and Shia, that there are not easily achievable communal dividing lines out there – that that, therefore becomes why it is so important to bring the violence down and under long-term control right now, because what we might tend to style as an end game could be a very, very long, very, very bloody process with consequences that none of us at this stage can foresee if it's allowed to get out of hand again.


But isn't it the case that Baghdad is still much more dangerous than was originally planned in the surge, the idea being that about this time, most of Baghdad would be secure and reasonably safe, when in fact an internal military assessment has found that less than a third of Baghdad's neighborhoods are secure?

Well, again, it's a very complicated situation. I don't recall anyone making predictions in the — at the very beginning of the surge how much order and security could be achieved by which time. And, again, bear in mind that although the surge policy was announced back in January, the full strength of the surge has not yet been achieved. We still have one more brigade to close in Baghdad and only then will we be up to full operational strength.

So I do not think it's really very useful to talk in terms of, this much should have been achieved and it was or it wasn't. We have got a ways to go on this. And we have said all along there are going to be good days and bad days, and there are — there is going to be a lot of hard fighting. I think it is too soon to make any judgments on the long-term impact of this plan. We have seen some clear progress in certain areas, less so in others, but there is not out there at this time in my view enough of a trend to make a conclusive judgment. We're just going to have to stay with this and give it some time to demonstrate results.


With all due respect, Ambassador, because you haven't been there for most of these last four years, Americans have heard that notion quite a bit: We have just got to give it some time, and, you know, sort of hope for or wait for the results to come in. What is your estimate at this moment in time on how long the U.S. will be in Iraq in force?

I could not give that estimate. As you know, Gen. Petraeus and I will be back in Washington in September. Our job at that time will be to give an assessment, kind of a snapshot of where we think we are at that time. But, you know, where we will go from there or how long we will need to be engaged here at what level, my crystal ball is not clear enough for me to give you an assessment.

I go back to what I said, though. We're four years into this. If we take decisions, dramatic decisions, in the coming months that affect in a major way our presence, our engagement, that doesn't bring the movie to an end; it goes on. And I think one of the things all Americans have to consider is if we were to scale back our engagement here in a major way before there has been a major change in circumstances on the ground, what are the consequences? What's likely to happen?

Because I think there – as difficult and challenging as things are now and as they've been over the last couple of years — my experience of three-and-a-half decades in this part of the world suggests to me that things could get very much worse if we don't maintain an effective engagement here. And I think you've got to look at the negative side of the case in trying to come some – consider judgments about what we should and should not do.


Though, does your experience tell you, though, at all that the worst thing that can happen is going to happen whether the U.S. stays or not, that there's a fight to be fought and until it's fought out, it's not going to be over?

Well, if what you're suggesting, as some have, that there is a full-scale civil war under way and there's nothing we can do about it, all we can do is get out of the way, I don't think that's where we are. There is a government; there is a parliament; there are Iraqi security forces that are fighting in the streets and taking casualties at a level much greater than our own. So I think it's important to be kind of careful about how we describe the situation.

But I also think, again, what are the consequences if we do really end effective engagement here? You have to consider whether our strategic enemy in Iraq, al-Qaida, then assumes real power and what that means for security, not just in the region, but well beyond. And we've got to consider what a total breakdown of security would mean in terms of its impact on the neighbors: What does Iran do, what does Turkey do, what do the Arab states do? Again, I can't predict what those consequences might be, but I think they have to be very seriously considered before Americans make any decisions that would have an enormous impact on stability here in the region and well beyond that.


Could I just ask you one last question, going back to something you were talking about earlier where you had said that there were bad actors and then there were also people sort of essentially doing their jobs and trying hard and being honorable about it? Could I just ask you this: Could you give us one specific and brief example of either a ministry or an even an individual, in fact, doing the job, getting the job done?

Well, I think there are any number of examples there. I think, one, because I've been — it's on my mind because I've been very much involved in it would be on the hydrocarbon negotiation where I have seen a spirit of compromise on some pretty key issues that, going into this, I wasn't sure would be possible. And that's as a result of people in key positions – the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Petroleum, in the Kurdistan regional government – saying if this will lead to a compromise that furthers the greater good, I'm prepared to come off a maximalist position.

Now, that may not be as dramatic as standing on the barricades and saying they shall not pass, but in terms of the long-term future of this country, it's the willingness of individuals to make compromises for national interest, rather than do what would be perhaps the more natural thing, stand tough to defend parochial interest. That is the best indicator of what the way forward is for the country as a whole. If that can be replicated in a number of other areas, I guess I would define that as national reconciliation in its broadest sense and that's what will make the difference in the future.




Administration fights iraq civil war propaganda { August 7 2006 }
Baghdad areas inhabited by mixture sunnis and shiites { June 6 2007 }
Bush called for 1991 shiite rebellion against saddam { April 12 2003 }
Business is booming during so called iraq civil war { November 2006 }
Democrats push for iraq division { September 2007 }
Iraq violence causing massive refugee migration { February 4 2007 }
Iraqis celebrate unity despite bombings { June 2007 }
Iraqis infuriated over sunni shiite segregation wall { April 24 2007 }
Iraqis unite against partition plan { September 2007 }
Iraqis_not_divided_ _democracynow_7_25_07 [mp3]
James baker says iraq cities are mixed sunni shiite { April 29 2007 }
Mixed sunni shiite soccer celebration bombed { July 26 2007 }
Shiite deathsquares fade as sunnis on warpath { February 2007 }
Shiites drive sunnis from their enclaves { June 4 2007 }
Sunni less sees shiite friends { July 23 2007 }
Sunni shiite mixed neighborhoods now divided { April 9 2007 }
Sunnis agree to rejoin shiite govt { April 24 2008 }
US arming insurgents in civil war { June 11 2007 }
US supports sunni militias for division { January 8 2008 }
US using iraq segregation for stability { January 8 2008 }

Files Listed: 20



Correction/submissions

CIA FOIA Archive

National Security
Archives
Support one-state solution for Israel and Palestine Tea Party bumper stickers JFK for Dummies, The Assassination made simple