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Fixing nasa culture Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
http://abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20030827_65.htmlhttp://abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20030827_65.html
Fixing NASA Culture May Be Hardest Task
Fixing NASA's Culture May Be Most Difficult of Space Agency Changes, Experts Say After Review
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON Aug. 27 —
Fixing NASA may be harder than fixing the space shuttle.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board included in its 29 recommendations a call for fundamental changes in the "culture" of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, a way of doing business that has resisted change for more than two decades.
In the report, the board found a continuation in the modern NASA of characteristics that were blamed 17 years ago for the accident that destroyed space shuttle Challenger and killed seven astronauts. NASA had pledged to change, and did for a while, but eventually drifted back to its old ways, the report found.
By the time Columbia was launched last January, "NASA retained too many negative ... aspects of its traditional culture," according to the report, which was released Tuesday. "These characteristics were reflected in NASA's less than stellar performance before and during the (Columbia) mission."
Columbia broke apart while returning to Earth on Feb. 1 following a 16-day mission. All seven astronauts on board were killed.
The report said some of the negative aspects included flawed decision making and a tolerance by managers of abnormal events, such as the shedding of foam insulation from the shuttle's external fuel tank during launch.
Members of the board also found that communication was stifled in NASA and that the safety program often was "silent" because engineers with safety concerns were intimidated into silence.
The board's chairman, Ret. Navy Adm. Harold Gehman Jr., said the panel was confident that NASA would make sure that the next few space shuttles that fly will be among the safest ever, pushed by a vigorous vigilance, zeal and attention to detail inspired by the Columbia tragedy.
But Gehman and others said they were worried that that enthusiasm will fade with time and NASA will slip into its old culture, setting the stage for another accident.
"Over a period of a year or two, the natural tendency of all bureaucracies, not just NASA, (to) morph and migrate away from that diligent attitude is a great concern to the board," said Gehman. "The history of NASA indicates that they've done it before."
To guard against this, Gehman said the board included in its report recommendations designed to prevent the "atrophy of energy and zeal."
The recommendations calling for culture changes in NASA, he said, "are more fundamental and harder to do" than the repairs that have to be made on the space shuttle. But that culture must be modified "for success in the future," Gehman said.
After the Columbia tragedy, the space shuttle fleet was grounded. But the board said the shuttle was "not inherently unsafe," and NASA officials have a goal of resuming flights sometime between March 11 and April 6 next year. However, they acknowledge that may be too optimistic, given the board's recommendations.
The organizational recommendations include establishing:
An independent Technical Engineering Authority to assure that all the safety standards are met before each launch. The authority engineers would vigorously investigate any abnormal events in the complex spacecraft and not ignore problems that could cascade into another catastrophe. In Columbia, engineers knew that chunks of foam insulation coming off the fuel tank could damage the shuttle, but continued to fly because they were convinced, even without proof, that it posed no risk.
An Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, with powerful authority over the space shuttle program. The office would have the power to stop launches if there were unresolved safety issues and would not be swayed by scheduling demands.
A Space Shuttle Integration Office that would monitor quality and assure that quality is maintained in equipment, testing, parts and design changes.
The board said NASA should be required to submit to Congress annual reports detailing how these recommendations were being carried out.
Gehman said the recommendations were just a start.
"You can't change bad culture by reorganization," he said. "It takes both reorganization and leadership."
He said NASA leaders at all levels will have to "actively drive the bad cultural traits out of the organization" and inspire workers to "accept it in their gut, in their daily reactions."
Because such changes would be so difficult, Gehman said the board was not insisting that they be made before the shuttle was cleared to fly again.
But the board did make 15 recommendations that it said must be accomplished before another shuttle can be safely launched.
Five of these "return to flight" issues dealt with strengthening, repairing and avoiding damage to the heat shield that protects the wings and body of the spacecraft. It was a breach of this heat shield that caused Columbia to break apart.
Four recommendations called for taking high-resolution pictures of the shuttle as it is launched and as the external tank separates from the orbiter. Also, NASA is to routinely get a spy satellite to take pictures of the shuttles while they are in orbit and to have the astronauts relay to the ground images of the shuttle's wings and underside.
The board also recommended that mission managers be trained to respond to safety contingencies that occur after the shuttle is in orbit. It also called for NASA to relax its tight shuttle launch schedule and make sure that the pressure of time does not impact safety.
NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said his agency already was moving on many of these recommendations, including the establishment of independent engineering and safety organizations.
On the Net:
CAIB: www.caib.us
photo credit and caption:
Jonathan Clark, husband of astronaut Laurel Clark who was among those killed when space shuttle Columbia broke apart on re-entry earlier this year, looks through the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's final report, during an interview at KRIV-TV in Houston, Tuesday, Aug. 26, 2003. In a report that cited disturbing "echoes" of the shuttle Challenger disaster of 1986, investigators said, "NASA's organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as foam did." (AP Photo/David J. Phillip)
Copyright 2003 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
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