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Lives saved { March 26 2000 }
WAS IT A MISTAKE?
The True Test: Lives Were Saved
Ivo H. Daalder
Michael E. O'Hanlon
March 26, 2000; Page B1
On March 24, one year ago, NATO began its campaign to defend ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After almost three months of bombing and a massive exodus of Albanian refugees, Serbian troops withdrew from the embattled province. Today, Kosovo is roiled by continuing violence, and ethnic divisions seem as strong as ever. Inevitably, a debate has surfaced about the wisdom of NATO's intervention: Success or mistake? "Serbs and Albanians in Angry Standoff
on Bridge Dividing Mitrovica"
"NATO Soldiers Use Tear Gas and Stun Grenades"
"American GIs Raid Albanian Farms in Search of Weapons Caches"
"International Support for U.N. Administration in Kosovo Falls Far Short"
With headlines like these in recent weeks, it is no surprise that people think all is not well in Kosovo today, one year after NATO went to war to protect ethnic Albanians from Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's forces. And they would be right. But just because Kosovo is a long way from being the multiethnic, democratic and secure place many had hoped for, it would be wrong to conclude that the NATO campaign was a mistake. The problems in Kosovo are nothing compared with what would have happened if NATO had not intervened. And in most instances, today's difficulties are the natural consequence of years of conflict between Serbs and Albanians--capped by Milosevic's massive ethnic cleansing offensive last spring, which forced more than 1.3 million people from their homes, including more than 850,000 from Kosovo itself. Measured by that standard, the situation in Kosovo is not nearly as bad as many are willing to believe.
It is important to remember the circumstances that existed in the days before NATO went to war. When peace talks in Paris broke down on March 18, 1999, about 40,000 Serb army and police troops and thug-based militias--wielding more than 1,000 heavy weapons--moved swiftly onto the offensive in a well-planned operation. Given Milosevic's track record in the Balkans, that was cause for grave concern. After all, the Serb leader was primarily responsible for the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, which had left more than 100,000 dead and more than 2 million displaced. In the summer of 1998, Serb forces had indiscriminately driven 350,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes in a purported counterinsurgency against the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). And later that year, Milosevic approved Operation Horseshoe--a plan of truly evil proportions designed to ethnically reengineer Kosovo by pushing much of its civilian population permanently out of the province.
Had NATO not responded to the escalating violence in Kosovo, it is of course possible that the death toll would have been lower than the 10,000 or so people--based on the best estimates--killed during the war. Possible, but not likely. Once Milosevic realized that NATO was not going to intervene, many more Kosovo Albanians could have been killed. Indeed, Milosevic had suggested as much to NATO's top military commanders months before the war, invoking a 1946 massacre of ethnic Albanians by Serbs in describing how he might deal with his modern-day Kosovo problem.
The lack of a NATO response also would have meant that many hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians would have wound up stuck in refugee camps for years--or remained chronically unemployed, and unwelcome, in neighboring countries unable to absorb their numbers. The regional consequences of such a large refugee population would have been severe: Albania and Macedonia would have been further destabilized, perhaps to the point of one or both collapsing, aggravating the humanitarian nightmarein southeastern Europe. That, in turn, would have been of real concern to key NATO allies, not least to Italy, Greece and Turkey.
The war ended with Belgrade accepting the creation of a de facto international protectorate, administered by the United Nations and secured by a NATO-led force of 50,000 troops. By requiring the removal of all armed Serb personnel from the area, NATO forced Belgrade to relinquish control over Kosovo--at least for now, if not forever. It is this reality that allowed the nearly 1 million ethnic Albanians forced out of Kosovo to return home within weeks of the war's conclusion, thus reversing much of what Milosevic had set out to accomplish by going on the offensive.
So NATO was right to act. And while it took 78 days--and major adjustments in a military strategy that was hardly optimal--the alliance did in the end succeed in creating an environment in which the overwhelming majority of Kosovo's population is far better off than it otherwise would have been.
Although ethnic Albanians returned to their homes with remarkable speed, it was not an unmixed blessing. More than half of the 200,000 or so Serbs living in Kosovo abandoned their own homes when the Kosovo Albanians returned--many forced to flee by Albanians bent on revenge, and many more who feared such reprisals. Worse, around 200 to 300 Serbs have been brutally murdered. Many of the Serbs who stayed have chosen to resettle in Serb-dominated sectors (primarily in the north, including in the northern part of Mitrovica and in the region around the Trepca mines) to ensure their safety.
Ethnic expulsions and revenge killings are clearly unacceptable, but also unsurprising in light of what happened during the war and the long-standing animosity that preceded it. Fortunately, ethnic violence has subsided considerably in recent months. Since last June, the number of people killed each week has dropped from 50 to five--a lower per capita rate than the District of Columbia's--and the victims today are primarily ethnic Albanians, not Serbs. The improvement in the security situation is due in part to the active patrolling of NATO soldiers and international police, and in part to the growing separation of ethnic communities. But ethnic separation, regrettable as it may be, is preferable to ethnic violence.
Some critics paint Kosovo as a den of thieves, drug smugglers and mobsters, most of them linked to the KLA and strengthened by the consequences of NATO's military action last year. This portrayal of Kosovo contains small elements of truth; after all, the KLA was not formed as a civic organization or the local chapter of the Rotary Club. But the KLA does not run Kosovo; the U.N. and NATO do. In fact, the KLA no longer officially exists, and only small numbers of its partisans remain militarily active (fewer after U.S. raids on their headquarters and arms caches earlier this month). Several of its former leaders have turned to politics, preparing for likely elections later this year (even though, according to the latest polls, many are likely to lose).
Gangs and criminal rings from Albania are indeed active in Kosovo, but they should not be confused with the former KLA. In a recent report to Congress, the CIA concluded that the KLA as an organization engaged in neither drug trafficking nor terrorism. NATO and the U.N. do need to keep an eye on former KLA elements. But they are, in almost all cases, already proving themselves far more constructive members of society than the thugs and extremists who rule Serbia proper.
All in all, the situation in Kosovo is about as good as one can expect nine months after a bloody war. It is not a multiethnic or democratic entity--and it is unlikely to be that for many years to come. But Kosovo today is a vast improvement over what it was a year ago--a place where throats were slit, women were raped, and a vast population was sent packing across the border. The improvement would not have been possible had NATO stayed on the sidelines.
To be sure, big problems remain. Three that involve security are key: the violence in Mitrovica between ethnic Albanians wanting to return north and Serbs resisting expulsion from a final stronghold in Kosovo; the escalation of violence in the Presevo Valley area of eastern Serbia, where Kosovo-based extremists eager to protect the Albanian population there in ways that are bound to provoke a violent Serb response; and continuing uncertainty regarding the future political status of Kosovo. The province is an area that is to be neither independent nor under direct rule from Belgrade. That limbo status hinders economic recovery by making it difficult to privatize government property and to set up laws governing commerce.
In Mitrovica, the essence of the solution is to live and let live. NATO should not try to keep the town ethnically integrated, but tolerate the consolidation of two essentially ethnically pure communities above and below the Ibar River.
As for Presevo, NATO is right to put pressure on former KLA elements, raiding their military headquarters in an effort to prevent them from provoking Serb reprisals against Albanian innocents across the Kosovo border.
Finally, to expedite economic and political reform, the U.N. interim administration in Kosovo should treat the territory as if it were sovereign, rather than a ward of Yugoslavia, which retains nominal sovereignty. Moreover, to retain the full cooperation of the ethnic Albanian leadership and population, it is imperative not to do anything that excludes the possibility of independence eventually. Indeed, we would go further and explicitly hold out the prospect for an independent Kosovo, provided the local leadership continues to back U.N. and NATO efforts in helping to bring this territory back onto its feet.
A year ago last Friday, NATO went to war thinking Milosevic would give in quickly and accept a negotiated solution. That proved to be a colossal miscalculation. Rather than withdraw, Milosevic's forces escalated their effort to expel much of the Albanian population, confronting NATO with one of the gravest challenges in its 50-year history. It is testament to the alliance and its leaders that they persevered, confronting Milosevic with overwhelming power and finally reversing much of the damage the Serb leader had wrought. Today, there is no question that Kosovo--and the rest of Europe--is the better for it.
Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution. Their book, "Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo" (Brookings), is due out in June.
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