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CHAP08 FROM: NSDRF --CPUA TO: NSSRS --CPUA 09/30/85 13:27:46 To: NSSRS --CPUA -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER SUBJECT: Sovs and Summit I see from INR summit Hungarians are not too pleased by the direction of new Soviet leadership. Is this a theme, more broadly, we ought to begin to play upon: less liberalization in east, etc. FROM: NSREL --CPUA TO: NSSES --CPUA 12/23/85 18:41:19 To: NSSES --CPUA Steve Steiner NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD Subject: Status of Nuclear Testing Issue GREAT! We are locking up and going ashore. About 11:30 tomorrow, we will have eggnog (spiked) for you and Judyt and Helen. *** Forwarding note from NSSES --CPUA 12/23/85 18:37 *** To: NSWFM --CPUA Classification: UNCLASSIFIED NOTE FROM: Steven Steiner Subject: Status of Nuclear Testing Issue Bill, the cable to allies referred to here is the one I discussed with Bev. I tubed to you the cable as worked and fully cleared interagency in Timbie's office a few minutes ago. Timbie said S/S does intend to cross hatch it, so could you please ensure that it goes tonite. It is already cleared here by Matlock, Linhard, Wright and myself. Thanks. This cable also indicates how we intend (hope) to handle this publicly -- see last 3 paras. Classification: UNCLASSIFIED *** Forwarding note from NSREL --CPUA 12/23/85 17:26 *** To: NSWFM --CPUA NSWFM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWFM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD SUBJECT: Status of Nuclear Testing Issue THIS IS A SHORT STATUS REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE. WE HAVE A SIGNED NSDD AND THE APPROPRIATE COVER MEMORANDUM TO DISTRIBUTE THE NSDD IS AWAITING SIGNATURE AND RELEASE. IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE SIGNED NSDD COULD BE CIRCULATED BY OOB TOMORROW (TUESDAY). THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY MATLOCK AND PROVIDED TO STATE FOR FORMATTING AND TRANSMISSION THIS EVENING. IT WILL BE DELIVERED IN MOSCOW TOMORROW (WITH NO SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW). A MESSAGE TO ALLIES HAS BEEN DRAFTED AND STEINER IS COORDINATING IT AT STATE WITH OSD, JCS, STATE, ACDA, AND CIA. IT, TOO, SHOULD GO THIS EVENING SO THAT ALLIES CAN BE BRIEFED AS THE GORBACHEV MESSAGE IS IMPLEMENTED IN MOSCOW. BILL WRIGHT WILL PROVIDE TO LYNN SACHS A SET OF BRIEF TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN THE MORNING TO NOTIFY KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. WE PLAN NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT"S RESPONSE -- AND IF PRESSED WE WOULD SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAS RESPONDED AND OFFERED SOME NEW IDEAS. WE WOULD DRAW ON EXISTING MATERIAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR (AS NECESSARY) WHY THE SOVIET IDEA OF A MORATORIUM ON TESTING IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IN SHORT, WE WILL TRY TO RUN SILENT FOR A BIT TO SEE IF MOSCOW WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE LETTER. NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, THE THRUST OF US RESPONSE IS TO PROPOSE AN EXPERTS' MEETING TO DISCUSS ANY "COMMON GROUND" BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING PROPOSALS TO BE HELD IN FEBRUARY (LOCALE UNSPECIFIED). WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET TESTING MORATORIUM PROPOSAL PER SE -- US TESTING WILL CONTINUE IN JANUARY. NOR DO WE ACCEPT THE SOVIET CALL FOR RENEWAL OF THE US/UK/USSR TRI-LATERAL TALKS ON TESTING IN JANUARY. WE WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE SOVIETS IN DISCUSSION OF WAYS OF IMPROVING VERIFICATION SO THAT WE COULD REMOVE AT LEAST ONE OF THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENTS TO US RATIFICATION OF TTBT AND PNET. IN THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE, HE ALSO PROPOSES THAT US AND SOVIET EXPERTS MEET DURING THE lSTWEEK OF FEBRUARY, EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW, TO EXPLORE THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS. (THIS IS A SECOND, SEPARATE EXPERTS GROUP MEETING). cc: NSSES --CPUA NSJPM --CPUA NSLSS --CPUA NSWHW --CPUA NSSFK --CPUA cc: NSREL --CPUA NSWHW --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA NSJEM --CPUA NSBLP --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 02/14/86 12:47:13 To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT From Linhard. *** Forwarding note from NSREL --CPUA 02/14/86 09:47 *** To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 02/13/86 21:08 NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD Subject: MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT Per the note sent to you on PROFs last night, we have in the system a short summary of the consultations to date. We hoped to get it to you last night or this morning, so that you could give the President an update. It does a good job of reviewing the Allied views -- but does not go into great detail on next steps. On the next steps issue, we have a meeting this morning at State of all SACG and ACSG principals to get a debriefing on the trips. I will then chair a ACSG meeting this afternoon to discuss next steps. I think that the consultation process has really bought us some running room. Our options now are: (1) modify our INF position to reflect Allied concerns (and we have a good ideaon how that can be done, and how it could help strengthen our position in the process), or (2) hang tuff on our November 1 INF position (as a result of some Allied concerns). I think that we should work towards a final decision about Thursday of next week, to be followed by a follow-up consultation via diplomatic channels, leading to a US action just prior to the Soviet party congress (perhaps with some echoes in the defense speech). I will send you a longer PROFs with more detail on this later today. On the substance of the alternative INF position, Ron and I have been working on an options (much really good thought by Ron) to have us propose a staged INF reduction: (1) we both reduce to our 140 missile level (echo of Nov 1) in 2 to 3 years, with proportional reductions in Asia (2) we both go to zero in Europe and the Far East in the next few years (Soviets can retain systems only in central USSR (between 90 and 85 degrees -- or at Novosibirsk and Barnaul only -- US with matching number in CONUS), then, (3) all go to zero. I find this may work CAPs concerns and the concerns of the Japanese, UK, France and the Dutch -- while showing we really consult (which undercuts Soviet efforts to divide Allies) and while conserving US negotiating capital. Will give you a fuller read-out later. Hope this is enough, with last nite's package, to give you material to brief the President. If not, please advise. cc: NSRFL --CPUA NSWHW --CPUA NSSFK --CPUA NSDAM --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER cc: NSFEG --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA NSREL --CPUA FROM: NSREL --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 02/20/86 12:17:25 To: NSPBT --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD Subject: INF - URGENT PAUL, PER CONVERSATION WITH THE ADMIRAL, PLEASE PASS THIS TO HIM SOONEST. ADMIRAL, ATTACHED IS THE PROFS THAT I GOT THIS MORNING AND WHICH WE DISCUSSED EARLIER. RON AND I HAVE TALKED, AND WE BOTH UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN C AND F IS WHETHER YOU CALL FOR A ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE AT ANY POINT SHORT OF A GLOBAL ZERO. I THINK THAT WE COULD SUPPORT MAKING C A BIT STRONGER BY INCLUDING A CALL FOR A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A DATE CERTAIN FOR THE ULTIMATE ELIMINATION OF LRINF (AS IN F). IF F IS CHOSEN, WE WOULD WANT TO ADD A SECTION TO THE NSDD INDICATING THAT WHEN WE MOVE TO 80% REDUCTIONS GLOBALLY, THE US WILL CONSIDER SOVIET LRINF BASING AND EVALUATE OUR OWN BASING IN LIGHT OF THIS. IN A SENSE, THIS OPTENS THE DOOR TO THE FUTURE OPTIONS WHICH RON ARGUES FOR. WE ARE RESEARCHING THE TURKEY ISSUE NOW. WILL HAVE A MORE DETAILED PROFS IN ABOUT 1 HOUR OR SO. INITIAL REACTIONS: 1. REMEMBER TURKEY IS IN "NATO EUROPE". 2. NOT SURE THAT THE KENNEDY - KRUSCHEV AGREEMENT ON CUBA DOES NOT APPLY HERE -- WE ARE TRYING TO RESEARCH, BUT I REALLY DON'T HAVE ACCESS . 3. WILL PROVIDE HISTORY OF WHY TURKEY WAS NOT AN ORIGINAL BASING COUNTRY. 4. SHOULD CONSIDER GREEK REACTION. 5. SHOULD GUARD AGAINST A "QUICK FIX" THAT MAY NOT BE IMPLEMENTABLE. WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF A DECISION HINDGES ON THIS, QUITE A BIT OF STAFFING WITH THE TURKS (AND GREEKS) MAY BE NEEDED. 6. FINALLY, IF YOU ARE LOOKING A SUCH OPTIONS, SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER S.KOREA BUT SAME CAREFULL STAFFING NEEDED. *** Forwarding note from NSRFL --CPUA 02/20/86 11:20 *** To: NSREL --CPUA NOTE FROM: RONALD F. LEHMAN SUBJECT: INF - URGENT In reference to System II 90126, INF Options, I share your concerns about Option C but believe that we are protected against the major dangers if we simply state that the package is contingent upon agreement to a specific date for the total elimination of all LRINF missiles. With that change, we achieve extensive negotiating flexibility, link zero in Europe and the Far East to zero globally, and will have simply refined the President's previous decision to improve it based upon inputs from allies and our own resources. Like A and F, this would reinvigorate our own version of zero. Option F involves essentially no substantive movement in INF and backtracks significantly from what we have already told the allies we would be prepared to do. Although we can try to put the best light on it, very quickly the story will be that the Reagan Administration was not up to the challenge of Gorbachev and the usual stupid rhetoric. More importantly, our allies have all formally come on board with zero in Europe despite their very real reservations and they will not help us on this one. On the contrary, they will moan, live with it, but then pocket this one and put pressure on us to move in other areas. Furthermore, Option F is such a change in direction from where our allies are now forward leaning that many are going to be caught very much off guard. My recommendation is Option C modified so that the zero in Europe and the Far East is contingent upon agreement to a date certain for the elimination of LRINF globally. If that is not acceptable, then I would propose that we go with Option F in the following way. That we present it to the allies as our proposed position but with the option to be presented to the Soviets that if the number of warheads where reduced significantly below 270 RVs on a reduction schedule which ends with zero LRINF globally, we could entertain a proposal that would result in an interim period during which there would be zero in Europe and zero in the Far East. Again, agreement to a date certain on zero LRINF globally would be a precondition.We would thus have put forward a tough and creative package and the burden wollld be sharedwith the allies. cc: NSSFK --CPUA NSWHW --CPUA NSDAM --CPUA cc: NSRFL --CPUA NSREL --CPUA FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 03/05/86 23:12:48 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 03/04/86 16:51 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE Subject: MISSIONS Roger on the Iranian issue. With regard to the Geneva talks, let me get something off my chest. I have worried for some time--going back to last summer--that the delayed pace of serious analytical work to define just what we are after on the mix between offense and defense and the derivative questions such as how to conduct the transition, how to respond to critics (and Russian) charges that SDI is intended for offensive purposes etc. will put us in an impossible position vis-a-vis both the Russians in Geneva and the Congress. Those fears are proving out. They are exacerbated by the deficit problem to the extent that it makes it all that easier for people to cut SDI. But I see a future (six months from now) when the Russians will conclude that we have lost control of the appropriation process. By that time they will have seen-absent an initiative from the President--the congress move several domestic bills at higher levels than requested. Over time (even with vetos) the climate will sour even more on the Hill as the election nears and vetos will become harder. Defense will come last and because at least some domestic bills will have already been enacted over budget, the pressure to take more out of defense will be even greater. The Russians will watch all this with some amusement and pleasure and probably slow down the Geneva talks or become more unyielding given our propensity to cut our own programs--including SDI (which will be the case if, by that time, we don't have answers to the central questions on the future of the program and how it relates to arms control.) The only way I see to avoid this is to take the initiative now to get the best deal you can on defense. It seems to me that the Packard Commission provides a good foundation for launching such an effort. The President could call together the leading bipartisan players on national security issues from the congress (Nunn, Goldwater, Aspin, Dickenson etc) and say he has reviewed the report and endorses it. The specific changes he would recommend would include: -A reinvigorated PPBS (as Packard recommends). -Congressional reform (less micromanagement) and a commitment to a five year (two years as a fallback)appropriation. -Agreement to the first two years being at a level of 2% real growth each year. -He would concurrently appoint a Bipartisan Board to serve with staggered terms in perpetuity to advise on national security issues. They wold be asked to report on an interim basis within two months and then annually forever. It might include, as part of the first effort "Congressional Advisors" who would take part in forging the first report. -Then the Board would be named (HAK might be a good Chairman)_ to include Harold Brown and half a dozen other heavies. A variant would be not to propose the compromise until the Board recommends it two months from now with the Congress asked to suspend work on the defense budget until the reports comes in. Unless this concept or something like it which gets the initiative back in the White House is tried, by September we will be watching the investment of the past five years go down the tubes, the victim of congressional preoccupation with the deficit (thanks to Don Regan and Gramm Rudman). With it goes arms control and before long, we will be seeing a more ambitious Soviet Union a la the late 70's. One reason I believe that the scheme might work is that there are several politically ambitious Democrats (Nunn and Aspin) who understand that it will not be smart to be the party that cut defense in 88 even though it may look like the politically smart thing to do now. But they need something--some new event or commission or compromise to point to as their "contribution to wisdom." All this is pretty far afield from your original point concerning John Tower's departure. I suppose this has been a long way of saying that it seems to me that the hardest work is here in Washington and you will need all the horses you can find to overcome the congresional tide running in favor of cutting the feet out of from under the guys in Geneva. I guess I think I could be more help here--or stated anopther way; if the job isn't done here, it won't make much difference who is in Geneva. I am flattered that you would think of me John. But I suppose in my heart believe that assuming we get the initiative back from the congress (and I honestly believe it is feasible to do so) that you might want to try something differennt on arms control anyway. And that would be to establish the private channel with Paul Nitze or someone else tasked to do the negotiating. It is kind of you to think of me but I honestly believe there are solid people who would do it and would keep up the image of a prestigious delegation who are probably better than I am. A different approach would be just to have Ron Lehman move up to fill Tower's shoes. You would take some knocks from those who wouldn't think his tickets are good enough--even though intellectually they are. Other candidates might include Sy Weiss, Johnny Foster, Johnny Vogt, Tom Hayward, John Lehman or Rick Burt or even Richard Perle. As a final footnote, it looks from the outside as if Regan is charting some very dangerous courses in congresional relations. Today's throwing down of the gauntlet on the Contra issue seems to me very shortsighted. I may be wrong--maybe it is Pat Buchanan--he likes to go over the cliff with flags flying--but it doesn't matter who is doing it. It will alienate the few friends we have among Democrats who are going to be key on the issue in the House. Sorry to be so verbose. The record of accomplishment is terrific. My kibbitzing is only out of concern for what I see Don doing to lay a groundwork for disaster in the future. If I can help, please just holler. MISSIONS FROM: NSHRT --CPUA TO: NSSRS --CPUA 06/24/86 15:33:05 To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER -- CONFIDENTIAL -- NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher SUBJECT: vice president's meeting with yakub khan the meeting went as predicted. in brief: - yakub summarized the soviet threat to retaliate against pak nuclear activities while making plain the real problem is continuing pak support for the afghans. - yakub argued that a combination of factors had led to this hardened soviet position: o impasse at geneva over withdrawal schedule and monitoring mechanism o rabbani visit o khan visit o reports of stingers to the rebels which the soviets allegedly believe will fundamentally undermine their operational strategy o forthcoming visit of junejo yakub stressed that pakistan will not be intimidated by these threats. but because of the real danger to pakistan "feels that it would be appropriate for the u.s. to let the soviet union know that any soviet or soviet-backed aggression would activate the mutual u.s.-pakistan security agreement. the timely expression of us commitment to pakistan's independence and territorial integrity would help deter soviet adventurism." (quoted from zia letter). the vice president assured him that the u.s. found the soviet demarche unacceptable and pointed to our security cooperation as a clear manifestation of u.s. interest in the security of pakistan. however, he also reiterated u.s. concerns over the pak nuclear program. next steps: - hartman will be instructed to demarche the soviets regarding the unacceptability of their threats to pakistan. - a parallel demarche will be made here, as well as on the margins of murphy/ross talks in stockholm. - a reply for presidential signature is being drafted which would inform zia of our actions, stress our support for pakistan, but reiterate our concerns over their nuclear program. the key question in my mind is whether the soviets are genuinely considering major military action against pakistan. steve and arnie think the soviets are threatening the paks in an effort to wrest concessions on the withdrawal and related questions while simultaneously exacerbating the tensions in indo-pak relations. while this is certainly true, at a minimum, i think the odds of a major soviet escalation against the paks is increasingly likely, both for the local political-military reasons as well as the global value of soviet military action against an american ally. moscow surely recognizes the dilemma we would face due to the political-operational difficulties associated with projecting american power to pakistan along with the policy conundrum created by the [Two and half lines deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] cc: NSSRS --CPUA NSPWR --CPUA NSDBR --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSHRT --CPUA 06/24/86 16:16:39 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: vice president's meeting with yakub khan *** Forwarding note from NSHRT --CPUA 06/24/86 15:58 *** To: NSPWR --CPUA NSSRS --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA NSSRT --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher Subject: vice president's meeting with yakub khan *** Forwarding note from NSJFM --CPUA 06/24/86 15:56 *** To: NSHRT --CPUA *** Reply to note of 06/24/86 15:37 NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock Subject: vice president's meeting with yakub khan Suggested action looks fine to me. As for Soviet intention, I think it is primarily to bring pressure on the Paks in proximity talks, but also to make points with the Indians re the nuclear program. Whether the Sovs would really hit Pakistan directly with military actions is another question. I am inclined to think this is relatively unlikely. More likely might be cooperation with an Indian strike on nuclear facilities, if the Indians are sufficiently exercised to try something like that. In short, while I believe that the Sovs for some time have considered pressure on Pakistan as an aption to get back at us for what they see as humiliations in other areas I do not believe they are likely to go about it in an overt and direct way. (I could be quite wrong, of course.) cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA NSHRT --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 08/18/86 17:59:15 To: NSJFM --CPUA NSREL --CPUA NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Soviet agreement to meetings Current info indicates lineup for talks with Soviets now as follows: 8/18 - US/UR terrorism talks (Sokolov and Oakley) 8/26 - US/UR superregional talks in WDC (Armacost) 8/26 - US/UR RRC talks in Geneva 9/2 -3 US/UR periodic regional talks - on Afghanistan 9/4 - US/UR nuclear testing talks 9/5 - 6 US/UR NST in WDC 9/8 week US/UR MBFR talks in WDC 9/10 -12 US/UR space cooperation talks in Moscow Would appreciate any corrections/changes with cc to Ken Krieg for calendar. Thanks. *** Forwarding note from NSJFM --CPUA 08/18/86 17:33 *** To: NSWRP --CPUA NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock SUBJECT: Soviet agreement to meetings State has just informed me that Sokolov has: 1. Confirmed the dates we suggested for the NST group's second round in Washington. Soviet team will be the same with Dubinin added. 2. Confirmed the Afghan regional talks for Sept 2-3. 3. On the "Superregional" Talks (Armacost group), confirmed that Admishin will arrive in Washington August 26 with Kazimirov, Zotov, and Krylov. Latter three are specialists on Latin America, Middle East and Africa. cc: NSREL --CPUA NSSRS --CPUA cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSPWR --CPUA NSWAC --CPUA NSSRS --CPUA KRIEG --VAXB NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSFEG --CPUA 8/22/86 18:53:21 SECRET ADMIRAL, ATTACHED BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A PACKAGE ON INTERIM RESTRAINT THAT WE DISCUSSED EARLIER THIS WEEK. THE PACKAGE WENT INTO OUR SYSTEM ON FRIDAY AT COB BUT IT LIKELY WILL NOT MAKE IT TO YOU UNTIL MONDAY AT THE EARLIEST, SVEN WILL PRESS ON WITH THE MEETINGS THAT ARE REFERENCED IN THE COVER MEMO TO YOU WHICH IS NEXT BELOW. ANY FEEDBACK THAT WE ARE ON THE WRONG PATH IS NEEDED SOONEST. PROMPT ACTION ON THE PACKAGE WHEN IT ARRIVES WOULD BE HELPFUL. I WILL BE IN GENEVA UNTIL WEDNESDAY (RISK REDUCING), SO IF ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, PLEASE PASS DIRECTLY TO SVEN. BEGIN TEXT OF COVER NOTE TO YOU SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER FROM: SVEN KRAEMER/BOB LINHARD SUBJECT: Interim Restraint Policy As the Administration prepares for a new series of U.S.-Sovlet meetings in September/October (including NST experts, Shultz -Shevardnadze, NST resumption, and SCC) and in the face of Congressional legislation seeking to mandate arms control by legislative fiat, we need to consider more specifically how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual interim restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations. In particular, we need to be clear on what our interim restraint policy is, and on a close-hold and timely basis, to have a study prepared on possible interim limitations on strategic arms (including limitations that might be drawn from SALT and some that might be new) consistent with U.S. policy and with the START negotiations. We believe such work would best be tasked through an NSDD and worked through a special group. Accordingly, we have prepared an NSDD at Tab A for the President's signature, summarizing established U.S. interim restraint policy and tasking preparation of a study on the above elements through the Arms Control Support Group by mid-September. Because the document includes a statement of policy, and to give it more weight, we have titled it as a NSDD rather than as an NSSD. We have touched base informally on the tasking aspects of this NSDD with appropriate CIA and OSD reps and will do so with other agencies soon. We propose to have a special subgroup of the Arms Control Support Group Work this study (probably in a compartmented channel) and will try for a first draft for Support Group review by Labor Day, with the final product due to the NSC by September 17. We propose to kick off the effort with a meeting of such a group next Tuesday, August 25, starting with an inventory and assessment of SALT limitations, definitions, counting rules, notifications, etc., that to be considered for carrying forward if consistent with the U.S. proposal on START and with U.S. policy on interim restraint. A memorandum explaining the purpose of the NSDD and recommending the President's signature is attached for your approval at Tab I, A memorandum of transmittal to agencies is attached at Tab II, for use if and when the President signs the NSDD. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the proposed NSDD for his signature. BEGIN TAB I -- MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER SUBJECT: Interim Restraint Policy Issue: Whether you should sign the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) summarizing U.S. interim restraint policy and requesting an interagency study on its further development and implementatlon consistent with our objectives and our proposal in the START negotiations. Background: In June, 1985, you decided to go the extra mile with the SALT I and SALT II agreements in order to give the Soviet Unlon adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint by: (1) correcting its noncompliance; (2) reversing its military buildup; and (3) negotiating seriously in Geneva. In May 27, 1986 you decided that in view of Soviet failure during the preceding year to allay our concerns and to make progress in these three areas, the United States would base future U.S. strategic force decisions on the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which was being undermined by continued Soviet noncompliance, and which involved two agreements that had expired and, in the case of SALT II, were unratified. You indicated that while the Unlted States would remain in technical observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty for some months because of the Poseidon submarine retirements this summer, you intended later this year to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the SALT II Treaty. At the same time, you urged a priority focus on achieving an equitable and verifiable agreement on significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms. While pledging utmost U.S. restraint, you invited the Soviet Union to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending achievement of such an agreement. In addition, as matters of unilateral restraint, you indicated that, assumlng no significant change in the threat we face, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union. At the Special Session of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) held in Geneva at the end of July, the Soviets asserted that they were in full compliance, rejected your call for an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, and characterized as unfair your position on SNDVs and strategic ballistic missile warheads. Meanwhile, the Congress, in particular the House, is seeking to impose SALT I limits on the United states through legislative fiat. Discussion: In light of the above considerations and as we approach major U.S.-Soviet meetings this fall, we need to consider more specifcally how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations. Accordingly, as we seek Soviet correction of their noncompliance and a reversal of their strategic arms buildup, we also belleve it helpful to have a study prepared on possible interim limitations on strategic arms, including limitations that might be drawn from SALT and some that might be new, consistent with U.S. policy and with the START negotiations. The NSDD attached for your signature at Tab A summarizes established U.S. interim restraint policy and requests preparation of such a study through the Arms Control Support Group by mid-September. Recommendation: That you sign Nationai Security Decision Directive at Tab A. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT NSDD -- TAB A INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY (U) U.S. Interim Restraint Policy. In my August 19 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-232) on "Preparing for the Next NST Round," I stated that I remain fully committed to my May 27 decision that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance. I noted that SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified which would have expired if it had been ratified and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union, while the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union. (S) Concerning future U.S. actions, I noted that, as I indicated on May 27, I intend to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st Aircraft, as an appropriate response, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Since the United States is retiring two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance with the terms of the SALT II Treaty until that event near the end of the year, I have requested that the Secretary of Defense inform me in advance of the exact timing of any action that would result in exceeding SALT II limits. (S) In my May 27 decision I stated that the United States will exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces and assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernizatlon program. Additionally, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union, (S) My basic message has been that the two sides need to build a sound new foundation of truly mutual restraint and real arms reductions. I have emphasized that we continue to seek constructive Soviet action as we work to substitute a truly mutual framework of restraint for one that was not working and that was increasingly obsolete. We therefore continue to seek Soviet action in each of the three major areas which I initially identified in June, 1985, i.e.: (1) the correction of Soviet noncompliance; (2) the reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and (3) serious Soviet negotiations in Geneva. At the same time, I have made clear that no policy or framework of interim restraint is a substitute for an arms reduction agreement, and that my hlghest priority remains the achievement of an agreement on significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. (S) Interim Restraint Study. We hope that our interim restraint policy will put the arms control process on a more constructive foundation and will make the best use of the promise provided by the ongoing arms reduction negotiations in Geneva. We do so even though at the Special Session of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission this July, the Soviet Union rejected my call to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint and criticized our approach as unfair. (S) As we put SALT behind us and look to the future with a focus on the Geneva negotiations, and notwithstanding the Soviet Union's regrettable rejection, we need to consider more specifically how the interim framework of truly mutual restraint we have proposed can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with the established policy guidance above and supportive of our objectives in the START negotiations and the conceptual approach we have presented in those negotiations. (S) I therefore request that a study be conducted on a closely held, priority basis that addresses the following questions: 1. In the context of a proposal for a mutual interim restraint regime, what numerical limitations (in addition to, or as substitutes for, the two measures that I have proposed as unilateral steps) and conceptually consistent with our START reductions proposals could the U.S. consider? 2. In addition to these numerical limits, what supporting definitions, counting rules, notifications, and procedures (to include dismantlement and destruction procedures) should the U.S. consider? 3. Should the U.S. consider other qualitative limits and restrictions on new types of system in the context of an arrangement that the U.S. views as intended to be of very limited duration, i.e., until we can, in the near future, implement a START agreement, from which it should not divert the two sides. 4. If such elements were considered appropriate and if agreement, in principle, on any of these elements were reached with the Soviet Union, would the U.S. prefer documentlng such agreement in the form of a treaty, an executive agreement, or by parallel political commitments (such as were made regarding SALT in 1982)? (S) In answering the above questions, the study should also include the following: 1. An assessment of the answers to each of the above questions in terms of their precedential implications both on our ability quickly to conclude a START agreement and on our ability to obtain the terms we seek in such an agreement; 2. An assessment, led by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the answers in terms of their impact on U.S. and Allied security and military sufficiency; 3. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of the problems of verification posed by Soviet noncompliance; and 4. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of their impact on our ability to assess the level and quality of Soviet forces under such arrangements. (S) The study, to be conducted under the direction of the Arms Control Support Group should be submitted to the National Security Council by September 17. (C) BEGIN DISTRIBUTION MEMO FOR AGENCIES MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY SUBJECT: NSDD- on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy (S) The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy and requesting a study on how future U.S. restraint, and the interim framework of truly mutual restraint have proposed, can be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with the established policy guidance and supportive of our objectives and our approach in the START negotiations. (S) Due to the sensitivity of this subject, this NSDD should be restricted to those who must have access in support of the requested study.(C) SECRET Declassify on: OADR END TEXT OF PACKAGE FROM: NSJEM --CPUA TO: NSWR --CPUA 10/30/86 10:55:54 To: NSWR --CPUA NOTE FROM: Judyt Mandel Subject: Afghanistan Briefing *** Forwarding note from NSPWR --CPUA 10/29/86 09:29 *** To: SESTANOV--VAXB NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Afghanistan Briefing I talked to Fred Ikle before this morning's S-W-P breakfast about this. I strongly urged on him the importance of this briefing in getting out a lot of facts that haven't been put out, e.g., the units and equipment that came in just to go out. I said I hoped he would be there, if only to introduce it, so it would get more visibility.It was essential to do it. He seemed very interested in getting it done and did not exclude participating himself; he mentioned the UNGA vote next week and understood the relevance of this. He said they would probably not do it Thursday (so as not to compete with Cap's speech that day) but would do it either today or Friday. He mentioned the hangup over whether imagery could be used. He felt it would be better with pictures; I agreed, but said the briefing would be worthwhile even without pictures. He expressed interest in continuing a dialogue with us on overall strategy. He probably would get in touch with vince, though I told him you were also involved in the political strategy. cc: NSVMC --CPUA NSSRT --CPUA NSKED --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA NSWRP --CPUA NSPWH --CPUA NSWAC --CPUA NSJEM --CPUA NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL MSG: FROM CHAINES[?] --VAXA TO:NSPMJ --CPUA 12/ 5/86 13:30:26 TO: NSPMJ --CPUA Subject: BEAZLEY BRIEFING INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM Date: 5-Dec-1986 01:27p EDT From: Jay R. Watkins WATKINS Dept: Decision Support Tel No: 395-6922 TO: Remote PROFS User ( _PROFS%NSPMJ@CPUA ) TO: Remote PROFS User ( _PROFS%NSPMJ@CPUA ) Subject: BEAZLEY BRIEFING SECRET December 3, 1986 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: Arms Control Briefing for Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley (C) PARTICIPANTS: NSC Australia Peter Rodman Kim Beazley Robert Linhard Henry John Coates Adm. William Cockell Ross Dottrill Sven Kraemer David Reese James A. Kelly David N. Laux Jay R. Watkins DATE, TIME December 3, 1986 AND PLACE: 11:00-12:00 PM, West Wing, Situation Room Conference Room Mr. Kelly introduced the NSC attendees to Defense Minister Beazley. Mr. Rodman began the substantive briefing by describing Soviet behavior in arms control negotiations with the United States. The Reykjavik summit did not go as well as the Soviets had expected. US Congressional reaction has come more from the right wing. These critics have said to be careful, not to be too anxious to sign an agreement with the Soviets. Senator Sam Nunn a Democrat, is taking that line. The Soviets can not be quickly satisfied. Our Congressional elections had interesting results for the Soviets. They perceive, in the emergence of a Democratic Congress, a shift toward the center-left. They do not quite yet know what to make of the Iran arms sale flap. Will it weaken Reagan? Will he be desperate for success in some area of foreign policy--such as arms control? The USSR is unable to let its arms negotiation strategy lay fallow over the next two years, in the expectation of a better bargaining position folowing Reagan's term. The United States will not give in to the "wait-and-see" attitude of the Soviets. It is not in Moscow's interest to delay. If the President recovers from the current controversy, we'll be in business. There is no certainty that a Democratic Administration in 1988 would be any easier to deal with in arms control. The Democrats could run into the same arms control problems Jimmy Carter did. The reality is that SDI continues to receive Congressional funding. SDI recently received $3.3 billion. SDI technological advances will continue, providing another imperative for the Soviets to continue arms control negotiations. The Soviets can reach closure on arms control in the next two years. Rodman expressed his optimism. The current pressures on the Administration are, hopefully, temporary. In the long run, the pressure will be on Moscow. Mr. Linhard outlined the Administration's position at Reyjavik. He said that, following the summit, there was considerable confusion in Europe over whether the United States had tabled a proposal for elimination of all long-range ballistic missiles or whether it applied only to medium-range missiles. Following Reykjavik, Linhard traveled to Vienna, then Bonn, London, Rome, Paris, and Brussels to brief foreign ministries and military staffs on the talks. At Reykjavik, he said, we had two priorities: first, significant START reductions of 50%. The USSR would only accept 30% cuts. Second, we sought a Soviet reduction of the 513 SS-20s in Asia. The Soviets would not budge on reducing their missiles in Asia. Linhard expressed concern that the Soviets might try to propagandize the issue by playing our European allies against our Asian allies, especially the Japanese. The large overall number of ballistic missiles suggests US negotiating leverage is rather tenuous. But the Soviets are definitely concerned about US space weapons. It is our best leverage against them. One of the Soviet delegates, Chief of General Staff _______ Akhromyev?? , is an amazing asset. He was very open. The discussed the military problem directly. Linhard felt Reykjavik was our equivalent of Vladivostok. At Reykjavik, we tried to reduce the approximately 6,000 nuclear delivery systems, with an appropriate treatment of bombers. We were looking for a 50% reduction in Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). We were pleasantly surprised when the Soviets went to 100 in INF. We'd prefer 0-0. The Soviets asked the United States for a 10 year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They were thinking specifically in terms of SDI. Reagan's price for this concession was "zero-level" offensive ballistic weapons. FROG and SCUD systems would have to be eliminated. Reagan had in mind the NATO alliance. The spectrum of systems, from FROGS-7s, with a range of 100 kilometers, though SS-21s and SCUD-Bs to SS-23s, are a mix of forces. The Soviets have a total long-range and medium-range force of 18,000-19,000 missiles. By contrast, NATO has ???? and 170 PIs. The imbalance is obvious. Let's leap from INF to START. Where do we get the leverage? The answer is in our SDI program. Linhard added that shorter-range Soviet weapons are also chemically and biologically capable. Linhard said that he understands theatre forces and the European concerns. It used to be his account while at JCS. Theatre forces are just one side of the nuclear equation. There are two points of view. The NATO alliance is essentially defensive. A defensive posture surrenders the military initiative. The Soviets have the advantage of mobilizing out of garrison their tactical nuclear weapons, putting them out of danger, while the West's arsenal lies vulnerable in its hardened locations. NATO's airfields, with its tactical nuclear air delivery mission, as well as fixed garrisons where nuclear artillery and armor battalions reside, are vulnerable to short-range ballistic nuclear attack. Our alliance depends on our ability to project a deterrence. We have a tactical capability. We have the capability to maintain deterrence. Linhard said that if he were on the Soviet General Staff, his view of his ballistic missle force structure would be that it is a "technological beast." These missiles are technologically basic and can be tested in peacetime. The probability of damage can be accurately assessed. The USSR knows in advance what an initial nuclear onslaught will do. Linhard said we in the West have to remove that high degree of certainty. If the Soviets had to rely instead on Floggers and Fencers to deliver nuclear weapons, this raises the degree of uncertainty. NATO has an effective tactical air defense capability. The USSR could not be certain that their planes would survive a break-through. Linhard said the European reaction has been interesting. The tabled proposals have caught military atrategist and observers by surprise. The Soviets were not caught by surprise. The Soviets do not want "zero-level" in ballistic missiles. They want "zero-level" strategic forces. They view SDI as ongoing, making technical progress. Adm. Cockell reinforced that last point. The conventional defense of Europe relies on US resupply capability. Fragile as it is already, seven? major resupply points, known to the Soviets, could be rendered inoperable. Our defense, then, becomes problematic. There are good arguments for supporting conventional forces if we can eliminate that threat to our conventional forces. Mr. Beazley. The European reaction seems short-sighted. Europeans fear the "zero-level" ballistic missle idea. They worry that elimination of ballistic missiles will lead to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons. Where will it end? The pressures could then build on restructuring conventional forces. Mr. Linhard. There were themes in our European talks. The first was confusion, even at the foreign ministry level. The US side clarified this confusion. In Italy, after long conversations, we finally made clear that we were talking only about nuclear ballistic missles, not other nuclear delivery systems. We stated that it is unlikely that the Soviets will buy this proposal. If the USSR buys it, and then the United States backs away, do we deploy other short-range delivery systems (artillery, cruise missiles, tactical air) to compensate? Do you, as Europeans, want this? France currently has no major domestic opposition to their nuclear "force de frappe." The French are fearful that anti-nuclear sentiment will creep into their country. They wonder where this will put their own independent nuclear arsenal. The US proposal does not involve French, British, or Chinese missiles. If the superpowers negotiate limits, however, third country nuclear arsenals may ultimately be considered. [Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Adm Cockell added that since Reykjavik, President Reagan has backed off the "zero option" on ballistic missiles. The proposal was for a 50% reduction in ballistic forces. The Soviets wanted concessions on the testing of SDI. For the first five years of such an agreement this may not be a problem. There was no revision of tabled offer Reykjavik. [Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Mr. Linhard said that the "fear of being duped" view is expressed by European think tanks, not government officials. Linhard made reference to a cartoon about the summit from the Atlanta Constitution, in pointing out that our own citizens are frustrated by the results of Reykjavik. Linhard said we must put down a marker with the Soviets. We can assume maximum leverage with SDI. Otherwise, there is just so much leverage the United States can assume. Linhard said the Soviets respond to out "programmatic" arms development, not our "jawboning" in Geneva. The US team conveyed to the Soviets why we feel ICBMs are destabilizing. The US view is that the Soviet Union has over-invested in ballistic missiles. We need to be more hard-nosed. Adm. Cockell staed that the post-Reykjavik climate has revealed how many "nuclear lovers" there actually are in Europe. [Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Mr. Linhard. The chief US priority is that SDI should not be treated as a bargaining chip. The price to restrict SDI would have to be high. We will not let SDI die. The United States also hopes the Soviets will join us in reducing START forces by 50%. In short range (SP) INF, a 100-missile deployment package is acceptable only if there are constraints at the lower levels. The United States will not accept permanent restriction on the 100 INF-level. We have to remain flexible to changes by the Chinese not covered in the treaty. For example, the Chinese may raise their INF levels. Adjustments then can be resolved through negotiation. Rowny briefed the Australians on this following the summit. Linhard moves the discussion to the issue of nuclear testing. There is no significant difference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United States and the Soviet Union agree on where to go next. We recognize the need for further negotiations. The USSR tabled a "package" that looks similar to our stance on the agenda and objectives. Our only difference is in some terminology. The Soviet delegation was not wholly united on the outcome and results of Reykjavik. Akrimanov??? and Karpov? disagreed over the characterization of the talks. The international political climate and interpretation do not quite put us there, in terms of reaching agreement. The establishment of a nuclear risk reduction center is perking along. This is being discussed quietly. We are upgrading the "hot line." This area of cooperation continues, even during the darkest period of USSR-US relations during this Administration. We need a bit more time to distance ourselves from current political issues. On the issue of chemical weapons, we face the challenge of instituting an adequate inspection system. This is mandatory to prevent the high risk of cheating. This refers to Article 10 proposals. [Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Mr. Linhard said that a good doctoral thesis would be to examine the sociology of negotiations. Linhard then outlined the Soviet initiatives since July. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister _______ came in, the day after the delivery of Reagan's SDI letter in July. He proposed an experts meeting, to which we agreed. Seven US experts were sent to Moscow. We encountered four Soviets: Arbatov, Gen. Chervov???, Gen. Turtinov???, and _______??? We went to a dacha. They showed up in military uniforms, which was highly unusual. The first two days were fruitless. They started by saying they hoped we had come with concessions. A month later we met in Washington, DC. The same meeting of seven Americans and four Soviets took place. Then Shultz and Shevardnadze met and proposed the Reykjavik meeting. We then encountered a different cast of Soviet delegates. The new mix was odd: Gen. Akrimanov???, Gen. Karpov???, Gen. Velakov???, Feline??? and Arbatov. We had long, hard discussions. Karpov stressed the non-linkage, linkage points. He got off the track. We returned to Vienna after the Geneva meeting. The Soviets had problems. They did not have a response. There must not have been a great debriefing in Moscow following the Reykjavik meeting. At Geneva, we met new people: Sachabik??? Murtnik??? and Nikulchek??? (an American desk officer.) The Soviets wanted to know our view on ABM compliance. The US agenda was post-Reykjavik. Nonetheless, Paul Nitze went point-by-point through the US position on the ABM Treaty. They were upset at what ended up being our lecture. The US side then turned toward post-Reykjavik topics. The Soviets stone walled us. Murtnick??? was uncomfortable. Karpov??? and Kampelman agreed to an experts meeting in Geneva with a different format--three Americans and three Soviet experts. The United States has been consistent with our arms negotiation team. The Soviets have not; they are running through a variety of fora and players. Mr. Rodman said the linkage strategy ultimately works against the USSR. The US bargaining position is remarkably sound. The United States has pocketed Soviet concessions at Reykjavik and are holding them. We receive some pressure on the United States from Europe. But the United States is positioned to fend off anti-US propaganda. Mr. Linhard. Is the US position being articulated in Australia? Can we do better? [Three paragraphs deleted, (b)(1)(c)(s) exemption] Mr. Linhard said we began SDI in 1983. Military and industrial strategic planners have met on research and development. If SDI were to go away tomorrow and the Soviets pursue defensive activity, as we believe they are, SDI will eventually come back--in reaction to Soviet SDI efforts. Their bunkers, dispersal sites, government leadership protection, all point to their strategic defense effort. If I were a Soviet, I would be building be terminal defenses to protect Moscow. The United States has been able to sustain substantial funding for three years. The Delta-180, HCA test, and shorter range projects have been successful. [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Mr. Rodman US leverage on SDI has gotten the Soviets to the negotiating table. Awareness of this may help sustain Congressional funding. We have to fight every year for it. [One paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] SECRET EXDIS Declassify on: OADR Beazley2 MSG FROM: NSREL --CPUA TO: NSWT --CPUA 01/24/87 18:46:02 To: NSGSG --CPUA Colin L. Powell NSWRP --CPUA Colin L. Powell NOTE FROM: ROBERT E. LINHARD -- SECRET -- SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES GENERAL, I PROMISED THAT I WOULD GET BACK TO YOU TODAY WITH A RECOMMENDATION ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED ON BOTH THE SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. I AM CONTINUING TO REFINE THIS PLAN, BUT HERE IS HOW I WOULD LIKE TO PRESS FORWARD. SDI: 23 JAN -- WE DID SUBMIT TODAY A PAPER WHICH LAYS OUT THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SDI BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S WEEKEND READING AS PLANNED. -- SHULTZ, NITZE, HOLMES ET AL WERE BRIEFED TODAY BY ABRAHAMSON, AND PERLE AS PLANNED. WE GOT A DEBRIEF ON THE SESSION FROM OSD. 25 JAN -- ON MONDAY WE WILL HAVE THE REGULAR SDI MAFIA MEETING AT 2PM IN ROOM 208. I WILL TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE EXPERT LEVEL OF THE SYSTEM TO KEEP THE ENSUING DISCUSSION "OBJECTIVE" IN ALL AGENCIES. -- WE WILL ALSO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE SDI ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT AND THE SDI REPORT TO CONGRESS. 26 JAN -- I WILL MEET WITH NUNN AND WARNER TO BRIEF THEM ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION, BUT TRY TO MAKE SOME IN ROADS ON SDI WITH NUNN. -- I ALSO PLAN TO SIT DOWN WITH RICHARD PERLE ON THURSDAY AND SEE IF WE AGREE ON THE STATE OF PLAY AND ON THE PROPER PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES. 27 JAN -- WILL TRY TO GET A MORE COMPLETE BRIEFING FROM ABRAHAMSON ON THE SURVIVABILITY ISSUE. -- WILL MEET WITH NITZE TO DISCUSS COST EFFECTIVE CRITERIA AND SMOKE OUT HIS VIEWS ON THE LEGALLY CORRECT INTERPRETATION ISSUE. -- WE HAVE ASKED OSD TO ENSURE THAT GATES (CIA) AND ROWNEY ARE BRIEFED BY COB WEDNESDAY. 28 JAN -- IF MAX RETURNS FROM GENEVA, I WILL TRY TO HAVE HIM COME IN AND DISCUSS BOTH SDI AND ARMS CONTROL WITH ME ON THURSDAY. HE WILL BE (I BELIEVE) THE KEY INFLUENCE ON SHULTZ ON THESE ISSUES (NOT NITZE) -- NITZE AND PERLE WILL LEAVE TOWN FOR WERKUNDE IN MUNICH AND BE OUT OF POCKET UNTIL TUESDAY 3 FEB. 29 JAN -- ASSUMING AN NSPG ON 3 FEB, WE WILL SUBMIT THE STANDARD PRESIDENTIAL MEETING MEMO BY COB FRIDAY -- HAVE ENCOURAGED OSD TO HAVE CAP MEET WITH MAX KAMPELMAN ON FRIDAY IF POSSIBLE BOTH GET A DEBRIEF FROM MAX AND TO LOBBY MAX ON OSD'S VIEWS OF THE SDI ISSUE. 30 JAN -- SHULTZ WILL MEET AGAIN WITH OSD STAFF TO RECEIVE THE ANSWERS TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS THAT HE ASKED THIS SATURDAY. -- WE WILL SUBMIT THE SUGGESTED TALKERS FOR FCC AND THE PRESIDENT'S USE AT THE 3 FEB NSPG. FEB -- WOULD ENCOURAGE A PRIVATE BREAKFAST OR LUNCH WITH FCC, CAP, SHULTZ AND PERHAPS CROWE ON MONDAY. PURPOSE WOULD BE TO HAVE ONE FINAL DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES ON THE 3 FEB NSPG AGENDA PRIOR TO TUESDAY. -- WE WOULD SUBMIT A DECISION PACKAGE FOR FCC'S REVIEW AND USE AFTER THE NSPG ON TUESDAY. THIS WOULD INCLUDE: 1. A MEMO TO THE PRES 2. A DRAFT NSDD 3. A PLAN FOR THE SCHEDULE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS (LEADING TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 15 FEB)WHICH ADDRESSES ALLIED CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. FEB -- NSPG FRAMED TO ADDRESS THE SDI ISSUES -- BUT ALSO THE RELATED ISSUE OF THE SOVIET (AND SHULTZ) PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING THE DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUE IN GENEVA. -- AFTER THE NSPG, FCC SENDS THE DECISION PACKAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. FEB -- WE RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND EXECUTE THE PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION. ARMS CONTROL: 3 JAN -- CIA HAS NOW PROVIDED THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE "GRIP 01" PAPER WHICH DESCRIBES THE INTEL COMMUNITIES VIEWS OF WHAT TO EXPECT IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE SOVIETS FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. 5 JAN -- THE GRIP 01 PAPER WILL BE CIRCULATED THE THE ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT GROUP (ACSG) FOR THEIR FINAL REVIEW. -- STATE IS DRAFTING A 3-4 PAGE PRESENTATION OF THEIR DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL, THE EVALUATION OF WHICH WILL BE ONE OF THE TWO MAIN PURPOSES OF GRIP 02. 6 JAN -- ACSG WILL MEET TO BLESS GRIP 01 AND APPROVE IT FOR SUBMISSION TO THE CABINET LEVEL FOR THEIR INFORMATIONAL READING. IT WILL ALSO BEGIN DRAFTING OF GRIP 02. THIS PAPER WILL BE INTENDED TO EVALUATE HOW THE US SHOULD REACT TO THE POSSIBILITIES LAID OUT IN GRIP 01. IN REALITY, IT WILL FOCUS ON TWO MAIN ISSUES: 1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL STATE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK, AND 2. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMS CONTROL PATH WE ARE NOW ON (I.E., PAPERS BEING DRAFTED IN GENEVA, LEADING TO A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AT WHICH THE ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED, WITH AN EYE ON A SUMMIT AT WHICH AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE COULD BE REACHED). ** THIS IS A CRITICALLY NEEDED AGREEMENT! ** 7 JAN -- 1ST FULL DRAFT OF GRIP 02 CIRCULATED TO ACSG FOR CRITICAL REVIEW. -- WILL DISCUSS GRIP 02 PAPER WITH RICHARD PERLE AND PAUL NITZE. 8 JAN -- ACSG TO DISCUSS GRIP 02 AND PREPARE FOR 2ND DRAFT. -- WILL DISCUSS GRIP 02 PAPER WITH MAX. -- 2ND DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY COB THURSDAY 9 JAN -- FINAL WORKING DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DEVELOPED AND CIRCULATED. ?0 JAN -- FINAL DRAFT OF GRIP 02 PAPER DISTRIBUTED TO ACSG TO BE PROVIDED TO CABINET PRINCIPALS FOR THERE WEEKEND READING(PRIOR TO THE NSPG ON 3 FEB). ? FEB -- DISCUSSION OF GRIP 02 WITHIN NSC WITH FCC PRIOR TO 3 FEB NSPG. IF APPROPRIATE, WE CAN WEAVE THE EVALUATION OF THE STATE DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL INTO THE FLOW OF THE 3 FEB NSPG DISCUSSION. IF NOT READY FOR DISCUSSION BY THAT POINT, WE CAN REQUEST A SEPARATE MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT. IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THAT WE FACE THREE MAJOR ISSUES OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS: 1. SDI -- AND ESPECIALLY THE DECISION TO RESTRUCTURE THE SDI PROGRAM TO THE LEGALLY CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY; 2. DEFENSE AND SPACE -- THE TIMELY EVALUATION BY ALL AGENCIES OF THE NEW PROPOSAL IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA SUBMITTED BY SECSTATE TO THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK (AND AN IDEA THE SOVIETS WILL PUSH IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS FROM THEIS DIRECTION); AND 3. PROCESS -- MAKING A CONSCIOUS DECISION WHETHER WE WANT TO ALLOW THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS THAT WE ARE NOW ON(I.E., PAPERS IN GENEVA TO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN MOSCOW TO SUMMIT IN DC) TO PROCEED ALONG THE CURRENT PATH -- OR PROVIDE SOME ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES TO MINIMIZE OUR RISKS ON THAT PATH. WHILE INTERRELATED, WE WOULD USE OSD BRIEFINGS AND INFORMAL CONTACTS TO SET THE STAGE FOR AN NSPG ON 3 FEB ON ISSUE 1, WHILE USING THE ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT GROUP TO WORK 2 AND 3 SO THAT THEY TOO ARE READY ABOUT THE SAME TIME. WE CAN THEN CHOOSE IF WE WANT TO TRY TO KILL AT LEAST ISSUES 1 AND 2 AT THE SAME NSPG (THE ISSUES ARE DIRECTLY RELATED), OR USE THE 3 FEB NSPG TO WORK ISSUE 1 DIRECTLY AND SET US UP FOR A SECOND NSPG SHORTLY THEREAFTER ON ISSUES 2 AND 3. SORRY ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THIS. WOULD LIKE YOUR FEEDBACK. AS THEY SAY IN THE NAVY UNODIR (UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED) I WILL PROCEED ALONG THE PATH OUTLINED ABOVE. CC: NSSES --CPUA NSSFK --CPUA NSDAM --CPUA NSLFB --CPUA NSFWE --CPUA NSWAC --CPUA NSWT --CPUA NSREL --CPUA NSGSG --CPUA NSWRP --CPUA bTHOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED ON SDI AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

AREADME CHAP01 CHAP02 CHAP03 CHAP04 CHAP05 CHAP06 CHAP07 CHAP08 CHAP09 CHAP10 CHAP11 CHRON { November 22 1986 } WHOSWHO Files Listed: 14

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National Security Archives

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