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CHAP05 FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSHRT --CPUA 09/09/85 13:20:17 To: NSRCM --CPUA ROBERT C. MCFARLAN NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: peace process/arms sales Note from Howard Teicher. *** Forwarding note from NSHRT --CPUA 09/09/85 11:09 *** To: NSWFM --CPUA ROBERT C. MCFARLAN NSWRP --CPUA ROBERT C. MCFARLAN NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher SUBJECT: peace process/arms sales - secret - as i now understand the subject decisions, there will be no murphy meeting but there will be an arms sale. given the congressional mood, an arms package that includes everything but the aircraft stands a fair chance of congressional approval while sending the clearest policy signals to the middle east. i hope there is still an opportunity to consider modifying the package to give hussein 85 % of what he's after. cc: NSJC --CPUA NSDRF --CPUA cc: NSHRT --CPUA NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 12/04/85 02:02:55 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 08/31/85 13:26 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: PRIVATE BLANK CHECK Subject: Current Status of Operations Recovery: Following summary is based on discussions in Geneva among Kimche, Copp, Gorbanifahr and Kiyarashi which were concluded this weekend, subsequent discussions with Mendy Meron here in Washington which are continuing, and calls btwn Copp and Kimche's asset (Nimrodi) who is "baby sitting" the Iranians in Paris (where they are are receiving guidance Tehran). The attempted transfer through Portugal of 18 Hawk missiles went awry because the Iranians were in fact seeking a weapons system that would be capable of stopping reconnaisance flights along the Iranian/Soviet border and on the Iranian/Iraqi border. Gorba rptd that these flights occur regularly and as deep as 40mi inside Iranian airspace. Because Schwimmer and Ledeen were unfamiliar with the operational parameters of the HAWK, they agreed to ship 120 weapons that were totally inadequate to meet the rqmts established by the Iranians. This delivery has created an atmosphere of extraordinary distrust on the part of the Iranians; in Kimche's view, because the credibility of the Gorba/Kangarlu/ Kiyarashi mission has probably been seriously called into question. Despite this perception (Gorba said numerous times that this whole thing was a "cheating game" on the part of the Israelis), Copp & Kimche have been able to proceed with a renewed dialogue which still promises hope for achieving our three objectives: -- support for a pragmatic - army oriented faction which could take over in a change of government -- return of the five AMCIT hostages -- no more terrorism directed against U.S. personnel or interests. From these ongoing discussions, which in two cases included Iranian military officers, Copp and Kimche conclude that the military situation in Iran is desperate. The Iranian descriptions of the state of their equipment, lack of competent management, inability to use much of the remaining U.S. materiel portends the real possibility of a military collapse (at least by the Army) in the near to mid-term. Thus, there is considerable pressure on the interlocutors in Europe to produce quickly. Given the relatively low level of competence on the part of the Iranians in Europe, and the fact that any supplies delivered will undoubtedly have to be examined by an Army or Air Force officer, it is very doubtful that a "single transaction" arrangement can be worked out with the parties in Tehran, no matter what is agreed to in Europe. In short they have been "scammed" so many times in the past that the attitude of distrust is very high on their part. At the same time, in all discussions (including today's phone calls) they are desperate to conclude some kind of arrangement in the next 10 days and have even asked that the meeting scheduled for Saturday in London be advanced. Based on what we can conclude from intelligence in Beirut, we believe that they are very concerned that the hostages (the only Iranian leverage point besides the Jews in Iran) may be killed or captured/released by the Syrians, Druze, Phalange or Amal in the near future. Waite's contacts with the captors seems to corroborate this assesment. In short, time is very short for all parties concerned. Finally, there is the matter of the longer term strategy for what we should be attempting to accomplish viz a viz the Iran-Iraq war ans a more reasonable government in Iran. From my personal discussions with Kimche and Meron it is apparent the the Israelis want: the war to continue at a stalemate, a more moderate Iraninan government in the end and will somehow find a way to continue getting their people (Jews) out of Iran through some kind of barter arrangement. In that the first two of their goals, it would seem, generally congruent w/ our interests, and their last a fact of life, we should probably be seeing the return of the AMCIT hostages as a subsidiary benefit -- not the primary objective, though it may be a part of the necessary first steps in achieving the broader objectives. While Kimche, Meron, Copp and I all agree that there is a high degree of risk in pursuing the course we have started, we are now so far down the road that stopping what has been started could have even more serious repercussions. We all view the next steps as "confidence building" on the part of both sides. None of us have any illusions about the cast of characters we are dealing with on the other side. They are a primitive, unsophisticated group who are extremely distrustful of the West in general and the Israeli/U.S. in particular. They have not the slightest idea of what is going on in our government or how the system works. Today for example, Gorba called Copp in absolute confusion over the fact that Rafsanjani had just received a letter from (of all people) Sen. Helms regarding the American Hostages. Since the Iranians are adamant that they not be publicly connected with the seizure, holding or release of the AMCITs, why, Gorba wanted to know, was Helms being brought into this "solution to the puzzle." Gorba reiterated that "Batri ought to have more control over the members of his parliment" than to allow them to confuse an already difficult problem. Dick told him the letter had nothing to do with what we are about, but Gorba did not seem convinced that this wasn't some sort of effort to embarass Iran. Given this very unsophisticated view of things on their part and the distrust that the Iranians obviously feel, we believe that if we stop the current effort at this point and do not at least proceed with a "test" of the current? relationship we: -- run the risk of never being able to establish a "foothold" for the longer term goals in that the people we are dealing with will be totally discredited at home; and -- incur the greater likelihood of reprisals against us for "leading them on." These reprisals could take the form of additional hostage seizures, execution of some/all of those now held, or both. While the threat to carry out sanctions against us has not, to my knowledge, ever arisen (it certainly has not since Kimche/Copp/ North have been directly engaged -- and Michael never mentioned it), it is interesting to note that when Copp questioned the bona fides of Gorba and his cohorts as capable of delivering on their end of the arrangement, Gorba carefully noted that since these discussions began w/ Michael & Schwimmer, there has not been a single Islamic Jihad bomb threat, hijacking or kidnapping -- and that there would be none if this "worked." D.K., Copp and I regard this to be at least one sign of confidence that this activity may yet prosper. There are some lesser indications of confidence in recent days: -- in response to Copp's demand for funds to be deposited in advance to defray operational costs, and what the Iranians were told were "purchases" on the arms market" a total of $41M has been deposited; -- the 18 HAWKs delivered last week have been repackaged and are ready for return to origin on the next available flight; -- the parties in Europe continue to stress that their requirements are long-term and that they are anxious to get on with a longer range program of Israeli originated support which would include technical assistance w/ sophisticated hardware which is critically needed but deadlined (in this regard Gorba at one point noted that at times they have as few as 50 operationalmtanks and less than a dozen flyable aircraft). With all of the above as a lengthy preamble describing two nearly frantic weeks w/ the Israelis & Iranians, the following proposal has evolved which the Iranians today said they wd like to discuss in detail on Saturday: -- The total "package" from the Israelis wd consist of 50 HAWKs w/PIP (product improvement package) and 3300 basic TOWs. -- Deliveries wd commence on or about 12 December as follows: H hr: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT H+10hrs: 1 707 (same A/C) w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT H+16hrs: 1 747 w/50 HAWKs & 400 TOWs = 2 AMCITs H+20hrs: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT H+24hrs: 1 747 w/2000 TOWs = French Hostage All involved on our side recognize that this does not meet one of the basic criteria established at the opening of this venture: a single transaction which wd be preceded by a release of hostages. However, given the points above regarding the mutual distrust in the dialogue, we all believe it is about the only way we can get the overall process moving. Measures have been taken to reduce the chance for duplicity on the part of the Iranians and to preserve a measure of OPSEC in carrying out the transaction. In the case of a double cross, one of the Iranians will be in the hands of assets we control throughout. One of them (Kangarlu) has already suffered a serious (although apparently not fatal) heart attack after last week's HAWK transaction failed to produce results. The first two deliveries, via 707 freighters are relatively small and if they do not produce the desired outcomes, all else stops. All $ are now under our control. OpSEC concerns are threefold: communications, deliveries enroute to Iran and replenishment of the Israeli stocks. To solve the first problem an OPs Code is now in use by all parties. This code is similar to the one used to oversee deliveries to the Nicaraguan Resistance and has never been compromised. The delivery/flight planning security problem has been solved by a much more deliberate selection of aircraft and aircrews as well as a series of transient airfields which can be used enroute to the field controlled by the Iranian Army at Tabriz. Appropriate arrangements have also been made to ensure that the overflight of Turkey is not challenged. All A/C will be inspected by one of the Iranians at a transient location between Tel Aviv and Tabriz. Before the A/C actually crosses into Iranian airspace, the appropriate release(s) must occur. The last OPSEC concern, that of replenishing Israeli stocks, is probably the most delicate issue. The quality of TOWs requested represents [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Meron and I are working w/ the Israeli purchasing office in NYC to ensure that the replenishment can be accomplished quickly after December 12 as possible. All recognize that quantities [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] degrade Israeli readiness and that the items will need to be dispatched quickly in order to preclude disaffection and leaks. Meron has solved at least one of the problems in this regard by identifying a means of transferring the required cash to an IDF account which will allow cash (rather than FMS credit) purchases from the U.S. In order to put this plan into action, Kimche, Copp, Schwimmer and Goode plan to meet in London on Saturday morning to review all arrangements. If we are satisfied that all our assets (money, aircraft, aircrews, transit facilities, overflight arrangements and military equipment) are prepared, Copp and Kimche will meet another hotel with Gorba and Kiyarahi to finalize the plan. Our side will then reconvene later in the evening at our hotel to review any last minute changes. I wd then call you (using the Ops code), transmit the agreed upon arrangements for approval and, if you concur, Kimche & Copp will meet again w/ the Iranians on Sunday a.m. to express our agreement with the plan. Copp & Goode wd return to the U.S. Sunday p.m. on separate flights. On the 11th, the day before the plan is to be executed, Copp will establish a CP in Cyprus at the Turkish controlled airfield (Arjan) where he can monitor implementation and stop it at any point we desire. The secondary fields at Brindisi, Cagliary (Sardinia) and Lisbon will be covered by Copp controlled assets who are not witting of the true origin, destination or contents of the A/C but who can "fix" things in a hurry if something goes wrong. One of our people will be in contact in Turkey throughout. [Three lines deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Once in hand, the hostages will be flown [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] to Larnaca on our Navy HH-53 where they will be picked up by a EUCOM C-141 and flown to Wiesbaden for debriefing. 18hrs later Oakley will proceed from Andrews AFB to Wiesbaden with family members -- thus allowing us 24 uninterrupted hours for debriefing. The debrief team will be staged at Wiesbaden 12 hours in advance, just as we did two weeks ago without notariety. Dewey is not briefed on [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] -- though he suspects. The Israelis are in the same position. Dewey and I have been through the whole concept twice looking for holes and can find little that can be done to improve it given the "trust factor" with the Iranians. In that all parties involved have great interest in keeping this as quiet as possible, and [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption], we believe it to be worth the risk. I have not confided in Dewey re the longer term goals we could/should hope to achieve. Thus, the only parties fully aware of all dimensions of what we are about are you and RCM. I have given careful consideration to what you suggested re an RCM meeting with the Iranians in an effort to obtain release of the hostages before starting on an effort to undo the present regieme in Tehran. Like you and Bud, I find the idea of bartering over the lives of these poor men repugnant. Nonetheless, I believe that we are, at this point, barring unforseen developments in London or Tel Aviv, too far along with the Iranians to risk turning back now. If we do not at least make one more try at this point, we stand a good chance of condemning some or all to death and a renewed wave of Islamic Jihad terrorism. While the risks of proceeding are significant, the risks of not trying one last time are even greater. PRIVATE BLANK CHECK MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 01/16/86 13:50:49 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 01/10/86 18:57 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: MIKE LEDEEN Have told this to Ami[?]. You should be aware, however, that it is my opinion, based on my meeting w/ Gorba on Monday night, that Gorba tells Ledeen everything. Ami[?] suspects that there is probably a secret business arrangement among Schwimmer, Ledeen and Gorba that is being conducted w/o the knowledge of any of the three respective governments and that this will result in at least some cross fertilization of information. This may not be altogether bad if we can keep in touch w/ Ledeen enough to get a feel for what is really going on. I have no problem w/ someone making an honest profit on honest business. I do have a problem if it means the compromise of sensitive political or operational details. We might consider making Mike a contract employee of the CIA and requiring him to take a periodic polygraph. Yes? No? Y MIKE LEDEEN FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 02/25/86 12:25:30 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Saudi arms From Stark. *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 02/25/86 11:29 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER -- CONFIDENTIAL -- NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK SUBJECT: Saudi arms Don raised an important issue yesterday with respect to the number of missiles in the Saudi package. The numbers were based on the long-term assessment of potential threats to Saudi Arabia (South Yemen, Iran, and Iraq) which would apply through the end of the missile delivery period. They are based on the standard methodology for computing threat-oriented weapons inventory requirements, and were originally much larger (based on a combined Iran-Iraq threat). The current AIM-9 numbers are based on the threat from the largest single potential foe--Iraq. As a benchmark, you should be aware that we have already sold the Saudis a large number of missiles. The following list shows the total sold and, in parentheses, the number remaining to be delivered to complete that total. [Three lines deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] As you can see, there are [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] Sidewinders still in the pipeline awaiting delivery to the Saudis. Thus, a US move to notify additional missiles would have less immediate military value than accelerating deliveries already approved. The Saudi goal is the tangible evidence of US political support and commitment for their security represented by a Presidential decision to raise the arms issue. cc: NSJRS --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 03/06/86 21:34:10 To: NSRBM --CPUA NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: AIPAC and Saudi Arms FYI. *** Forwarding note from NSJMP --CPUA 03/06/86 19:22 *** To: NSWRP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 03/06/86 11:53 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER Subject: AIPAC and Saudi Arms JOCK, PLEASE TELL TOM, IF YOU THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE, THAT I REALLY APPRECIATE HIS EFFORT. I WILL APPRECIATE IT EVEN MORE IF IT IS SUCCESSFUL. cc: NSJC --CPUA JOCK COVEY cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSRCM --CPUA 03/26/86 09:19:12 To: NSRCM --CPUA *** Reply to note of 03/20/86 23:04 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Anything New?? After the House vote on aid to the resistance, I plan to take a few days just to get re-acquainted w/ the family. Meanwhile, we are trying to find a way to get 10 BLOWPIPE launchers and 20 missiles from [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] thru the Short Bros. Rep. The V.P. from Short Bros. sought me out several mos. ago and I met w/ him again in London a few weeks ago when I was there [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Short Bros., the mfgr. of the BLOWPIPE, is willing to arrange the deal, conduct the training and even send U.K. "tech reps" fwd if we can close the arrangement. Dick Secord has already paid 10% down on the delivery and we have a Salvadoran EUC which is acceptable to the [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Unfortunately, the week all this was going to closure we decided to go fwd [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] The arrangement is now on ice and we are casting about for a way to tell the [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] that we wd be pleased if this all went thru. Yr thoughts wd be appreciated. On our other action, there are fresh developments. Yesterday, [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] called the phone drop that Dick Secord had given him. Al Hakim, who we passed off as a"White House interpreter" at the Frankfurt mtg. spoke to [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] twice yesterday. The bottom line of the calls is that [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] wd like to have us meet w/ the Iranian side next week at Kharg Island. Supposedly, during the mtg the hostages wd be released and we wd immediately start delivering the 3k TOWs and agree at the mtg to the delivery of spare parts which they desperately need. They profess to be very concerned about the nature of the Soviet threat and want all we can give them on that score. Not sure at this point how real this offer is, but he says Rafsanjani wd come as the head of the Iranian side. If this looks like a go -- and we should know more tomorrow when the next phone call is scheduled--how are you for travel during the week of 31Mar-4Apr? Warm regards, North BT W Anything New?? FROM: NSPWR --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 05/20/86 16:29:54 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Saudi Arms A friend of mine on the West Coast who is well plugged in to the Jewish community leadership called me to offer his ideas/help on the Saudi package. (He's a strong Reagan supporter and has heard many lectures from me on the importance of our military relations with Arabs.) The idea he was suggesting was that we offer Israel some new goody as part of a "package deal" -- he's convinced this would give both Jewish leaders and pro-Israel Senators a way out. First he suggested forgiveness of FMS debt, which I explained was a non-starter for budgetary reasons.Then he expressed interest in the various things Rabin had come over to argue for, which were all artfully designed not to have budgetary consequences. I have no idea whether these things are do-able. But this guy is convinced that linking the Saudi package with something for Israel would change a lot of votes, and he is in a position to know whereof he speaks. Where does DoD stand on the various things Rabin was asking about? Has anyone thought about these two issues in tandem? cc: NSJRS --CPUA NSHRT --CPUA FROM: NSPWR --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 05/21/86 08:46:56 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Saudi Arms My earlier note, passing on a suggestion about sweetening the pot with something for Israel, OBE. But save it for future reference: Many times in the past, things unpalatable to the pro-Israel crowd -- whether arms deals with Arabs or even argreements involving withdrawals from territory -- have been made more palatable by adding something to their side of the ledger (instead of subtracting from the other side). Any future breakthrough in the peace process will probably also find us looking for ways to buy them off the same way. cc: NSHRT --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA FROM: NSCPC --CPUA TO: NSOLN --CPUA 08/19/86 08:13:07 To: NSOLN --CPUA NSRLE --CPUA NOTE FROM: Craig P. Coy SUBJECT: singlaub he called wanting a meeting with north or vince or anybody. he wants to know what to do with all of the equipment in hls name. who's buying etc. i put him off until oln returns. i think i could have gotten a parts list with serial numbers from him over the phone if i had asked. MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/12/86 21:50:26 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 09/10/86 13:15 NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Iran Have just returned from mtg w/ Rabin, who called at 1910 and asked me to come by his hotel. Mtg lasted abt 1.5hrs. Summary: Vy complementary to you & noted that the hostage operation had to be the longest running no-leak operation of its kind in history. Said he was vy pleased w/ yr reaction & SecShultz re Kfir to Honduras. He finally got to the point of inviting me over. He noted press stories and other intel on lack of supplies for Contras and wanted to know if we had any need for SovBloc weaps and ammo he could make avail. I told him that we wd vy much like to have whatever he cd spare and he asked "has your shipload left the Med yet?" (This is the one I tried to get Casey's people to pay for as a means of covering some of Dick's debts). At this point I cd see no reason to dissemble, and told him it was in Lisbon. He then suggested that if it is "your ship, not the CIA's," it shd come to Haifa and he wd have it filled w/ whatever they cd have assembled in the next five days. He went on at some length about his low opinion of our intel service - both in terms of covert ops and intelligence collecting (I noted that maybe we were getting better at counterintelligence than they thought - and he allowed that was probably true and that there would "be no more Pollards). Bottom line: Don't quite no what to do. Did not want to turn down offer - since it includes recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea. We can go ahead and move the whole shipment to Honduras or El Salvador - but still won't have any money to pay off rapidly growing debts. Hate to turn away offers like this - it will really help in the long run. Any advice? V/R North P.S. pls look at today's [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] re Contra resupply effort. All flights being flown - including three msns last night and three more tonight at last light have been vy successful. All being done by Dick's pilots w/ borrowed $. ( Iran FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSAGK --CPUA 09/16/86 19:28:10 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Persian Gulf *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 09/16/86 18:46 *** To: NSHRT --CPUA NSDBR --CPUA NSSRT --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSWRP --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK SUBJECT: Persian Gulf A couple of news items: --Bandar is reportedly returning to Washington tomorrow. --The GCC had a team in the US last month looking at the Lockheed P-3 as a possible surveillance aircraft. In general, we want to support GCC multilateral defense efforts. Unfortunately, this mission did not go well (ISA didn't get apprised of it til the eleventh hour and neither Navy nor Lockheed went to much trouble to make it a success). GCC has now reportedly narrowed its search to Dutch or French alternatives. The real issue is need for a PD making GCC eligible to purchase defense goods and services, which we don't yet have. DOD is ready to go but has been holding up the paperwork due to their understanding that GCC wants to downplay public association with the US. (Since the PD has to be notified to Congress, USG to GCC arms sales would inevitably become public). We ought to be going ahead with the PD, but want to check with the GCC first. GCC Secretary General Bishara is in town next week and should pay a call on Armitage, who can be expected to raise the issue with him. cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL FROM: NSDBR --CPUA TO: NSPWH --CPUA 10/11/86 10:13:22 To: NSPWH --CPUA *** Reply to note of 10/10/86 20:08 FROM: Dennis Ross Subject: NSC complicity in NY-based Iranian Arms-smuggling deal. If you want me to, it's okay by me. I think he's been fed a line of BS--unless there are things going on that I don't know about. FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSHRT --CPUA 10/22/86 16:59:56 To: NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: a-4s for argentina *** Forwarding note from NSHRT --CPUA 10/22/86 16:00 *** To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 10/16/86 19:18 *** -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher Subject: a-4s for argentina during the u.s.-u.k. pol-mil talks last week, the brits raised on their own initiative u.k. opposition to the transfer or sale of a-4s to argentina. [Five lines deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] the meaning of this is clear: thatcher is worried about the electoral reprecussions of what labor will describe as the u.s. payback for her cooperation. notwithstanding her political problem, which u.k. experts continue to credit to economic problems, non-anglophiles in the u.s.g. (i.e. ara types, pm types and soviet types) remain convinced that we must find ways to strengthen argentina's military and support alfonsin. everyone who supports this approach believes the president should discuss the problem with{ thatcher next month. i would propose the following sequence of actions in advance of such a dialogue - you and shultz discuss at the end of this week; - assuming he agrees it should be put to the president, discuss with the president or send decision memo next week; - if he agrees to raise it with thatcher, you and shultz could send a substantive message to your counterparts advising them of the importance the president attaches to this issue and his intention to raise it when he meets with mrs. thatcher; - the bureaucracy will meanwhile develop a game plan for a-4 modernization and diplomatic initiatives (perhaps to include a u. s. commitment to work with alfonsin to bring about an end to hostilities and further progress in the political area. - thatcher might still say no, forcing the president to decide whether to acquiesce or take the measures which most objective observers feel best serves our hemispheric interests. cc: NSJT --CPUA NSPRS --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSWRP --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL cc: NSHRT --CPUA FROM: NSDGM --CPUA TO: NSDBR --CPUA 11/10/86 12:34:53 To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: David Major SUBJECT: ARMS SALES TO IRAN DOJ CALLED TO ADVISE THERE IS A PENDING CRIMINAL CASE IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK THAT COULD POSSIBLY SPILL OVER TO THE ISSUE RELATING TO OUR REPORTED CONTACTS WITH IRAN AND ARMS SELLS.DOJ ADIVSED 4 ISRAELI CITIZENS AND 6 AMERICANS HAVE BEEN CHARGED, FOLLOWING A CUSTOMS INVESTIGATION WITH CONSPIRACY DURING THE PERIOD 9/85-4/86 TO SHIP ARMS FROM ISRAELI TO IRAN. THESE ARMS WERE SHIPPED TO ISRAEL FROM THE USA WITH THE PROVISION THEY NOT BE TRANSHIPPED FROM ISRAEL WITHOUT US APPROVAL. KUNSLER IS DEFENDING ONE OF THE SUBJECTS AND PLANS TO SUBPOENA BUD AND OLLIE TO CLAIM THIS GROUP WAS DOING NOTHING MORE THAN WHAT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS DOING. DOJ WILL BE OFFICALLY ASKING FOR GUIDANCE RE THIS MATTER, HOWEVER WE SHOULD BE AWARE THIS IS GOING ON. THE INDIVIDUALS AND FRONT COMPANIES INVOLVED ARE: B.I.T.COMPNAY,IMPORT-EXPORT AND METAL LIMITED; DERGO ESTABLISHMENT;FLEAR INCORPORATION";INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT AND SALES INC; VIANAR AND ANSTALL; SAMUEL EVANS, GURIEL EISNBERG, RAEFEL ISRAEL EISENBER, WILLIAM NORTHROP, ABRAHAM BAR-AM (FORMER ISRAELI GENERAL), NICO MINAROS, ALFRED FLEARMOY, HERMAN MOLL, RALPH KOPKA, HANS BIHN. THIS ARMS LIST IS LONG BUT INCLUDES AIRPLANES, MISSILES, RADARS,GUNS, HELICOPTERS ETC. cc: NSOLN --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSWRP --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSDBR --CPUA NSKED --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA FROM: NSPWR --CPUA TO: NSAGK --CPUA 11/28/86 09:47:02 To: NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: European Arms Sales to Iran I note in the Sit Room's evening summary the other day a report that Genscher is emphasizing that the FRG will not ship arms to either side in the Iran-Iraq war. I have been worried that the disclosures of our limited arms transfers might provide an excuse for several other countries to throw off all restraints in permitting such sales (citing US "hypocrisy," etc.) However, maybe the uproar will turn out to encourage other governments to crack down harder, for fear of inviting similar "scandals" there. I can see the brouhaha in Italy having the same result, for example. So -- at least in that respect -- we may not turn out so badly. cc: NSRBM --CPUA NSDBR --CPUA NSHRT --CPUA FROM: NSHRT --CPUA TO: NSJT --CPUA 01/09/87 17:15:14 To: NSJT --CPUA *** Reply to note of 01/09/87 17:08 NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher Subj ect: A 4s i agree with your analysis. the israelis will not quickly find a way to reimburse the argentines, and may even try to force us to eat the costs by involving the congress. i continue to believe that we must find ways to strengthen argentine democracy with arms transfers, perhaps through agreement for a long-term co-production arrangement that would give the argentines confidence in our support. but don't look to the israelis for relief on this one, especially when we're pushing to kill the lavi. FROM: NSPWR --CPUA TO: NSDBR --CPUA 02/11/87 09:19:34 To: NSRBO --CPUA NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Operation Staunch Even if we have trouble putting Operation Staunch back together, we can at least blow the whistle on the countries that are sending arms clandestinely to Iran. I note in this morning's INR summary a major new Bulgarian arms shipment. (These are John Whitehead's new friends!) We should let the Iraqis know of such information when it turns up. Perhaps we are already doing so, but in the present environment we should make a point of telling the Iraqis what we know. cc: NSDBR --CPUA NSWJB --CPUA NSPJD --CPUA

AREADME CHAP01 CHAP02 CHAP03 CHAP04 CHAP05 CHAP06 CHAP07 CHAP08 CHAP09 CHAP10 CHAP11 CHRON { November 22 1986 } WHOSWHO Files Listed: 14

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