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CHAP01 FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSWRP --CPUA 06/07/86 10:51:08 To: NSWRP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 06/06/86 18:45 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER Subject: Marcos and Panama (CONFIDENTIAL) IS RICH STILL IN HAWAII? LAXALT CALLED ME YESTERDAY AND SAID A WASHINGTON LAW FIRM HAD CONTACTED HIM AND SAID THEY WERE WORKING ON A PANAMA OPTION. THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF USG HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO MARCOS' GOING TO PANAMA. I TOLD PAUL I WOULD CALL HIM ON MONDAY. IT SEEMS TO ME I SHOULD SAY WE DO NOT OBJECT. cc: NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON NSRBM --CPUA ROD MCDANIEL NSRTC --CPUA DICK CHILDRESS NSFEG --CPUA FLORENCE GANTT FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 06/10/86 23:21:54 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 08/31/85 13:26 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: PRIVATE BLANK CHECK Hopefully you have by now been informed that UNO/FDN safely released the eight West Germans this evening just before dark at the religious commune at Presillas. Franklin is headed North in attempt to get across the Rama Rd before the Sandinistas can close in on him. At this point the only liability we still have is one of DEMOCRACY INC.'s airplanes is mired in the mud (it is the rainy season down there) on the secret field in Costa Rica. They hope to have it out by dawn. On a separate but related matter: The reason why I asked to speak to you urgently earlier today is that Ray called Elliott Abrams regarding the third country issue. Elliott has talked to Shultz and had prepared a paper re going to the Saudis and Taiwanese for contributions. Elliott called me and asked "where to send the money." I told Elliott to do nothing, to send no papers andto talk to no one further about this until he talks to you. He is seeing you privately tomorrow. At this point I need your help. As you know, I have the accounts and the means by which this thing needs to be accomplished. I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the Saudi and Taiwanese aid that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Did RCM ever tell Shultz? I am very concerned that we are bifurcating an effort that has, up to now, worked relatively well. An extraordinary amount of good has been done and money truly is not the thing which is most needed at this point. What we most need is to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine LtCol. Money will again become an issue in July, but probably not until mid-month. There are several million rounds of most types of ammo now on hand and more ($3M) worth on the way by ship from China. Critically needed items are being flown in from Europe to the expanded warehouse facility at Ilopango. Boots, uniforms, ponchos etc. are bein g purchased locally and Calero will receive $500K for food purchases by the end of the week. Somehow we will molify the wounded egos of the triple A with not being able to see RR. We should look to going back to [Deleted, (b)(1)(s)] on the blowpipesif we are going to do anything at all about outside support in the next few days, and I wd love to carry the letter from RR [Deleted, (b)(1)(s)] if we are going to move on something. Meanwhile, I wd recommend that you and RCM have a talk about how much Sec Shultz does or does not know abt Saudi Arabia/Taiwan so that we don't make any mistakes. I don't know who in the Taiwanese govt. knows since Fred never told me. At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Help. Warm regards, North FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSOLN --CPUA 06/11/86 18:54:06 To: NSOLN --CPUA *** Reply to note of 06/10/86 23:21 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER Subject: PRIVATE BLANK CHECK Out of the last NSPG on Central America Shultz agreed that he would think about third country sources. I wanted to get an answer from him so we could get out of the business. As I understand the law there is nothing that prevents State from getting involved in this now. To my knowledge Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way. My concern was to find out what they were thinking so there would not be a screw up. I asked Elliot at lunch. He said he had recommended Brunei where Shultz is going to visit. They have lots of money and very little to spend it on. It seems like a good prospect. Shultz agrees. I asked Elliot how the money could be transferred. He said he thought Shultz could just hand them an account number. I said that was a bad idea not at all letting on that we had access to accounts. I told Elliot that the best way was for Brunei to direct their embassy here to receive a person that we would designate and the funds could be transferred through him. Don't you think that is best? I still want to reduce your visibility. Let me know what you think and I will talk to George. I agree about CIA but we have got to get the legislation past. FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSHRT --CPUA 06/26/86 15:57:17 To: NSRBM --CPUA ROD MCDANIEL -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER SUBJECT: Iraq Financial Situation Al Haig yesterday expressed his concerns with Iraq's ability to hang on in the war. He agrees with our impartiality policy, but feels as we do that we can not permit Iraq to fall. He wondered if there was anyway we could help their financial situation through the multi-laterals. Let's take a look at that. cc: NSHRT --CPUA HOWARD TEICHER NSPWR --CPUA PETER RODMAN NSDBR --CPUA NSSID --CPUA STEVE DANZANSKY NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 06/30/86 10:58:07 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: South Africa Florence, please print for JMP. Thanks. *** Forwarding note from NSPHR --CPUA 06/30/86 09:36 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER S E C R E T NOTE FROM: Phil Ringdahl Subject: South Africa Below Prof forwarded FYI, with Walt's commerts. Thanks. S E C R E T *** Forwarding note from NSPHR --CPUA 06/30/86 08:00 *** To: NSPHR --CPUA S E C R E T NOTE FROM: Phil Ringdahl SUBJECT: South Africa 1. Walt and I met with Chet Crocker Saturday, and he reviewed generally what State plans (though witholding any decisions until Secretary Shultz has approved). We briefed our London meetings. State's emphasis is on "crash", visible program involving the President, Shultz, allies, and Front Line States ; process of policy review (which we suggested should be NSC) ; tactical timing of component parts of overall strategy ; and U.S. initiatives toward SAG itself. Given SFRC hearings set to begin July 21 or 22 (which Crocker believes could be advanced) and Shultz's important appearance there, action both in review process and demonstrating pro-active diplomatic initiatives is crucial in next two weeks.Following is offered for your considertion in advance of your discussions with Shultz and the President this week. 2. State envisages both positive and and negative measures, designed to keep Congress contained and send signal to SAG that we wish to remain positively engaged (by avoiding destructive, puntitive sanctions) if SAG behaves and continues reform process. Failure on either or both scores will dramatically dilute our influence and presence there, but we will have set the policy foundation for future options in dealing with with issue domestically and abroad. Positive : Restatement of U.S. committment to remain engaged and not walk away ; allied consultations and development of positive, collective strategy both political and economic ; and some FLS initiative (though State is very pessimistic, backed by historic experience, re energizing the FLS positively). Negagtive : Restriction of movement of people (visas, etc), SAG presence in U.S. (consulates and military offices), landing rights of SAG aircraft, and consideration of U.S. investment and bank loans. (we expressed concern on this latter point that these not enter the punitive zone). 3. State is approaching ANC issue in form of expanding contact w/o granting "recognition" or legitimacy they have not earned nor deserve as an organization given their committment to violence. Approach would be to expand and emphasize dialogue with ANC moderate elements in order to strengthen their hand and to enlarge U.S. influence in transition and post-apartheid period within ANC. As you know, there are downsides to this (especially in undercutting moderate blacks such as Buthelezi) so this needs to be studied carefully. It also needs to be combined with parallel approach to all other moderate blacks. 4. To set action tone, Walt and I believe a meeting of the allied four or give is essential the first half of July. Crocker is suggesting the "senior directors", but that won't achieve what is necessary. It must be the foreign ministers -- Shultz, Howe, Genscher, Abe, and perhaps Raimond. In addition to the collective strategy aspects, one result of such a meeting should be a visit to South and southern Africa to see all the parties. This would not only help consolidate any collective action, but also play extremely well to our respective domestic audiences. Whether the SAG would cooperate fully is problematic, but than in itself is an important point to register publicly. 5. A Presidential speech is also recommened, timed to achieve maximum impact on the process and the SFRC hearings. Both Lugar and Kassembaum have called for such a statement. This would have the greatest single impact on all the key players --Congress, allies, and inside South AFrica. 6. In sum, the EPG process will have been re-energized -- as you have suggested -- engaging the President personally, bringing together the "friends" of the SAG so as to increase impact of demarche(s) and receptivity in Pretoria, increase FLS and hence African involvement so as to broaden committment (and give at least partial "made in AFrica" dimension), and revisiting possible economic and financial leverages. In all of this, it will be important not to prejudge SAG reaction before we get a chance to develop and implement what we are planning. Without top level political involvement on this, we will be overrun by domestic and international political pressures for sanctions. cc: NSPWR --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA NSWRP --CPUA NSWR --CPUA cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSFEG --CPUA NSPHR --CPUA FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 10/03/86 10:43:23 To: NSPBT --CPUA PAUL THOMPSON -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER SUBJECT: Intel to Iraq Ken said yesterday that they had prepared a package on the subject. I need to see it. FROM: NSDBR --CPUA TO: NSRBM --CPUA 10/03/86 18:13:49 To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER FROM: Dennis Ross SUBJECT: Expanding Intelligence to Provided to the Iraqis I just talked to Tom Twetten, and he said Casey understood that you wanted to think about providing the intelligence on economic targets to the Iraqis. He said he assumed you would get back to him in a day or so on whether or not to go ahead. I told Twettenthat I thought you had decided that we shouldn't provide it at this time.Twetten said you might want to give Casey a call. FROM: NSDBR --CPUA TO: NSVMC --CPUA 10/06/86 15:22:54 To: NSVMC --CPUA FROM: Dennis Ross SUBJECT: Expanding Intelligence Support to Iraq Vince, I understand you have a copy of JMP's cmments/responses on the memo. Is there anything I need to do or is this one where you take the lead in responding to what JMP would like us to do? FROM: NSRLE --CPUA TO: NSCPC --CPUA 10/09/86 17:00:35 To: NSOLN --CPUA NSCPC --CPUA NOTE FROM: Robert L. Earl SUBJECT: BUSTIO VISIT Gen Bustio has an appointment at Walter Reed on 17 October..., probably too late for the hand holding that'll probably be required in the next few days. FROM: NSDBR --CPUA TO: NSGSG --CPUA 01/20/87 09:56:47 To: NSGSG --CPUA Frank C. Carlucci NSWRP --CPUA Frank C. Carlucci FROM: Dennis Ross SUBJECT: Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War I checked and was told by State that Waite has had no contact with US officials on his current trip. In the past, he has met with the Ambasssador and others. On the current fighting around Basra, the latest intelligence shows the Iranians around two miles from the Iraqi perimeter defenses around Basra. While the Iranians may be unlikely to take Basra at this time, they have already achieved a significant gain in a strategically important area. They are holding more territory, and the Iraqis will probably shy away from trying to dislodge them. This will add to the to the nervousness of our friends, even as the upcoming Islamic Summit in Kuwait gives them more of a reason publicly to hold us responsible for the Iranian successes--something the Iraqis will play up when the current fighting ends. (Mubarak's interview in a UAE paper should be seen as posturing himself for the Summit.) At the same time, Gulf state fears of Iranian gains will probably lead again soon to requests for help from us. Offering to convene our contingency planning groups now with the Saudis and others might make alot of sense. Last item: I'm doing a paper laying out where we are on Arab-Israeli issues after the Murphy mission. Murphy plans to see Shultz late in the week to talk about next steps--I've got some ideas on what we might be doing at several different levels and I'll send those into you today or tomorrow. FROM: NSWJB --CPUA TO: NSDBR --CPUA 01/20/87 12:13:48 To: NSDBR --CPUA NOTE FROM: William J. Burns SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq Jeff Hughes will obtain a detailed map of the Basra front from CIA in the next day or two. He will also continue to send us an all-source summary of status of fighting each morning, or as often as he can. I called to thank him for the package he sent today (left a copy on your desk). FROM: NSCLP --CPUA TO: NSWRP --CPUA 01/20/87 15:26:23 To: NSWRP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 01/20/87 11:59 FROM: Colin L. Powell Subject: Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War Subject of Iran-Iraq war came up at CWW/GPS/FCC lunch today. FCC wants to make sure we are anticipating what our actions might be if Basra does fall. GPS said he would have Murphy begin looking into the question. We need to monitor closely. In light of the war situation, Khomeni's health, etc , we may want to convene a PRG meeting this week to review the bidding. Armacost will be back tomorrow, I think, and Bob on Fri/Sat. Perhaps we can wait till Monday. Yourview? FROM: NSDBR --CPUA TO: NSWRP --CPUA 01/20/87 16:07:34 To: NSWRP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 01/20/87 15:44 FROM: Dennis Ross Subject: Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War Getting the process going soon is important. We need to energize the bureaucracy so that we are in a position to begin communicating to Gulf regimes about the steps we are prepared to take. At this point, fears will dominate the behavior of many of our friends--and they will be looking for signs that we are not paralyzed by the Iranian affair. While we have much to overcome, the Saudis and others still have no one else to turn to in the crunch and this could be a time to begin to re-establish some of our credibility. Given all that's at stake--and the pattern of the intelligence community underestimating the Iranian potential for gains--I think an early Deputies group meeting is called for.

AREADME CHAP01 CHAP02 CHAP03 CHAP04 CHAP05 CHAP06 CHAP07 CHAP08 CHAP09 CHAP10 CHAP11 CHRON { November 22 1986 } WHOSWHO Files Listed: 14

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