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GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 68­482 CC 2000 GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA-THE NEW LOCUS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JULY 12, 2000 Serial No. 106­173 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international - relations VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 2 (II) COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey DAN BURTON, Indiana ELTON GALLEGLY, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PETER T. KING, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina MATT SALMON, Arizona AMO HOUGHTON, New York TOM CAMPBELL, California JOHN M. M C HUGH, New York KEVIN BRADY, Texas RICHARD BURR, North Carolina PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CYNTHIA A. M C KINNEY, Georgia ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida PAT DANNER, Missouri EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama BRAD SHERMAN, California ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey JIM DAVIS, Florida EARL POMEROY, North Dakota WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York BARBARA LEE, California JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania R ICHARD J. G ARON , Chief of Staff K ATHLEEN B ERTELSEN M OAZED , Democratic Chief of Staff J OHN P. M ACKEY , Investigative Counsel M ARILYN C. O WEN , Staff Associate VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 3 (III) C O N T E N T S WITNESSES Page The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 10 Alan W. Eastham, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 13 APPENDIX Prepared statements: The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 46 The Honorable Peter T. King, Representative in Congress from New York ...... 48 The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from Pennsyl- vania ...................................................................................................................... 49 The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey .... 50 The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from New York ....................................................................................................................... 51 The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from Florida ...... 54 The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan ....................................................................... 56 Alan W. Eastham, Jr. .............................................................................................. 69 Additional material submitted for the record: U.S. Department of State On-the-Record Briefing Release from Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, and Michael Sheehan, Counterterrorism Coordinator ........................................................................................................... 77 Newspaper editorial from the Washington Times by Ben Barber on ``Afghani- stan: Seat of Terrorism Shifts to South Asia,'' dated Tuesday, May 2, 2000 ....................................................................................................................... 78 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 4 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 5 (1) GLOBAL TERRORISM: SOUTH ASIA-THE NEW LOCUS WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2000 H OUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES , C OMMITTEE ON I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS , Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Chairman G ILMAN . I am pleased to call to order today's hearing on global terrorism. In particular, we will focus on the most recent shift in the patterns of international terrorism to South Asia. This move away from the more traditional Middle East-based terrorist activity clearly deserves our attention and careful policy analysis. Earlier this year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the shift of the center of gravity for international terrorism has been eastward, toward Afghanistan in Southwest Asia. Each spring, under congressional mandate since the mid-1980's, the Administration publishes a report called Patterns of Global Terrorism. This report provides the Congress and the public with the latest trends and developments in international terrorism. The report for 1999 establishes that South Asia is the new locus of international terrorism, presenting both a regional threat and a growing threat to our nation. We will examine what this new trend means for our nation. Afghanistan has emerged as a safe haven for master terrorists like Usama bin Laden and his radical supporters. We have on dis- play today the State Department's wanted posters for bin Laden, offering a $5 million reward for his capture. Neighboring Pakistan, which has long supported the Taliban to its west and those bent on violence in Kashmir to its east, also con- tributes to the emergence of South Asia as the new locus of inter- national terrorism. Recent press reports indicate that the Russian intelligence serv- ices believed that the Taliban in Afghanistan promised to help Chechen rebels with weapons, training, and possibly even with trained fighters from Taliban camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban vehemently denied those serious Russian charges. We will examine that issue today as well. Through a coordinated law enforcement approach, many terrorist threats emanating from South Asia were thwarted last year. As a result, American deaths from terrorism were down to five in 1999, one of the lowest levels in several years, and for that we are grate- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 6 2 ful. It is a sad but undeniable fact that Americans are often the most frequent terrorist targets around the globe. The 1999 annual terrorism report notes that we have repeatedly asked Pakistan to end their support to elements that conduct ter- rorist training in nearby Afghanistan. We also asked that Pakistan interdict travel of all militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block fi- nancial and logistical support for the camps. In addition, the State Department's latest terrorism report notes that Pakistan officially supports Kashmiri militant groups that en- gage in terrorism. The recent report from the congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism noted Pakistan's occasionally excellent cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. However, the Commission also pointed out the consistent Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir. The Commission's report also called for naming Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism so that all the sanctions against such a terrorist nation could be applied. The new threat of radical Islamic terrorism emanating from the region can often be found in a loosely knit group of terrorists once trained and hardened in the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Today on the new battlefields in Chechnya and Kosovo, where war-making and fighting skills are honed and perfected, some of these radical Islamic elements have been learning skills that later can be used against our nation and others in radical terrorist acts. South Asian also presents new concerns for the war on drugs. By taxing rather than fighting the drug trade, the Taliban has effec- tively sided with the heroin producers and against innocent people, particularly our young people. The drug trade is also proving to be a lucrative resource for bin Laden's terrorist network. We are fortunate to have with us today the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Secretary of State's Office, who helps pre- pare the annual report on global terrorism and can help us sort out what this new shift means. We are also joined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. Both of these witnesses will bring their exper- tise to our inquiry today. Ambassador Sheehan, who, of course, oversees the preparation of the global terrorism report, is prepared to answer any questions on terrorism, and of course, no member is limited on what area of the globe he would like to address. Before we start with our witnesses, I welcome any comment from our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appen- dix.] Mr. G EJDENSON . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for calling this hearing. Both the State Depart- ment report and the Bremmer Commission report point out what we have suspected for some time, that global terrorism is increas- ingly a collaboration and a coordinated effort. As you have indicated, it has moved from its home in the Middle East and North Africa now into South Asia, and certain factors, the disintegration of Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era, the situation VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 7 3 in Pakistan, a country that is now once again in military rule with a weakened civil society, and increased influence of religious clerics and their schools makes for a dangerous situation. Usama bin Laden, seen often as the primary enemy of the United States or one who has chosen the United States as his pri- mary enemy, seems to make his home in that region. We in this country need to work with our allies globally. We have had some cooperation from Pakistan through the years, but reading this last June 25 New York Times magazine article on the edu- cation at religious schools leaves one with a very uneasy feeling. The authors go on to talk about these jihad factories where young men are educated in a way that seems to direct them to take on the West. We have had cooperation from Pakistan, but we also have chal- lenges coming from there, and we certainly feel that the reestab- lishment of democracy and a civil society is critical to make progress in that country. The Afghanistan situation is much more complicated. A country that has seen war for so long, its political situation has disinte- grated. The economic situation has left many in despair, and it now seems to be a country that processes drugs and terrorists more than almost any other activity. We need to pull and work with our allies and friends to contain and end this threat, which as you pointed out, often targets Ameri- cans first. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Any other Member seeking recognition? Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. R OHRABACHER . Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you very much for holding this hearing. As we discuss terrorism in South Asia, I think it is important to renew the Members of this Committee and the public's acquaint- ance with the request that I have made for the last 3 years con- cerning American policy toward the Taliban because, as we exam- ine terrorism in South Asia, one cannot help but recognize that if it were not for the fact that the Taliban are in power, there would be a different equation going on. There would be a whole different situation in South Asia. After a year of requesting to see State Department documents on Afghan policy, and I would remind the Committee that I have stat- ed that I believe there is a covert policy by this Administration, a shameful covert policy of supporting the Taliban, the State Depart- ment after many, many months-actually years of prodding-fi- nally began giving me documents, Mr. Chairman. In the assess- ment of those documents, I have found nothing to persuade me that I was wrong in my criticism. I might add, however, that there have been no documents pro- vided to me even after all of these years of requesting it. There have been no documents concerning the time period of the forma- tion of the Taliban. Again, I would hope the State Department gets the message that I expect to see all of those documents. The documents that I have read, Mr. Chairman, indicate that the State Department time and again has had as its position that they have no quarrel or that it would give them no heartburn to have VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 8 4 the Taliban in power, this during the time period when the Taliban was struggling to take over Afghanistan. Although the Administration has denied supporting the Taliban, it is clear that they discouraged all of the anti-Taliban supporters from supporting the efforts in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban, even so much as when the Taliban was ripe for being defeated on the ground in Afghanistan. Bill Richardson and Karl Inderfurth, high ranking members of this Administration, personally visited the region in order to discourage the Taliban's opposition from at- tacking the Taliban when they were vulnerable, and then going to neighboring countries to cutoff any type of military assistance to the Taliban, this at a time when Pakistan was heavily resupplying and rearming the Taliban. What did this lead to? It led to the defeat of all the Taliban's major enemies except for one, Commander Masood in the north, and left the Taliban the supreme power in Afghanistan. So when we hear today about terrorism and crocodile tears from this Administration, let us remember this Administration is re- sponsible for the Taliban. This Administration has acted in a way that has kept the Taliban in power. One last note. Many people here understand that I have been in Afghanistan on numerous occasions and have close ties to people there, and let me just say that some of my sources of information inform me of where bin Laden was. They told me they knew and could tell people where bin Laden could be located, and it took me three tries before this Administration responded to someone who obviously has personal contacts in Afghanistan to even investigate that there might be someone who could give them the information. And when my informant was actually contacted, he said that the people who contacted him were half hearted and did not follow through, did not appear to be all that interested, appeared to be forced to be talking to him. Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about terrorism. We are con- cerned about the Taliban because we believe in human life and human dignity. The worst terrorist acts of the Taliban are com- mitted against the women of their own society, and let us not for- get that. But none of the terrorism which we will hear about today by Mr. bin Laden or others would be taking place with Afghanistan as their home base if it were not for the policies of this Administra- tion. This Administration has had a policy concerning the Taliban which has created this terrorist mess, which I predicted in this body on numerous occasions 3 and 4 years ago. So I think I am pleased that you have called this hearing today, but let's keep this testimony in perspective. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I am pleased to recognize the Minority Whip, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bonior. Mr. B ONIOR . Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your indul- gence and your courtesies for letting me say a few words this morn- ing. I want to thank you and all the Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be with you today. I look forward to the testi- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 9 5 mony that Ambassador Sheehan and Deputy Assistant Secretary Eastham will be presenting. On earlier occasions, the Administration has expressed the im- portance of working with Pakistan in addressing terrorism in South Asia. I also believe that cooperation with Pakistan continues to be very much in our national interest. Combating and preventing global terrorism is one of the most se- rious challenges facing America's foreign policy in this new era. It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that Pakistan, as a longstanding ally of the United States, is committed to cooperating with the United States on terrorism. Its record shows that. Sanctioning Pakistan would serve no purpose other than to iso- late them and aggravate the social and economic and political chal- lenges in the region. I also strongly believe that the Taliban support for terrorism and its harboring of Usama bin Laden must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. We must also respond to the threat, and I believe that is where Pakistan plays a very critical role. We must remember that it is not in Pakistan's interest to have the Taliban on its border. It is also not in Pakistan's interest to have terrorist groups operating within its borders, and it is clearly not in India's interest to have Pakistan isolated, thereby producing a greater threat to peace and stability in South Asia. While it is undeniable that some terrorist groups operate in Pakistan, Pakistanis themselves are often the victim of terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan has been cooperating with the international community and the United States in counterterrorism efforts. In 1995, Pakistan turned over Ramzi Yousef, involved in the World Trade Center bombing, to the United States. In 1997, Pakistan helped apprehend Miur Amal Kanzi, who shot several people out- side the CIA headquarters, and in 1998 and 1998, Pakistan handed over two suspects involved in the bombing of our embassies in Afri- ca.I know from my talks with General Musharraf when I visited Pakistan and India in April that he is committed to dealing with the Taliban. He has met with one leader of the Taliban and is pre- pared to meet with others in Afghanistan. Throughout my trip I gained a new appreciation of the unique challenges facing the region. I also came away more convinced than ever that the United States must play a proactive role in helping to meet those challenges. There are serious challenges and threats which exist in Pakistan, but I also know that General Musharraf and General Aziz in Pakistan are well aware of what needs to be done. Pakistan has a responsibility to address terrorism in South Asia, but I believe we do, as well. The United States bears special re- sponsibility in South Asia. During the war in Afghanistan, the United States armed Pakistan's neighbors and militants. Then, in my view, we callously abandoned the region. The result of that neglect has been disturbing: the Taliban, tak- ing control in Afghanistan; the critical economic conditions in India and Pakistan, not to mention the nuclear weapons development that has taken place. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 10 6 Now we have an obligation to do our part to help establish sta- bility in South Asia, and it is in our interest to do so. The threat of nuclear conflict and terrorism in South Asia is very real. We must reduce this threat and halt the arms race in South Asia, but I believe that unless Kashmir is addressed, Mr. Chairman, no real progress can be made. If we turn our attention away from the region as we did after the war in Afghanistan, we risk further erosion, violence, and disillu- sionment. We are uniquely positioned as a longstanding ally of Pakistan and as an emerging friend of India to bring the parties together. Given the stake in South Asia, punitive economic sanctions are clearly counterproductive. Democracy will be strengthened not by economic sanctions, but by economic aid. Funds for cooperative counterterrorism efforts, economic develop- ment, civil society building, and respect for the rule of law are needed. The answer is not to further sanction Pakistan or India, but to open up possibilities for cooperation. I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee and the Administration as we respond to this serious issue and de- velop an approach to South Asia that recognizes our responsibil- ities in the region and strengthens our cooperation with our friends and allies. I thank you for your time. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Bonior. I am going to ask our Members to please be brief so that we can get on with the hearing. Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . Mr. Chairman, I want to fully associate my- self with the statements made previously by the gentleman from Michigan. I think the statement was cogent, precise, and right to the point. It is really a sad commentary, at least in my experience serving as a Member of this Committee, how we have applied such a dou- ble standard toward our relationship with Pakistan. I think this country has been a friend of ours, through thick or thin, and it seems that we have been kicking this country. Every time we always need a whipping boy, we seem to always have Pakistan, which is where we always do this. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for the statement to that effect. We should not limit whatever seems to be the support for friends who support the issues affecting India, but we also have to be mindful of the fact that Pakistan is just as much a friend of ours as is India, and I want to commend the gentleman from Michigan for that statement. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Royce. Mr. R OYCE . Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. As my colleague from Southern California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who I know has worked with you in the past and myself on his request for documentation, I share his frustration with the Administra- tion's lack of cooperation in providing this documentation. Let me also say that I think that there has been a lack of pur- pose on the mayhem and anarchy coming out of Afghanistan. For VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 11 7 many years now, we have held hearings to try to get the Adminis- tration to focus on the lack of policy, the lack of a strategy to try to bring resolution to what has happened there in Afghanistan. It seems to me that we are not dealing with the terror that is coming out of the region, given the fact that there has been a great call for a policy to try to do something about resolving the under- lying problems that have given rise now to Afghanistan offering Usama bin Laden and others a place to do business, a place to pre- pare for the next round of terrorist activity. But this is a result of a lack of focus in our foreign policy in South Asia, and I hope that we can muster some attention and re- solve in the future to develop a strategy to deal with Afghanistan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Royce. I am going to have to ask unanimous consent that the state- ments by Congressman Peter King, Congressman Joseph Pitts, and Congressman Jim Saxton, in charge of the special oversight panel on terrorism of the Armed Services Committee, be included at this point in the record. [The prepared statements of Representatives King, Pitts, and Saxton appear in the appendix.] Chairman G ILMAN . Without further delay we will proceed with the witnesses. Our first witness today is the Honorable-- Ms. M C K INNEY . Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Ms. McKinney. Ms. M C K INNEY . I would like to make an opening statement. Chairman G ILMAN . Please make it brief so that we can get on with our witnesses. Ms. M C K INNEY . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate any attempt to understand and thwart the presence of terrorism anywhere it appears in the world. But I hope this hearing provides the critical analysis that is much required. Last October I wanted to take a family who are my constituents to the White House to observe the arrival ceremony of the then leader of Italy. Because I have had such a miserable experience with White House security, I phoned ahead of time and told them what gate I was arriving at and, of course, reporting the require- ment of name, Social Security number, etc., for myself and in- formed the White House that we would be arriving in separate cars. We were told fine and everything would be OK. I was driven to the White House by a young, 20-year-old white staffer of mine, and my guests were driven in a separate car by an- other staffer of mine, a young woman of color. Before I could get into the White House, I was insulted at the White House gates be- cause the Secret Service representatives mistook my young black staffer for the Congresswoman of 6 years and asked me to prove my identity. After getting inside the White House, I was challenged at every checkpoint by the Secret Service yet again. That was nothing compared to the experience of my guests who had been invited by me and who were being escorted by my staffer. They had been vetted by the Secret Service and by White House protocol, but when they showed up, I guess all of the Secret Service anti-profiling lessons just flew out the window as they had with me earlier. The family consisted of a 16-year-old child in her silk Paki- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 12 8 stani cultural dress and her father, whose hair is beautiful, thick, black, and curly. He also sports a beard. And so despite all of the correct procedure of communicating with White House protocol, despite the added precaution of calling the White House to let them know the specific gate that we would be arriving at, none of the precaution and preparation on our part worked. I almost did not get inside, and unfortunately my guests did not get inside. I have to admit that I was angry. I was angry that my guests were denied admission for an event that their Congresswoman had invited them to. I was angry that they had been ordered by Secret Service to get out of the car being driven by my staff person of color who had never ever been treated before in such a manner. They were dog sniffed at the White House gates as if they were common criminals, and then they were never admitted to the event to which they had been invited, and I was tired. I was tired of being humiliated every time I tried to exercise my very existence as a Congresswoman, tired of people who looked like me and who think like me being persecuted just because we exist. I have to admit that I shed a tear on that day for the humiliation of my constituents and of myself. But the 16-year-old girl put her arms around me, and she said, ``That's OK. I'm used to it.'' After much publicity, the First Lady graciously invited the entire family back and gave them a personal apology. Now, I am sure you are wondering what does this have to do with the subject at hand. I think it has everything to do with the subject matter of today. Unintended consequences of our own policies and hasty dis- engagement from those consequences. It is far easier to blame the victim than to solve the problem. A few months after my White House experience with my guests, the country awoke to news that the Secret Service was being sued by a few courageous black Secret Service agents who had the guts to say that something was rotten inside the Secret Service, and im- mediately it became clear how that grotesque mistreatment of me and my guests on that day flowed logically from the systemic mis- treatment of minorities within the very organization itself and, in- deed, our American community at large. Mr. Chairman, I hope that today this Congress is not going to do to Pakistan what the Secret Service did to my Pakistani Amer- ican constituents. We need a comprehensive approach to the prob- lem of terrorism, and I will support that. But we also need to be balanced, and we need to get to the root problem and not deal with just the symptoms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Ms. McKinney. Mr. Meeks. Mr. M EEKS . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing on global terrorism addresses a subject of great con- cern not only to the people of this nation, but to people from na- tions all over the world. We have been the unfortunate witnesses of numerous terrorist attacks all over the world that have de- stroyed or altered the lives of individuals on nearly every con- tinent. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 13 9 Whether it is in embassy bombings in Africa, government and commercial office buildings in Oklahoma and New York, car bombs in Ireland, mosque shootings and school bus bombings in Israel, kidnappings in South America, or plane hijackings in Asia, ter- rorism is a misguided and hateful method of addressing discontent with governments and other groups by targeting random, innocent people. It is essential that the United States and all nations of good con- science work together on the best methods of combating global ter- rorism. The U.S. Government, beginning with this Congress, has a spe- cial responsibility as the world's only super power to set an exam- ple of even handedness and just dealings when it comes to fighting terrorism. Too often this nation's government and its peoples have chosen to unfairly target ethnic, racial, and religious groups, do- mestically or overseas, who are different from the majority of Americans when trying to address a social ill or increase our na- tional security. Throughout American history, these scapegoat groups have in- cluded Native Americans, African Americans, Italian and Japanese Americans, Jews, and most recently Arabs and Muslims. Policies based on the misguided targeting of ethnic groups when trying to address our domestic or national security has led to unconstitu- tional practices, such as indicated by my colleague Cynthia McKin- ney, racial profiling and the use of secret evidence. Our focus on terrorism in Southeast Asia should not be for the purpose of condemning or casting aspersions on a particular nation or people because their predominant religion or form of government is different from ours. Congress must additionally resist playing fa- vorites between one nation over another, no matter what political forces pressure us to do so. In one of the background documents prepared by the Committee, Afghanistan and Pakistan were the two countries singled out as concerns in a region where incidents of government and organiza- tional terrorism exist in many nations. Both nations have experi- enced major government upheavals and instability in their recent past, and certainly the legitimacy of the Afghan Government is in question. However, the government of Pakistan has demonstrated contin- ued cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism de- spite certain internal pressures that question U.S. cooperation. Pakistan has arrested and extradited suspects in the murder of CIA agents and in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and our embassies in Africa. According to the U.S. Government, Pakistan is considered a friendly nation to the United States and has done a good job in pro- viding security for our embassy and has, overall, been an ally of the United States in our counter-terrorist efforts. While there may be room for improvement, and certainly there is, in Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, that improvement will come from a continued close relationship with the United States, where information and methodologies are shared for the benefit of both nations and the rest of the world. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 14 10 Undue criticism will only drive a wedge between us and benefit no one. The United States has a responsibility to be a facilitator in Southeast Asia to additionally help reduce terrorist acts between nations, just as we have been doing in the Middle East. In closing, let me just remind my colleagues that this hearing fo- cuses on Southeast Asian-centered terrorism. Terrorist acts are a worldwide issue targeted toward people of all backgrounds by ter- rorists of all backgrounds. The recent report of the National Commission on Terrorism noted that today's terrorists are less dependent on state sponsor- ship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations. So I would just say, let's make sure that we are fair and even handed as we look at this issue and not take sides, because we can- not help if it appears as though we are on one side as opposed to the other. If we are going to be the facilitators, we need to have an even hand so that we can make sure that we can continue com- munication with all nations, and then we can combat this terrorism that is going on around the world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Meeks. We will be continuing our testimony right through the vote on the journal. I have asked one of our Members to go over and return quickly. We will now call our first witness today, the Honorable Michael Sheehan, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counter- terrorism at the Department of State, where he has primary re- sponsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. counterterrorism policy. Ambassador Sheehan was confirmed by the Senate in August 1999. His office chairs the Working Group for Counter-Terrorism, which develops and coordinates policy, manages the State Depart- ment Task Force that responds to international incidents, and co- ordinates government efforts to improve cooperation with foreign governments, including the Administration of the anti-terrorism training assistance program. Ambassador Sheehan's background includes serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Inter- national Organization Affairs and as a Special Advisor to the rep- resentative of the Secretary General of the U.S. mission to the United Nations. Ambassador Sheehan retired as a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army after a career that included two tours on the National Security Council's staff. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, adjoining my congressional district. Ambassador Sheehan. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AM- BASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-TER- RORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador S HEEHAN . Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, and thank you for this opportunity to address the shift of the locus of terrorism to South Asia. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 15 11 In our annual report to Congress this year, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, we describe the shift in some detail. This was one of the two trends we identified as the most important recent devel- opments in terrorism, the other being the shift from well organized and hierarchical groups supported by state sponsors of terrorism to the loosely organized international networks of terrorism that are often able to raise funds and sustain themselves by smuggling nar- cotics trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other types of fund raising. Mr. Chairman, I just returned from the Philippines and before that Colombia, where this new type of terrorism is manifesting itself in a very dangerous way. It was very troubling for American interests in both of those countries of longstanding importance to the United States. I purposely addressed the trends that I alluded to earlier on the very first page of my introduction in this report to show the impor- tance of these trends, and the increased willingness and ability of terrorists to seek refuge in South Asia are disturbing develop- ments. They require us to refocus our diplomatic energies and pol- icy tools as well. I have a fairly lengthy written statement that I will submit to the record, Mr. Chairman, and I will briefly cover some of the main points of that statement in my oral remarks this morning. Chairman G ILMAN . So ordered without objection. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, I will talk about three areas this morning in my oral remarks. No. 1 is why South Asia. What is important about South Asia? Second, what we are doing right now. And, third, what we will do next to deal with this evolving threat. Why has South Asia become the locus for terrorism around the world? Primarily the reason is Afghanistan, and the complete col- lapse of the state of Afghanistan starting in 1979 with the invasion of the Soviet army. The long and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan attracted fighters from around the world, many of them at our be- quest, in the mid-1980's. The proximity of Afghanistan to other conflicts, such as Kashmir and others in Central Asia, also contributes to making it a hub of this type of activity. In addition, the welcome mat provided by the Taliban to these fighters that are often supporting the Taliban's fight against the Northern Alliance often also find refuge in Af- ghanistan for other agendas that they have in different parts of the world. In Afghanistan, the situation is exacerbated by an explosion of narcotics trafficking and finances involved with that, a virtual arms bazaar throughout the country, and religious extremism that is fostered in many of the Madrases in Afghanistan and nearby Pakistan. Afghanistan came to the forefront of attention of the United States, although we had known about it. The increasing support for terrorism in the region came to the forefront after the bombings of our embassy in East Africa in August 1988. Also, last year, as Con- gressman Gilman mentioned in his opening remarks, we had a good year, only five deaths of Americans from international ter- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 16 12 rorism, the lowest in many, many years, three in Colombia and two in Central Africa. We did have continuing threats coming from South Asia, includ- ing the terrorist threat around the millennial period that mani- fested itself in Jordan, that wound its way back into Afghanistan; the hijacking of an aircraft from India that wound up on a runway in Kandahar; and various other threats that manifest themselves around the globe and often have tentacles leading back to the lead- ership in the camps in Afghanistan. Why is Afghanistan important? Why is South Asia? Let me men- tion three reasons. First, the most immediate are the threats that directly affect us around the world today, and as many of you know, recently the State Department has put out an additional warning, a public an- nouncement of warnings as terrorist threats have increased around the world recently, many of those, again, winding their way back to Afghanistan. Second, the terrorism that emanates out of this part of the world threatens regional stability. As mentioned by some of the Members here in Pakistan itself, Kashmir conflict, other conflicts in Central Asia, reaching into the Caucasus and the Middle East and beyond. And finally, over the longer term, as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I am concerned about the caldron of terrorism that is bubbling out of Afghanistan and will continue to threaten American interests in the longer term. What are we doing to confront this threat? We are moving on a lot of different fronts. I will, again, break those into three areas. First, on the immediate front, we are working 24 hours a day times 7 days a week to disrupt any cells that threaten Americans around the world. Working with our liaisons with law enforcement and intelligence organizations around the world, we are actively in- volved in disrupting any activities that threaten American inter- ests. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is ongoing continuously, both the threat our count-threats. Second, we are working very actively to isolate and contain this threat with pressure on the sanctuary of these groups. Over the longer term, third, is what I refer to in the report and often in many of my remarks. We want to drain the swamp, which is a term I use to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations that need space in order to organize its leadership, plan its activities, train its fighters, assemble its equipment and arms in order to con- duct attacks. And the primary swamp that I am concerned about right now, Mr. Chairman, is in Afghanistan, although there are many others around the world as well. Let me say a word about resources while I have the opportunity. I thank this Committee particularly, many of the Members of this Committee and the staff, for the support they have given my office over the years. I would like to emphasize we have two important funding requirements in front of the Congress right now, a funding for the anti-terrorism assistance program and for a center for anti- terrorism security training, CAST, that are being requested by the Administration. Right now, in particular, the funding for the CAST seems to be in great jeopardy. This center will help us train not only our diplo- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 17 13 matic security personnel, but primarily, it will train those law en- forcement and security people that work with us on a day-to-day basis around the world to disrupt those cells I referred to earlier. We need, in the 21st century, a 21st century terrorist training facility in order to confront the 21st century terrorist threats. I ap- preciate your support, Mr. Chairman, and others on the Committee as we work forward on this requirement. In conclusion, I would like to remind that our efforts to combat terrorism in South Asia and around the world start with our sup- port from Capitol Hill and often from this Committee. Carefully calibrated counterterrorism legislation, such as those regarding state sponsorship, the foreign terrorist organizations, and others are very key to our efforts. Sufficient resources and the public discourse such as the hear- ings are also key. Your support coupled with the force of our sus- tained diplomatic and political efforts will help us drain the swamp in Afghanistan and in other states that are not mustering the polit- ical will to confront terrorists. We have had a great deal of success in the past 20 years, Mr. Chairman. This success can be attributed to our commitment to stay the course in a tough counterterrorism policy and to rally international support. Applying diplomatic pressure, raising polit- ical will and levying sanctions, these actions have made many cor- ners of the world intolerable for terrorists. We must continue to stay the course while adjusting to new geo- graphic threats and a changing face of terrorism. We must main- tain strong political will within the Administration and in the Con- gress to be tough on terrorism and push our allies to do the same. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Committee today. I look forward to answering any of your questions or Members of the Committee. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheehan appears in the appendix.] Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan. We have with us Alan Eastham, who has a long record of service in the State Department and in the service of his country. He is now a Special Assistant and Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He was involved with the Near East and South East in his respon- sibilities for a number of years, including Sri Lanka and as the India Desk Officer. He has been a staff officer in the Office of Combating Terrorism, and he has had a wide range of experience overseas, in South Asia. You may proceed, Mr. Eastham. STATEMENT OF ALAN W. EASTHAM, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF STATE Mr. E ASTHAM . Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to you and the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come here today to talk about an issue of great importance to the United States and its interests in South Asia. Let me also express the regrets of Assistant Secretary Karl Inderfurth, who was originally invited to attend this hearing. He VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 18 14 is presently on his way back from a visit to China where he con- sulted on South Asian issues with the Chinese Government, coinci- dentally on the same day as Ambassador Holbrooke was there to talk about other issues relating to South Asia and other parts of the world. I would like to begin by talking about some of the events, actions we have taken since the last time we had an opportunity to testify before Congress regarding terrorism in South Asia. I would remind the Committee that in October 1999, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously passed U.N. Resolution 1267, which calls on the Taliban to hand over Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to justice. Since October of last year, we have been diligently monitoring the application of the sanctions which were applied in that resolu- tion, which include effects on financial transactions affecting the Taliban and a ban on flights by the Afghan National Airline, which is controlled by the Taliban, outside Afghanistan. With Russia and other countries we have been talking in recent weeks about the situation in Afghanistan, including terrorism. With India this year we have established a joint working group on counterterrorism which first met in February of this year. India has also agreed to accept and work closely with a legal at- tache at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, and a country which has not yet been mentioned in this morning's proceedings. With Sri Lanka, a friendly country which has been fighting an insurgent group that employs the weapon of terrorism, we have enjoyed ex- cellent cooperation in a number of areas related to counterterrorism. I have a lengthy statement, Mr. Chairman, which I will at this point summarize if that would be agreeable to you. Chairman G ILMAN . With unanimous consent, so ordered. Mr. E ASTHAM . Thank you. Ambassador Sheehan and his colleagues have rightly stressed the shifting locus of international terrorism to South Asia. Though several South Asian countries face terrorist threats of one kind or another, terrorists in Afghanistan pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests, lives, and property in the region, and it will be that coun- try which is largely the subject of my testimony today. I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the Com- mittee of a number of tragic incidents which have occurred over the past several years in the region for which I bear some responsi- bility. Beginning in March 1995, members of the Consulate General staff in Karachi were murdered in transit between their homes and the office. That case remains under active investigation to this day. A similar incident occurred in late 1997 in which four American businessmen were shot to death, and that case also is under inves- tigation. In Kashmir in July 1995, several foreign tourists were abducted while hiking in the mountains of that region. I have to say that we have devoted a great deal of time and attention to the case of Mr. Donald Hutchings, the American citizen who is still missing from the incident, and with whose family we are still in touch. We are still very actively pursuing that case. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 19 15 Ambassador Sheehan has mentioned the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight last December, which had a profound effect and some relation to the earlier kidnapping in Kashmir by the fact that one of the Indian prisoners who was released as a result of the de- mands of the hijackers was also the subject of demands of the kid- nappers of the Americans from 1995. At present the hijackers were last seen at the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The gentleman who was released from In- dian custody is presently in Pakistan. There have been no arrests in that case. And I would also draw your attention to November 12, 1999, when the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was the subject of a rocket attack from parked vehicles. The reason I bring these cases up, Mr. Chairman, is to remind you that there is still a clear and present threat from terrorism in the South Asia region. It affects U.S. interests. It affects U.S. per- sonnel. It affects U.S. property, and it is certainly worthy of this Committee's attention and the attention of the Congress. There have been many other such incidents against Indian inter- ests in Kashmir, bombings in cities in India and Pakistan and at- tacks, as I mentioned, against the government of Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which we have designated as a foreign terrorist organization. These include an assassination attempt in December against Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga, which injured her and killed sev- eral other people. It is clear that the trend is toward more and more deadly attacks against targets in South Asia. We have strongly condemned these attacks in the region, as we do everywhere in the world. It is not acceptable and, indeed, rep- rehensible for individuals and groups to adopt this tactic as a means of achieving political goals. With respect to Kashmir, Mr. Chairman, the President, when he visited South Asia in March, set out a number of principles which call for restraint, rejection of violence, respect for the line of control in Kashmir, and for India and Pakistan to renew their dialogue. We believe those principles are eminently practical and that they would, if pursued actively by the parties in South Asia, lead to a reduction in U.S. violence and, indeed, considerable U.S. support in that regard. It is Afghanistan, however, where the shifting locus of terrorism is most pronounced. I have in my written statement for the record addressed the historical factors in some detail. I know that Mr. Rohrabacher has also addressed more recent history. I would just note, however, the immense suffering of the Afghan people over the last 20 years since the invasion by the Soviet army of that country in December 1979. One major factor to which Am- bassador Sheehan has already alluded is the fact that over the past 20 years an entire generation of young men has grown up who know nothing but war. There is also an entire generation of young women who have come into mature life during that period who have known nothing but suffering, and it is toward peace in Afghanistan that our efforts are directed. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 20 16 Sadly for the Afghans, the brutality and ruthlessness that they learned in fighting the Soviets has carried over into fighting other Afghans as the Afghan civil war continued for the past 10 years. The breakdown of central authority in Afghanistan, the all too easy access to the tools of terrorism in the form of weapons and ex- plosives, and the rise of ideologies in which violence against inno- cents is considered a legitimate tool, have contributed to an in- crease in international terrorism emanating from that region. The rise of the Taliban has also been a contributing factor. The Taliban had no previous experience when they took power in Af- ghanistan in administering a government. They had little experi- ence with the outside world. They had a strong ideological motiva- tion based in Islam and in the Pushtu-based society from which they derive, and they had a strong need for support from any quar- ter.This led them to depend on extremely questionable outside sources of support, including those who advocate violence from out- side Afghanistan, and increasingly the financial benefits of the nar- cotics trade. They have since demonstrated that they support and sympathize with goals from outside the region, which include the removal of U.S. forces from the region of the Gulf, and they have taken no sig- nificant steps to curtail the pursuit of terrorist means to achieve goals emanating from Afghanistan. Ambassador Sheehan has outlined the steps we are taking to de- fend ourselves and to push back international terrorism. We have repeatedly demonstrated this over the past several years. One factor I would also like to note, Mr. Chairman, is the need for governments to realize that support for their groups will back- fire. These groups always, and I stress always, pose a threat to the stability, security, and other real national interests of their hosts and patrons, no matter the short term political advantage which might be seen from activities against national adversaries. The Taliban in Afghanistan have yet to learn this lesson. At the same time that we have been pressing the Taliban to take action to prevent the use of their territory for international ter- rorism, we have been careful to continue contributing to humani- tarian programs in Afghanistan. We have provided support for schools. We are the major donor of food assistance to Afghans. We provide medical supplies and most recently have just announced a new $4 million donation for drought relief in Afghanistan, a coun- try which is suffering from a significant drought which may lead to significant suffering and starvation in that country. We have had, we think, a positive impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans because it is not their fault, and they should not suffer be- cause the people who control that country support international terrorism. With respect to Pakistan, several members have noted the close relationship we have had over the years with that country. We have also worked together against terrorism. Pakistan has offered its cooperation, as has been noted previously during this hearing. Pakistan wants to see peace and stability in Afghanistan. After all, Afghanistan is next door to Pakistan. It has considerable influ- ence in Afghanistan and with the Taliban. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 21 17 Pakistan has made known its view that the presence of Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan is an obstacle to stability, and Pakistan makes the point that it does not control the Taliban. We will continue and have urged Pakistan to use every aspect of its influence with the Taliban to convince them to deal with this issue in the manner called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267. We are also very concerned at the problem of terrorism in Paki- stan. The country has taken some recent, very welcome steps to ad- dress this problem and has arrested a number of persons wanted for terrorist crimes, as has already been noted, and has announced it's taking a close look at foreigners living in Pakistan to insure they're there for lawful and peaceful purposes. I would note that the Pakistan press today, Mr. Chairman, re- ports that a senior delegation from the Pakistan Interior Ministry will be going to Afghanistan later this month to talk to the Taliban authorities about matters pertaining to terrorism and narcotics, and we welcome that as a manifestation of Pakistan's intent to deal with this problem as it affects that country. We are also concerned, as I noted, because both Pakistani and U.S. interests have been attacked in that country. Some terrorists and their supporters certainly continue to live in and move through Pakistan. This includes the organization formally known as Harakat-ul-Ansar, which was designated as a foreign terrorist or- ganization by the United States. We will continue to urge Pakistan to take action against such groups and to take all steps necessary to see that it does not be- come a safe haven or a safe transit point. I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can take as the example the counter- narcotics cooperation we have enjoyed with Pakistan for the past 20 years. We have come to the point where it is possible to see the end of the road for opium production in Pakistan. We have had ex- emplary cooperation with that country in this area, and we hope that we can take that as a model for cooperation on counterterrorism. I thank you very much for the opportunity. I will be happy to take your questions, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Eastham appears in the appen- dix.] Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Eastham and Secretary Sheehan. Let me first address Ambassador-at-Large Michael Sheehan. At your recent Central Asia terrorism meeting here in Washington, sponsored by the State Department, several of the government rep- resentatives from nations in the region impacted by radical Islamic terrorism talked about terrorist camps within Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan. Are you aware of any terrorist training camps inside of Pakistan? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, our primary concern re- garding camps is in Afghanistan, and I talked to those members of all five countries from Central Asia that came to our conference. We had very productive discussions with them. They were all con- cerned primarily about Afghanistan and the camps there. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 22 18 The situation in Pakistan is complicated. I may need a closed session to go into some more details on some of the aspects of it. In our annual report, we do mention the movement of terrorist groups through Pakistan. Primarily my concern is the camps are in Afghanistan. Often in order to leave Afghanistan, many terror- ists move through Pakistan, particularly through Peshawar and out through the region, but they also move north through the Cen- tral Asian states as well. But I think any other details regarding some activity of those camps we might do in closed session; but I would underscore to you, Mr. Chairman, the major source of camps for the training of those types of groups reside in Afghanistan. Chairman G ILMAN . But my question is: specifically, are there any training camps in Pakistan? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, I reviewed that question carefully with my analysts before coming up here. I think I need, based on their advice, to talk to you about that in a closed session. Chairman G ILMAN . A number of the Central Asian countries in- dicated that there was information of terrorist camps in Pakistan. Are they accurate? Are those statements accurate? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Again, Mr. Chairman, I think I would have to discuss that in a closed session. Chairman G ILMAN . All right. With regard to both panelists, what is your candid view of the level of cooperation that we've received from Pakistan in recent years in the fight against international ter- rorism in the region? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, the Pakistani Government has cooperated with the U.S. Government in counter-terrorist ac- tions over the past many years, and it continues to do so actively as we speak right now regarding helping us deal with specific threats to our security, both those threats that affect us within Pakistan, our embassy, and other points of interest, but also re- garding individuals that may be within Pakistan or transiting through Pakistan. So in that regard, they get fairly good grades on cooperation on specific cases. The other side of the ledger, I must say, is their poli- cies in Afghanistan and to a lesser degree in Kashmir that con- tribute to the problem of terrorism that emanates out of Afghani- stan. So it's a mixed record. They cooperate, but they also have policies that are very troubling to us, and we have had very frank discussions with them on those policies and urge them to address those issues. We remain closely engaged at a very high level with the Paki- stanis on these issues, and my particular concern is their relation- ship to the Taliban and how that affects our interest in counterterrorism. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Ambassador Sheehan. Secretary Eastham, did you want to comment on that? Mr. E ASTHAM . I would just add that I would second Ambassador Sheehan's remark regarding cooperation on specific cases. The threats to U.S. installations-- Chairman G ILMAN . Would you put the mic a little closer to you? Mr. E ASTHAM . Sure. The threats to U.S. installations, facilities, personnel, and interests in Pakistan receive the highest level of co- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 23 19 operation from the Pakistan Government. As Ambassador Sheehan has noted, the question of the Taliban and on the pursuit of longer term interests with respect to Afghanistan has an effect on Paki- stani attitudes with respect to that country. It would not be inappropriate to mention that policies toward Kashmir also have an effect, but I think that I would endorse Am- bassador Sheehan's remarks. Chairman G ILMAN . To both panelists, why has the State Depart- ment failed in not designating the Pakistani based LET group [LASHKAR-e TAYYABA], a foreign terrorist organization, espe- cially since the legal threshold is not very high? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, every 2 years, actually by legislation, the Congress requires us to review foreign terrorist or- ganizations. However, this year I have also decided, within the lim- ited resources in my office, to review other groups during the year because we can designate them as terrorist organizations at any time during the year. We are currently reviewing the LET, the LASHKAR-e TAYYABA, actively for its designation as a foreign terrorist organi- zation. The work has been done at the analytical level within the State Department. It is a very complicated and legal process, the designation of a foreign terrorist organization, and right now we are working with the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury to complete that legal analysis. We have been challenged twice in the past on our designation of FTOs in the U.S. court system, and we have won both times. So it is incumbent on us to be very well prepared before we designate a group for terrorism, and right now the LET or the LASHKAR- e TAYYABA, I think you are referring to, is under close review right now, and I expect, Mr. Chairman, to have an answer as to whether they will be designated within the next weeks, perhaps months, depending on that legal process. Chairman G ILMAN . We would hope you would keep this Com- mittee informed of your progress in that direction. Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. G EJDENSON . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the things that we want to make sure people see clearly is that our concerns here are isolated to terrorist activities and threats directed at the United States and our allies, and that what we want to make sure does not happen is that we do not want to create the appearance in any way that there is a conflict here between the West and Islam or, you know, people of the Mus- lim faith. These are isolated incidents, and certainly most of Islam, like most religions, focus on peaceful relations with their neighbors. So I just want to make sure that the fact that we happen to focus on this region today does not leave people with any other impression. My first question is that I am getting the sense, more and more, that it is hard to figure out what comes first, but there is an eco- nomic aspect to all of this. You look at Colombia, and you find the drug lords and the terrorists there. You go to Lebanon and you find in the Bekaa Valley they are growing poppies. You come to this area, and again, the drug trade, you can look at it and see that the drug trade is an easy way to make lots of money. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 24 20 The relationship here seems to be very tightly woven. So this is my first question. How much of the activity here is profit moti- vated, trying to make money off drugs with a little bit of fervor on the side for your terrorist organization, and how much is terrorism with its own goals associated with that? The second question is: What are the countries that have rela- tionships and provide assistance to the Taliban and the govern- ment in Afghanistan? Ambassador S HEEHAN . I am sorry. What was the second ques- tion, again? Mr. G EJDENSON . The second question is: Which countries have relations with the government in Afghanistan and provide assist- ance, military, other than humanitarian, of course? Ambassador S HEEHAN . All right, Mr. Gejdenson. On the first question regarding your question about terrorism and its economic roots, etc., you are absolutely right that most of the terrorism that I see, as the Coordinator when I look around the world, emanates from places where there is a breakdown of state control. The old days of state sponsorship have really waned considerably, although there are a few that I have great concern with, but those are less of my immediate concern. When you have a complete breakdown of lawlessness in a place like Afghanistan, where you have the confluence of narcotics traf- ficking, arms smuggling, other types of illicit activity, coupled with these other terrorist groups, you find this phenomenon at a high rate. In Afghanistan there are both types of terrorists, those that seem to be just in the profit business and others that are politically moti- vated. Some of them are just politically motivated, and those are some of the ones, frankly, that are more troubling. The ones that get caught up in narcotics trafficking and other elicit activities sort of lose interest in their terrorist goals. They're still of major concern, but not as threatening as the ones that are very focused on their political agenda. So there is a little bit of both in Afghanistan. Regarding your second question on support for the Taliban, the Taliban finds itself extraordinarily isolated around the world today. Initially they were recognized only by three governments: by Paki- stan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudis and the UAE both have an extraordinarily strange relationship with the Taliban right now, and I have discussed that issue with both of them at very senior levels. They have put a lot of pressure on the Taliban on a lot of issues regarding terrorism, narcotics traffic, and others, and have been co- operating with us on bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban. The other country is Pakistan. Its relationship with the Taliban is also longstanding and complicated, and I would not exactly de- scribe it as very warm at this point. I will let Al Eastham respond to this in more detail, but I know that the Pakistani Government is engaging the Taliban right now regarding all of the issues that we are concerned about in trying to get them to turn around their policies. Whether those efforts will bear fruit remains to be seen, but those are the main countries with relations with the Taliban. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 25 21 Mr. E ASTHAM . I would just add that, on your first question re- garding the nexus between drugs and terrorism, the Taliban have an ambiguous position on this. They say that the drug trade is un- Islamic, but they seem to permit it to occur and, indeed, to tax it along the way as a source of revenue; and this is a dichotomy in their policy, which is a little bit difficult to deal with because the two policies are completely opposite. We have been doing a great deal to focus on the problem of inter- dicting narcotics flowing out of Afghanistan. We have been working with all of Afghanistan's neighbors in this direction and also with the U.N. drug control program. There is a dilemma in trying to suppress the narcotics traffic in Afghanistan. You have to provide assistance to the country to be able to do that, and that is very hard for us to do with the Taliban. Mr. G EJDENSON . Under the present restrictions, are we able to do democracy building in, for instance, Pakistan with the present sanctions? The present leadership in Pakistan is arguing it is try- ing to establish democracy at the grassroots level. Can we partici- pate in that or are we blocked from doing that with our sanctions? Ambassador S HEEHAN . We can, Mr. Gejdenson, and we do. Mr. G EJDENSON . And if I could indulge my colleagues, one last thing. Are there any countries supplying weapons to the Taliban at this point? Ambassador S HEEHAN . I think I will have to go in closed session on that as well, Mr. Gejdenson. What I know about that is from classified sources. I will be glad to talk to you about it after this. Mr. G EJDENSON . Thank you. You might check with Mr. Rohrabacher for any other information you need on Afghanistan. He seems to be very knowledgeable about the military situation there. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. R OHRABACHER . This is a joke. I mean, you have to go to closed session to tell us where the weapons are coming from? Well, how about let's make a choice. There is Pakistan or Paki- stan or Pakistan. Where do you think the Taliban-right as we speak-are getting their weapons. I have not read any classified documents. Everybody in the region knows that Pakistan is in- volved with a massive supply of military weapons and has been since the very beginning of the Taliban. Let me just state for the record here before I get into my ques- tions that I think there is a-and it is not just you, Mr. Ambas- sador, but it is this Administration and perhaps other Administra- tions as well. I do not believe that terrorism flows from a lack of state control. A breakdown of state control, and all of a sudden you have terrorism. That is not what causes terrorism. What causes terrorism is a lack of freedom and democracy, a lack of a means to solve one's problems through a democratic process. Afghanistan from the very beginning, when the Reagan Adminis- tration was involved with helping the Afghans fight the Russians, which were engaged in trying to put a totalitarian government there; because of Pakistan's insistence, a lion's share of our support VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 26 22 went to a guy named Hek Makti Argulbadin, who had no demo- cratic tendencies whatsoever. And since the Russians left, the United States has not been sup- porting any type of somewhat free, somewhat democratic alter- natives in Afghanistan, and there are such alternatives, and those of us who have been involved know that. So there is no democracy or freedom in Afghanistan where people who are good and decent and courageous have a chance to cleanse their society of the drug dealers and the fanatics that torture and repress especially the women of Afghanistan. The men of Afghani- stan are not fanatics like the Taliban either. They would like to have a different regime. Only the United States has given-and I again make this charge-the United States has been part and parcel to supporting the Taliban all along and still is, let me add. You do not have any type of democracy in Afghanistan. You have a military government in Pakistan now that is arming the Taliban to the teeth. And in Kashmir, what have you got? You have got an Indian Government that supposedly is democratic, steadfastly refusing to permit those people to have an election to solve the problems there democratically. You have got Christians; you have got Seeks throughout India and Pakistan and Jamou where the people's rights are being denied them. It is a breakdown of democracy on the subcontinent, not a breakdown in state control that is causing the violence that threatens the world right now. Let me note that 3 years ago I tried to arrange support, aid, hu- manitarian aid to a non-Taliban controlled section of Afghanistan, the Bamiyan area. Mr. Chairman, the State Department did every- thing they could to thwart these humanitarian medical supplies from going into Bamiyan. And we have heard today that we are very proud that we are still giving aid to Afghanistan. Let me note that aid has always gone to Taliban areas. So what message does that send the people of Afghanistan? We have been supporting the Taliban because all of our aid goes to the Taliban areas, and when people from the out- side try to put aid into areas not controlled by the Taliban, they are thwarted by our own State Department. Let me just note that that same area, Bamiyan, where I tried to help those people who were opposed to the Taliban, Bamiyan now is the headquarters of Mr. bin Laden. Surprise, surprise. Everyone in this Committee has heard me time and again over the years say unless we did something Afghanistan was going to become a base for terrorism and drug dealing. Mr. Chairman, how many times did you hear me say that? This Administration either ignored that or are part of the prob- lem rather than part of the solution. Again, I am sorry Mr. Inderfurth is not here to defend himself, but let me state for the record at a time when the Taliban were vulnerable, the top person in this Administration, Mr. Inderfurth, and Bill Richardson person- ally went to Afghanistan and convinced the anti-Taliban forces not to go on the offensive. Furthermore, they convinced all of the anti- Taliban forces and their supporters, to disarm and to cease their flow of support for the anti-Taliban forces. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 27 23 At that same moment, Pakistan initiated a major resupply effort, which eventually caused the defeat of almost all of the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Now, with a history like that, it is very hard, Mr. Ambassador, for me to sit here and listen to someone say our main goal is to drain the swamp-and the swamp is Afghanistan-because the United States created that swamp in Afghanistan, and the United States policies have undercut those efforts to create a freer and more open society in Afghanistan which was consistent with the beliefs of the Afghan people. Mr. G EJDENSON . Will the gentleman yield for one statement? Mr. R OHRABACHER . I certainly will. Mr. G EJDENSON . I was wondering. During the time that the Ad- ministration supported the Taliban and created this policy, who was President during those years? Mr. R OHRABACHER . Well, there were several Presidents, and I would say that George Bush has to accept some of the blame, but I think the current Administration-no, the Taliban did not exist before that, Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Gejdenson, one of the other myths is that the Taliban were part and parcel of the Mujahadin. The Taliban, as both of you know, were not part of the Mujahadin. The Taliban basically sat out the war and came on the scene afterward. Mu Omar was not a renowned commander in the Mujahadin. Chairman G ILMAN . Mr. Rohrabacher, did you want the witnesses to respond? Mr. R OHRABACHER . Yes, one last note. Thank you, Mr. Chair- man. The Muslims are the victims of terrorism just as much as anyone else. In fact, Muslims are suffering more than anyone else, and I agree with my colleagues that we have to be very careful. Mr. Gejdenson was absolutely right in making sure that as we look at this Taliban drug-related terrorism that is now affecting all of us, that we do not do something to send a message that this is some- thing to do with the Islamic faith because it does not. They are vic- tims as well. And if you have any comments, please feel free. Thank you for giving me 5 minutes. Chairman G ILMAN . Did the panelists want to respond at all? Ambassador S HEEHAN . I would, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Ambassador Sheehan. Ambassador S HEEHAN . First of all, Mr. Rohrabacher, I am sorry that you think that it is a joke that I will not respond on the issue of support for the arms for the Taliban. The information that I have, which I cannot respond by public sources, is based on intel- ligence methods, and I do not have the authority to speak about that in this session, but I will be glad to talk to you or other Mem- bers afterward. Second, regarding the responsibility the U.S. Government has for Afghanistan in the situation there, I do not accept that conclusion at all. The United States did participate in helping the Mujahadin reject the Soviet occupation in the mid-1980's, and that was a pol- icy that I think was a correct one at that time. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 28 24 The situation in Afghanistan, the deterioration of that state since 1979, has primarily to do with the situation in Afghanistan. Cer- tainly there were those responsible, whether it was the Soviet occu- piers or those who were involved in the civil war that has waged there for 20 years, but the idea that the U.S. Government is re- sponsible for everything in Afghanistan is not true. The idea that we support the Taliban I also reject, as well, com- pletely. I have spent 18 months in this job leading the effort within the U.S. Government and around the world to bring pressure on the Taliban. After the bombing of the embassies in East Africa, when I got hired for this job, I have made it my sole effort, my pri- mary effort in this job to bring pressure on that regime. The U.S. Government leads that effort in providing pressure on that regime. My office leads that effort within the U.S. Govern- ment. We started with an executive order in August 1999 that brought sanctions to bear on the Taliban. We led the effort in the United Nations to bring international sanctions against them. We are also leading the effort internationally right now to look at further measures against the Taliban. It is the U.S. Government that is leading that effort. We are ahead of everybody else to bring pressure on the Taliban, and the Taliban knows it. Those other member states within the United Nations and the other commu- nities know our efforts to bring pressure to bear on that organiza- tion because of its support for terrorism. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you. Mr. Eastham, did you want to comment? Mr. E ASTHAM . Yes, sir, I would. I would be happy to defend Mr. Inderfurth if you would like, Mr. Rohrabacher, even if he is not here in person. I would just note that I have spent nearly 15 years of my life working on this part of the world. I was with the Mujahadin at Pe- shawar from 1984 to 1987. I was in the consulate at Peshawar at that time, and I have been back on this account now. I began my 6th year on the South Asia account this time around this week. I was in Pakistan when you were trying your effort to put air- drop assistance into Bamiyan. So I am quite familiar with the his- tory of the whole episode. And I can say that at no point, at no point in the last 6 years has the United States of America offered its support to the Taliban. This is why I think that despite the fact we have provided you nearly 1,000 documents in response to the requests of the Chair- man that you have not been able to find the support for the Taliban, because it is not there. Mr. R OHRABACHER . That is incorrect, by the way, and I will state that for the record. That is incorrect. I have found several ref- erences and documents that have been kept from me indicating what our policy formation about the Taliban has been. So that it not accurate. Mr. E ASTHAM . Well, we have a fundamental difference of opinion then about the record of what this Administration has done with respect to the Taliban. But I will say that our goals with respect to the Taliban have shifted over the past 2 years almost since the East Africa bomb- ings. When the Taliban first came into power in Afghanistan, we VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 29 25 had an agenda which addressed terrorism, narcotics, human rights including the rights of women, and bringing peace to Afghanistan. We tried to address all of those at the same time. After the East Africa bombing, the terrorism problem became much more acute and a much higher priority in terms of what we were doing, but we have been addressing all of these issues since the first day the Taliban came into being, and particularly since they came to power in Kabul. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just had a couple of questions I wanted to ask Mr. Eastham. Is Afghanistan currently a full fledged member of the United Na- tions? Mr. E ASTHAM . Yes, it is. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . And by all standards, 187 members of the United Nations recognized the sovereignty of Afghanistan through the Taliban? Mr. E ASTHAM . I am not an expert on this, but I think I can ad- dress it in terms general enough that I do not make a major mis- take. Afghanistan's credentials as a member of the United Nations have never been rejected by the credentials committee, and the Northern Alliance delegation, the delegation representing the enti- ty headed by Burhannudin Rabbani still occupies the seat of Af- ghanistan at the United Nations. At the same time the Taliban has a presence in New York as a group, but they do not sit in United Nations councils. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . The Taliban group does not sit in the United Nations council? Mr. E ASTHAM . That is correct. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . But by all legitimacy, all other nations do recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in its bi- lateral as well as multilateral relations? Mr. E ASTHAM . No, that is not correct. There are only three coun- tries that have formally recognized the Taliban as the governing entity in Afghanistan. Those three are, as Ambassador Sheehan mentioned, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan. No other country has, to my knowledge, established formal diplomatic relations or recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghani- stan. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . When the Soviet Union invaded Afghani- stan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are our closest allies and we com- mitted a tremendous amount of arms and assistance to these two countries to fight Soviet invasion; is that correct? Mr. E ASTHAM . That's correct. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . And what was the approximate amount in value of what we gave in terms of armaments and everything to these two countries to fight Soviet invasion? Mr. E ASTHAM . I cannot characterize any amounts which might have been provided under programs other than the assistance pro- vided Pakistan. With respect to Pakistan, we provided something VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 30 26 in the neighborhood of $3 billion, $3.2 billion in official assistance from 1982 until the imposition of sanctions in 1990. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . I wanted to ask Secretary Sheehan. You mentioned that you still have concerns about the policies that the Pakistani Government has concerning terrorism, and I want to know what specific policies does the Pakistani Government have that is of concern to the Administration. Ambassador S HEEHAN . We have concerns on both fronts, the east and the west. In the east, starting with Kashmir, we have concerns about the Pakistani Government, particularly their intelligence service support to groups that we have designated as foreign ter- rorist organizations and support for those groups that are oper- ating in Kashmir in that situation there. Second, and of more immediate concern to me, is Pakistan's long relationship with the Taliban, which started in late 1994 when the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan and continues to this day. They are the primary relationship, the Taliban, that Pakistan has. But as I mentioned in my remarks, it is a complicated one. The Pakistanis increasingly understand, I believe, they increasingly un- derstand the threat that the Taliban and its policies have and the backwash back into Pakistan itself. So we have concerns with the Pakistanis on both of those issues that we have talked to them about at the highest levels. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . As you know, the political situation in Paki- stan has also been very serious. We have a military general who felt very strongly that he had to take control of the government be- cause of the problems. Do you think that maybe it is not because that they are not anti-terrorist but because they just do not have the proper resources to properly control their borders when these terrorists go through its territories? What are we doing to give assistance to the Pakistani Govern- ment to alleviate this problem perhaps? Are we assisting them ac- cordingly? Ambassador S HEEHAN . I think the chief executive, Mucharev, definitely has his hands full, and as he has said many times before, his primary concern is turning around the economy in Pakistan, which is truly in tough shape. We do support Pakistan in a variety of different ways, and per- haps Al Eastham is better equipped to answer that question. We have had long ranging consultations with them on how to help them move in the proper directions in terms of democratic reform, in terms of economic reform, which will give them the strength po- litically to make some of the tough decisions they have to make re- garding terrorism. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . You know, there is a sense of hesitancy. If I were a Pakistani leader, I remember a couple of years ago, and my good friend from California will recall, Pakistan paid $600 mil- lion up front for the aircraft that we were supposed to deliver, and we never did. How are we to deal with other countries if we do not keep our promises in that respect? Mr. E ASTHAM . Well, we reached an understanding with the Paki- stan Government which settled that claim a year ago, and we are VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 31 27 in the process of implementing a settlement which is satisfactory to both sides regarding the question of the aircraft. The aircraft delivery was denied, however, I would note, because of legislation which required a Presidential certification relating to the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. We were con- strained by the legislative factor. We also have a considerable burden of sanctions relating to Paki- stan in the nuclear field, potentially in the terrorism, religious free- dom, and narcotics fields, and the ultimate sanction which exists now, which is the sanction against U.S. assistance-- Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . My point-- Chairman G ILMAN . The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. F ALEOMAVAEGA . My time has, but I just want to make my point here, which the fact that this government or this country paid $600 million, and all of a sudden we have all kinds of restric- tions, and then we hung onto their money for years until just now we made this settlement, and to me that is very unfair. It is one sided. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Royce. Mr. R OYCE . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . We will be continuing right through the vote. Mr. R OYCE . Mr. Chairman, I am particularly concerned about the social stability of Pakistan. Regional security is at risk of being se- riously undermined if the troubling social trends we have seen con- tinue. I am especially concerned about the Madras schools whose curriculum encourages radicalism, and as you recognized, Ambas- sador Sheehan, in your testimony, you mentioned anti-Ameri- canism as well. This is the same style education which gave rise to the Taliban and its militarism and the Taliban's horrible human rights prac- tices, especially with respect to women. I think there's a direct cause and effect between this type of propaganda that occurs in the schools. Now, Pakistan, in my view, is on dangerous ground with the op- erations of these schools, and I believe that the continuation of this education threatens the very foundation of the Pakistani state, and I think it threatens India, and I think it threatens the entire re- gion. I have spoken with Pakistani Government officials and have been told that General Musharraf is working very hard to empha- size the teaching of science and the teaching of technology in these schools and trying to develop a different curriculum, one that would contribute to economic development and lift Pakistanis out of poverty. I also wanted to recognize your statement in your report, Ambas- sador, where you say terrorism is a perversion of the teachings of Islam, and I want to commend you for making that observation in your report. My question, though, is to what extent is the central government of Pakistan having success in modifying what these schools are teaching Pakistan's young people. You discuss in your testimony VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 32 28 their intentions. Have there been effective actions that are occur- ring there? As I say, I think this is cause and effect, and I would like to know your observation. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Let me take a first crack, Mr. Congress- man. I am sure Mr. Eastham will have some comment as well. Mr. R OYCE . Sure. Ambassador S HEEHAN . I am glad you asked the question about Madrases. It is an important one, and one that has to be carefully reviewed. This is an issue that has been of concern with me from the first day on the job. Madrases are nothing more than schools that have filled a vacu- um in Pakistan where there are very often no schools or bad schools, and many Madrases are good schools run by legitimate people with the proper purpose in mind, to educate their children. There is a small percentage of them that are of concern to us. Those are ones that have a radical or extreme underpinning, that promote ideologies that are threatening. In fact, some of the Madrases along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan con- tributed to the radicalization of many of the fighters that now are of great concern to us. The issue of education in Pakistan is a fundamental one, and the issue of Madrases is a careful one for the Pakistani Administration to deal with. They have talked to us about wanting to gain control of the small number of those extreme Madrases and shutting them down, and also to have better control of the curriculum of some of the other Madrases that are trying to do the right thing educating the youth of Pakistan. So it is a complicated question, one that I think the Pakistani Government understands. They understand also the sensitivity of the issue and are working to address it. The progress will not be measured in the short term, Mr. Con- gressman. It will take time, and we will have to see what success they have in addressing that issue. Mr. R OYCE . Well, I commend you for your focus on education and propaganda because that question and which direction that takes is going to have a very real consequence in terms of terrorism in very short order. Let me also make the observation to the extent that we can de- escalate tensions between Pakistan and India and reduce the over- all budget dedicated to armaments, those are funds in South Asia that instead can go into public education so that there is not the need for the development, the creation of these alternative sources of education. Part of the problem in South Asia is the degree of the budgets in these countries that goes toward military armaments. Now, I would like just for a second to bring up another issue that is a little bit outside the scope of this hearing; but I serve as Chair- man of the Africa Subcommittee, and in reading your report, it mentions the Revolutionary United Front and Sierra Leone. This is a Libyan trained and Liberian backed organization whose prac- tice has been cutting off the arms and legs of little children in Si- erra Leone. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 33 29 If you go into Freetown, there are several thousand amputees, many of them as young as 2 years old. That organization, known as the RUF, has made war on a democratically-elected government and should be listed as a terrorist organization. I would hope you would consider in your next report doing so. I say that because many Members of this Committee, including the Ranking Member, including the Chairman of this Committee, have spent considerable time on this issue of Sierra Leone, and this report should reflect the reality of what is happening on the ground. I do not feel that was reflected by the fact that RUF is not mentioned as one of these organizations. Chairman G ILMAN . The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. McKinney. Mr. R OYCE . Could I have a response to that though, Mr. Chair- man, if I could, on the RUF especially? Ambassador S HEEHAN . We will review the RUF during this year, as well as before the end of our 2-year period. I am familiar with that organization. Much of the activity they are involved with falls more in the box of war criminality, which is a heinous crime in ei- ther case. Whether they fit into the box of foreign terrorist organi- zation is under review, Mr. Congressman, and I will stay in touch with you on that. Mr. R OYCE . Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Ms. McKinney. Ms. M C K INNEY . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to say to Mr. Sheehan that I think that that is a totally inadequate and insufficient response to that question. I would like Chairman Royce to know that on May 6, 1999, I wrote a letter to the President, to the Secretary of State, and I presume it got down to you as well, asking for the designation of RUF as a terrorist organization, and I can tell you that I got not a single straight answer from this Administration in response to that. Now, it appears to me that this Administration has cleaved itself, in its policy, to rapists of 12-year-old little girls and of hand chop- pers. So that response is totally inadequate. You have had it under review for far too long, and you still have not done anything about it, and you are still supporting the RUF. I would also like to associate myself with the remarks of Con- gressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher, too. It ap- pears to me that the State Department is excellent at writing revi- sionist history. In Mr. Sheehan's testimony, you state that this in- stability can be started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decade-long civil war which followed. That kind of passive language reminds me about what has been said about Mozambique by the opponents of Frelimo and that civil war that was visited upon Mozambique most unnecessarily; by the opponents of MPLA and the civil war that was visited upon Angola by those who opposed MPLA; about the civil war that was visited upon South Africa by the opponents of the ANC, and in each of those instances it was U.S. policy to support the other guys. And so now we get to hear these testimonies that include the lack of information in terms of the U.S. role. Congressman Faleomavaega and Congressman Rohrabacher are absolutely right VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 34 30 that the United States did have a role to play in the current situa- tion in Afghanistan. We provided weapons there, and we left those weapons there. And so if there is any instability, we do not need to just point the finger and say that the problem is Afghanistan's, as you have said earlier. The problem is also ours, and we need to deal with that. Additionally, and I guess finally, on page 6, Mr. Sheehan, of your written testimony you say if there is a criminal in your basement and you aware that he has been conducting criminal activities from your house, even if you are not involved in the crimes you are re- sponsible for them. In fact, your willingness to give him refuge makes you complicit in his actions, past and present. I would just suggest that that message that you delivered to the Taliban's Foreign Minister is also applicable to the United States itself, and it certainly ought to be applicable to the policies that we have formulated and pursued with respect to Africa. We have sup- ported criminals on that continent, continue to support criminals on that continent, and for some reason seem incapable of making people pay for the crimes that they commit, and of course, we are complicit in those crimes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. R OHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much. Would you like to respond, Ambassador? Ms. M C K INNEY . No need for a response because you will not get anything of any substance. Ambassador S HEEHAN . I will respond, Mr. Congressman. First of all, on the RUF: Murder, rape, cutting off of arms are heinous crimes. They are not necessarily terrorism. They can be terrorism, but not necessarily international terrorism by the defini- tion that we are required to respond to by the legislation that we are given. My office reviews the designation of foreign terrorist organiza- tions, and I receive no pressure. If I got pressure from anywhere else in the building, it would have no effect on me. If I determine, if our office determines that the RUF meets the criteria to be des- ignated as a foreign terrorist organization by the criteria of the leg- islation that is clearly spelled out, we will do so. Second, regarding our role in Afghanistan, I have repeatedly said many times and before we have played a role in Afghanistan in the 1980's, one I thought was an appropriate one at that time, and con- tributed to the situation there. I think we should acknowledge that and be part of the solution in Afghanistan. But I do not think the U.S. Government is responsible in the en- tirety for the situation, for the chaos and suffering in Afghanistan, or for the rise of terrorism from that region. Mr. R OHRABACHER . Thank you very much. Well, I am the Chairman. So I have a little prerogative. What a miracle this is. I actually have more than 5 minutes. Before I go on, this Committee will recess as we get into the next vote, and Chairman Gilman will be back. In the meantime I will do my mischief. First of all, let's talk a little bit about terrorism. Terrorism is not just when someone who is outside government commits an act of violence against unarmed opponents, whether civilians, noncombat- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 35 31 ants, etc. Terrorism can also be conducted by a government, and there are lots of terrorist examples of what government does at times, for example, in the Kashmir, and let us not forget that when we are discussing South Asia. To make matters worse, you have terrorism, as I stated before, when there is a lack of democracy, and in the Kashmir and Dramu and other places where not as much, but other terrorist acts against Christians and Seeks and others throughout India, but at least in the Kashmir there has been a denial of the democratic process. Now, wouldn't the democratic process help solve this situation in Kashmir? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, I believe that in all parts of the world where I face the threat of terrorism that democratic processes, the strengthening of state institutions, and particularly democratic state institutions in the long term is the remedy. Mr. R OHRABACHER . Right. Because in Afghanistan if they had a more democratic type government-and I have been pushing as you know for the king to come back and serve as a transition toward a more democratic society-people would have a chance to vote and express themselves and to weed out these evil people who are in- volved in drug dealing and repressing of their own people, the re- pressing of the women population in Afghanistan. So that would actually help if we had a more democratically oriented government there as well, wouldn't it? Ambassador S HEEHAN . That is correct. Mr. R OHRABACHER . All right. Let me just say that in your denials to the charges that I made, you were very good at general denials, but there was no denial of some specific charges. So I would like to address you about them now. I charged that the aid that the United States has been giving has been going to the Taliban controlled territories, especially during that time period when one-third of Afghanistan was being con- trolled by non and anti-Taliban forces. Specifically I used the exam- ple of the Bamiyan effort in which we tried to help the folks down there who my sources said were in great deprivation and starving, and the State Department undermined that effort. And we mentioned earlier there is an aid program going on to Afghanistan. Ten percent of Afghanistan is still controlled by anti- Taliban forces. Is any of the aid that we are giving going to this anti-Taliban area? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Mr. Chairman, I think I will defer to Mr. Eastham. I know that since my tenure in this job in the last 18 months or so that I have seen no evidence of that type of policy, but for previous time I will let Al answer. Mr. E ASTHAM . The answer to the question is, yes, there is aid flowing to all areas in Afghanistan. That is a function, however, of accessibility, of how you get it to them. There is assistance which flows through the United Nations, which is the implementers of the program, into the north via Tajikistan and also through the Chitral area of Pakistan, as well as to the 80 percent of the country that-- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 36 32 Mr. R OHRABACHER . OK. So your answer is, yes, that currently that one area in the Panjsher Valley now controlled by Commander Masood, they do receive humanitarian supplies. Mr. E ASTHAM . I cannot take you specifically to the Panjsher Val- ley because access to the Panjsher Valley is blocked from the south by the Taliban. Mr. R OHRABACHER . But, of course-- Mr. E ASTHAM . In order to get-- Mr. R OHRABACHER [continuing]. It is not blocked from Tajikistan, right. Mr. E ASTHAM . Yes, but there is assistance which flows into all areas of Afghanistan through these U.N. programs that we sup- port. Mr. R OHRABACHER . OK. You're on the record. Thank you very much. That is not what my source is saying. Mr. E ASTHAM . Now, with respect to Bamiyan, I want to take you back to the period 2 or 3 years ago that you are referring to. In fact, at around that same time I made a trip from Pakistan to Kandahar to talk to the Taliban about the blockade which they had imposed at the time upon assistance to Bamiyan because at the time Bamiyan was controlled by non-Taliban forces from the Hazara people there. One of the main effects of the trip by Mr. Richardson and Mr. Inderfurth that you have so criticized was to attempt to persuade the Taliban, in fact, to lift that very blockade of Bamiyan, which we followed up with discussion in Islamabad in which the Taliban did, in fact, agree to a partial lifting to enable foodstuffs to go into Bamiyan. Mr. R OHRABACHER . I see. So we traded it off for the Taliban. They were going to lift their blockade, and we were going to disarm all of their opponents. Mr. E ASTHAM . No, sir, that is not the case. Mr. R OHRABACHER . OK. Well, go to disarming the Taliban's oppo- nents, and by the way, this has been reconfirmed in everything that I have read, both official and unofficial. Are you trying to tell us now that the State Department was not at that crucial moment, when the Taliban was vulnerable, dis- arming the Taliban's opponents? Did not Mr. Inderfurth and the State Department contact all of the support groups that were help- ing the anti-Taliban forces and ask them to cease their flow of mili- tary supplies to the anti-Taliban forces? Mr. E ASTHAM . At that time we were trying to construct a coali- tion which would cutoff support for all forces in Afghanistan from the outside. Mr. R OHRABACHER . And I take it that is a yes to my question-- Mr. E ASTHAM . No, sir, you have left out-- Mr. R OHRABACHER . But the Taliban-- Mr. E ASTHAM [continuing]. The cutting off the Taliban part. Mr. R OHRABACHER . But the Taliban were not included. What happened right after all of those other support systems to the re- sistance groups had been dismantled because of Mr. Inderfurth's and Mr. Richardson's appeal and the State Department's appeal? What happened not only immediately after? Even while you were making that appeal, what happened in Pakistan? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 37 33 Was there an airlift of supplies, military supplies between Paki- stan and Kabul and the forward elements of the Taliban forces? The answer is yes. I know. Mr. E ASTHAM . The answer is-- Mr. R OHRABACHER . You told me because-- Mr. E ASTHAM . The answer is-- Mr. R OHRABACHER [continuing]. It is secret information. Mr. E ASTHAM . The answer is closed session if you would like to dredge up that record. Mr. R OHRABACHER . All right. OK. Mr. E ASTHAM . That would be fine. Mr. R OHRABACHER . I do not have to go into closed session be- cause I did not get that information from any classified document. That information is available to anybody watching the scene up there. They know exactly what happened. Mr. Inderfurth; Mr. Bill Richardson, a good friend of mine, doing the bidding of this Administration, basically convinced the anti- Taliban's mentors to quit providing them the weapons they needed with some scheme that the Taliban were then going to lay down their arms, and immediately thereafter Pakistan started a massive shift of military supplies which resulted in the total defeat of the anti-Taliban forces. Now, this is either collusion or incompetence on the part of the State Department as far as this Congressman is concerned. The people will have to look at the record and determine that for them- selves, and when this Congressman says this Administration has a covert policy of supporting the Taliban, I see examples of what I just described over and over and over again. I have read the documents you have given me, and the docu- ments over and over again to me indicate that the State Depart- ment has been telling the Taliban, ``Hand this over, bin Laden, and we can deal with you.'' Now, I am not going to quote because it is secret information. None of the documents I have seen, by the way, should have been classified, and let's get to those documents. Why haven't I been provided any documents about State Depart- ment analysis during the formation period of the Taliban and about whether or not the Taliban was a good force or a bad force? Why have none of those documents reached my desk after 2 years? Mr. E ASTHAM . Congressman, we were responding to a specific re- quest dealing with a specific time period, which I believe the com- mencing period of the request for documents was after the time pe- riod you are talking about. We were asked to provide documents by the Chairman of this Committee from 1996 to 1999. Mr. R OHRABACHER . Ah, I see. You found a loophole in the Chair- man's wording. Mr. E ASTHAM . No, sir. We were responding to the Chairman's re- quest. Mr. R OHRABACHER . You found a loophole in the Chairman's wording of his request so as not to provide me those documents. You know, I am the only one here. I am not the Chairman of the Committee. I would never get the opportunity to have a back-and- forth with you except in times like this. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 38 34 The State Department has taken full advantage of its use of words in order not to get this information out. I am looking forward to more documents. I will say this. I have spent hours overlooking those documents, and there has been nothing in those documents to persuade me that my charges that this Administration has been covertly sup- porting the Taliban is not accurate. Feel free to respond to that. Mr. E ASTHAM . It is not true. I have to negate the whole thesis that you are operating under. Mr. R OHRABACHER . All right. OK. Then the other option is the State Department is so incompetent that we have done things that helped the Taliban and put them in a position of having hundreds of millions of dollars of drug money and power in Afghanistan and undercutting the anti-Taliban forces. This is not intent. This is just incompetence. Mr. E ASTHAM . That is a judgment you can make. Mr. R OHRABACHER . All right. Mr. E ASTHAM . And if you want to make that judgment, that is up to you, Congressman. Mr. R OHRABACHER . OK. Mr. E ASTHAM . I would just observe that it is considerably more complex than that to deal with people over whom we have so little influence as the Taliban. I have been myself, by my count six times, into Afghanistan on both the northern side and the southern side, and I have met innu- merable times with Taliban officials to attempt to achieve U.S. ob- jectives, and I have to tell you that it is a tough job. Mr. R OHRABACHER . I believe it is. Mr. E ASTHAM . I would like to introduce you to some of them some time. Mr. R OHRABACHER . Oh, I have met many Taliban. Thank you. And as you are aware, I have met many Taliban and have talked to them, especially when you disarm their opponents and you par- ticipate in an effort to disarm their opponents at a time when they are being resupplied militarily. I guess it is very hard for them to take us seriously when we say we are going to get tough with them. Mr. E ASTHAM . You keep saying that, but it is not true. The effort-- Mr. R OHRABACHER . You are just saying-- Mr. E ASTHAM [continuing]. The effort was to stop the support for all the factions in-- Mr. R OHRABACHER . That is correct. You did not deny that we dis- armed their opponents. You just said we were doing it with the Taliban as well. But as I pointed out, which you did not deny, the Taliban were immediately resupplied, which means that we were part and parcel to disarming a victim against this hostile, totali- tarian, anti-Western, drug dealing force in their society. We were part and parcel of disarming the victim, thinking that the aggres- sor was going to be disarmed as well, but it just did not work out, at the moment when Pakistan was arming them, I might add. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 39 35 I have got just a couple of minutes, and then we are going to have to recess this. There is a 5-minute vote on. Could I have this on the screen, please? Can we put the vote on the screen? Two minutes. The Administration is saved again. All right. Let me just say I think that the Administration-Bill Richardson is a wonderful guy, and I think Rick Inderfurth is sincere. I think the record here is abysmal, and again, it is not state power we are talking about. We abandoned these people in Afghanistan, the wonderful peo- ple. The Taliban did not defeat the Russians. You know that. You were there at the time. The Taliban were not even in the field at that time. They did not exist. They were kept back, and we aban- doned those wonderful, courageous people in Afghanistan who were not fanatics when they were fighting for their homeland. We could have come back with an Afghan policy, and this Con- gressman supports an Afghan policy that would provide a real com- mitment, $100 million for de-mining, $100 million to help set up a democratic process, $100 million so that we can help them plant other things rather than poppies for narcotics. Let's have a real commitment by this Administration. We have seen no such policy initiatives from this Administration, just excuses and word games, but I thank you both because you do a good job, and you are both patriots, and I appreciate that. This Committee is in recess. [Recess.] Mr. G ILMAN [presiding]. The Committee will come to order. Mr. Delahunt. Mr. D ELAHUNT . Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a different line and get off of South Asia for a moment. On page IV of the State Department's April 2000 Report on Pat- terns of Global Terrorism, there is a paragraph. Let me read the paragraph into the record. As direct state sponsorship has declined, terrorists increasingly have sought ref- uge wherever they can. Some countries on the list have reduced dramatically their direct support of terrorism over the past years, and this is an encouraging sign. They still are on the list, however, usually for activity in two categories: harboring of past terrorists, some for more than 20 years, and continuing their linkages to des- ignated foreign terrorist organizations. Cuba is one of the state sponsors that falls in this category. Could you amplify on that? Am I to conclude that there is evi- dence that the Castro regime is no longer in the business of export- ing terrorism and revolution in this hemisphere? Mr. Sheehan, Am- bassador? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Yes, Congressman. I would say regarding Cuba that their support for terrorism has declined dramatically over the years, and right now its active support for terrorism is scant. Mr. D ELAHUNT . Is scant? You said there were some linkages to foreign terrorist organizations. Could you enumerate those organi- zations? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Yes, sir. The main ones we are concerned with are the two Colombian groups, the FARC and the ELN. Mr. D ELAHUNT . I thought that might be the case, and I have a problem with that, and let me tell you what it is. Recently, in fact, VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 40 36 there was a story in the Colombian press, and the headline is ``Cuba to play a role in Colombia peace talks.'' You are not suggesting that we should leave Cuba on this list be- cause of their involvement in the Colombian peace process, which I understand has been done at the behest of the Colombian Gov- ernment. For the record, I think it is important to note that there are four other countries that are involved in this multilateral effort to move the peace process along. Those countries are France, Spain, Nor- way, and Switzerland, and they are described as the friends of the process with the ELN, and I am aware obviously of the history of the ELN and its historical relationship with the Castro regime. But I would suggest that this is an occasion where we would wel- come, if you will, Cuban involvement in terms of moving a peace process along that I would suggest is the ultimate answer if we are going to do what we hope to do in terms of staunching the flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States. I would be interested in your response, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Yes, sir. I think the issue of Cuban in- volvement with the FARC and the ELN is not really the principal one. I do not think that alone would keep them on the sponsorship list if they were able to assure us that no terrorists of those organi- zations are there, because those are very violent organizations that threaten American lives in Colombia every day and are responsible for the deaths of many Americans and damage of a lot of material and property. So their relationship, those groups, is a little different than the Europeans, but I think that one of the-- Mr. D ELAHUNT . Can I interrupt, Ambassador? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Yes, sir. Mr. D ELAHUNT . I think it is important to note that the FARC has a physical presence and an office in Mexico, and the ELN has a physical presence in Germany, and you know, both the FARC and ELN have a presence in Spain. You know, these distinctions are very, very subtle that you are making here. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Right. Mr. D ELAHUNT . And, you know, these nuances are almost imper- ceptible to my eye. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Right. The other reason Cuba is on the list of state sponsorship, because it provides safe haven to numer- ous terrorists that we are interested in from the past, and that is why I mention in here many of them go way back. Some of them are the Machiteros that were involved in the killings of Americans in Puerto Rico and other places and providing safe haven to those former terrorists. I did, Mr. Delahunt, person- ally write this introduction, and what I was saying in here, I was signaling to countries like Cuba that there is a difference, their support for terrorism between now and before, and that their record for support for terrorism is very small, but they do have issues. If they want to address those issues and want to move forward on those issues, we would welcome that, as we would with all seven of the state sponsors. What I was trying to do in my report is sig- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 41 37 nal to them that, yes, their issues are relatively small, dramatically different from the Cold War Era. That era has passed us, and they could take steps to address these issues and be considered for the list in the future. Mr. D ELAHUNT . If I could indulge the Chair for one more ques- tion. Chairman G ILMAN . Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Mr. D ELAHUNT . Just one more question, Mr. Chairman. Chairman G ILMAN . Without objection. Mr. D ELAHUNT . That brings to mind a recommendation that was put forth by Ambassador Bremmer and his bipartisan commission when he suggested that there be an intermediate level or designa- tion in terms of a government as a state sponsor of terrorism. I am sure you are aware of that. Something less than an offi- cially designated state sponsor or terrorism, but something that would, I believe, give the American people and Members of this in- stitution, as well as Members of the Senate, a more realistic and accurate appraisal of where these particular states are in terms of the hierarchy of supporting terrorism. Does the Administration have a position? Have you reflected on the recommendation by the commission? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Congressman, I have been aware of this issue since I took this job, and that the perception among some around the world is that once you get on the list of state sponsor- ship, you never get off, and that list is deemed as political by some. In that regard, I have looked to try to very clearly articulate why countries are on the list and what it would take to get them off of the list. I studied carefully Jerry Bremmer's proposal. I have discussed it primarily at the staff level here in the Congress, to find more flexi- ble approaches to find another step on or off the list, what might more accurately reflect the real situation of support for terrorism by different states, and we have not come up with a formal position on that yet. There are some drawbacks that I have heard from Members, staff members of this Committee, as well as on the Senate side, also some concerns within the Administration, but I think we are carefully reviewing it. I understand the desirability of that, what benefits it could have to us, and we should have a response hopefully soon on whether we have a proposal for you. Mr. D ELAHUNT . I would urge that because I really think it is very important to recognize that in this particular area there are varying shades of gray, and it is very difficult, as you well know, to describe things in black and white terms without creating a dis- torted picture. Chairman G ILMAN . The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. D ELAHUNT . Thank you. Chairman G ILMAN . Dr. Cooksey. Mr. C OOKSEY . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here. I am concerned about terrorism for a lot of reasons. Personally I feel that all terrorists are like all dictators. They are all cowards, and this is their way of overcoming the fact that they are usually VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 42 38 not too well educated, and they are misguided, and they try to in- flict some of their misery on other people. I know that in the past Pakistan has been a friend and an ally, but I am concerned that they perhaps are not ferreting out as many of the terrorist as they should, and I feel like they could real- ly do a lot more to get rid of the terrorists within the limits of their country. Do you feel the fact that Pakistan is spending so much on their nuclear weapons program could diminish the amount of resources they have to run an effective anti-terrorism program? Could there be a correlation there? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Congressman, I am not sure, but I would say this in answering your question, that Pakistan, in order to de- velop the political space to take on some of these terrorist issues- because it is a political issue for them to take on some of these groups-in order to have the political space in order to do that, they need to take certain steps to reform themselves politically, economically, and socially. Clearly a smaller defense budget would help them, enable them to take on some of this reform. So if there is a relationship in terms of defense spending and their ability to reform, their defense budget takes a huge chunk of their public sector funding. If they were able to put more of those resources in some of those other issues, it might give the Pakistani Government more space to move in the direction we would like them to go on counterterrorism. Mr. C OOKSEY . Good. Thank you. At times I feel that too many Americans and maybe even some Americans in Congress become complacent about the threat of ter- rorism and will not be concerned about it again until we have some more acts of terrorism like we had a few years ago, both from Americans and from some people from this South Asia area. Do you feel that today the State Department has adequate re- sources to conduct surveillance and anti-terrorism activities, and if so, why, and if not, what additional resources would it take to get the State Department up to the level that we would consider a top notch, top drawer type level of anti-terrorism activity? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that question. There are two parts of it. The first part is do we have the secu- rity funding to do the protection of our embassies. Actually Dave Carpenter, my colleague who does diplomatic security, is best pre- pared to answer that. I am sure he has laid that out up to Con- gress, what resources he needs. But I would say this on the parts that I manage, which overlap with Dave's in a lot of areas. The anti-terrorism assistance pro- gram, we have asked for $38 million this year. We have got the Ad- ministration's request. We are hoping to get full funding for that when the appropriations committees come together in conference later on in the year. Right now I believe the House side has given us full funding, but the Senate has not. We also asked for $40 million to fund a counterterrorism training center which would help train diplomatic security personnel, as well as provide training for those security officials that we work with overseas. That is really the key. They are the front line of de- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 43 39 fense for Americans in our battle against counterterrorism. They help protect our embassies. They help protect airports that Amer- ican people travel through, the borders. There are a lot of Ameri- cans overseas. These are the front line of defense. They are our counterparts on the intelligence and law enforcement. We need a first class facility in order to train those people to build the type of relationships we need. The Administration has asked for funding for that, and we are having treat difficulty in the appropriations process, and we certainly could use your support on that, sir. Mr. C OOKSEY . You say you want to build a facility to do this anti- terrorism training? Ambassador S HEEHAN . That is correct. Right now we train in seven different locations around the country on a catch-can basis, sort of standing room only types of arrangements with different fa- cilities. It is just not a way to run a railroad. We would like to create our own training facility where we can bring in these people and establish the long term relationships that are really going to pay dividends for the security not only of our embassies, but for Americans that travel, live, and work abroad. Mr. C OOKSEY . Well, I bend over backward not to bring up paro- chial issues into my discussion, but since you raise the issue, the U.S. Marshal's training site is within my district, and I visited it several times. It is at Camp Beauregard. It used to be Fort Beau- regard, and they have really a top facility. Do you use that at all? If I am not mistaken, they do some State Department things. Ambassador S HEEHAN . We do some stuff there, yes, Congress- man, a great facility. Mr. C OOKSEY . Well, I would like to formally invite you to do all of your training there, and I guarantee you we will work to get what you need. Mr. D ELAHUNT . If the gentleman would yield for just a moment. Mr. C OOKSEY . Sure, I will yield to my friend from Massachusetts. Mr. D ELAHUNT . Well, I just wanted to point out that there is a military base on Cape Cod, no swamps, no bugs, the sounds of waves and sands that is 5,000 acres there, Ambassador, and I am sure that you would be warmly welcomed there. Mr. C OOKSEY . I would tell my friend from Massachusetts that after I got out of the Air Force I was in the Guard for a while, and we trained up there one summer. It is a nice facility. That was in the summer of 1970 or 1971, but they had some narrow bridges up there, and it is just not an ideal place to go. Mr. B URTON [presiding]. 1970 to 1971. Let me, I guess, conclude this hearing by asking a few questions. Mr. Delahunt talked about the connection, I believe, between Cuba and the FARC guerrillas and the ELN. The other committee on which I serve is the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, and we have a subcommittee that deals with national security and terrorism, and we have done some work in that area. There is no question from the information that we have and pictures that we have seen that the Cuban Government has been working with the FARC guerrillas and the ELN. As a matter of fact, the leaders of the FARC guerrillas, if you look at pictures of them, they are wearing Che Guevara type be- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 44 40 rets. They use the same basic techniques that he used, and we be- lieve there is a connection there, and I wonder why you folks are not aware of that. Are you aware of that? Ambassador S HEEHAN . Congressman, we are aware of the con- nections, the long connections of the FARC and the ELN to Cuba. Let me say this about the FARC and the ELN. The FARC is one of the more violent foreign terrorist organizations that I deal with, responsible for 10 Americans dead and 3 missing since 1980. Mr. B URTON . Right. Ambassador S HEEHAN . It is high on my list. They are involved in kidnapping, extortion in Colombia that is of enormous concern to us. The ELN, although not as deadly in terms of numbers, wreaked tremendous amount of damage to American interests in oil pipe- lines in Colombia. These are two very serious and dangerous ter- rorist organizations. Primarily though I would say this, Congressman, that they do not depend on support from Cuba. They do have links from Cuba, but quite frankly, as you know very well, they are able to generate funding and weapons right there at home. Mr. B URTON . No, I understand. They are getting as much as $100 million a month from the drug cartels. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Exactly. Mr. B URTON . And from kidnappings and everything else, but they do go to Cuba. They do do some training with the Cubans, and they are in concert with one another. The reason I am concerned about that, and probably Mr. Delahunt and others, is Venezuela is right there. We have got the entire Central American and the Panama Canal and everything that is right in that area, and if that is not handled properly, then that whole area could be in jeopardy. Cuba has always had an eye toward revolution in South America and Central America. That is why they supported the Sandinistas, the FMLN, and why Che Guevara went into South America in the first place. So there is a connection there, and I hope the State De- partment pays particular attention to that. One other thing that I would like to talk about, and I am sorry that I was absent. I had to go to the floor, but there has been a lot of talk about Pakistan, and Pakistan has been an ally of ours for 50 years. They helped us during the problems that we had in Afghanistan. They were a conduit for military equipment and weapons going in there to stop the Russians-the Soviet Union. They worked with us in Somalia. They worked with us during the entire Cold War. They have always been an ally of ours. Whenever we talk about terrorism involving Pakistan, it seems that there is always a reluctance to talk about the problems right across the border in India. In India, we have half a million troops in Kashmir gang-raping women, going in the middle of the night, taking people out of the houses and killing them and torturing them, and people just disappear. In Punjab we have had a similar problem over the years. It has gone on for a long time. I have got the statistical data, which I will not go into, but I will submit it for the record. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 45 41 And I do not understand why we pay so much attention to our friend who has been with us through thick and thin, and we do not say anything about India who was an opponent of ours during the entire Cold War. They were a nonaligned nation that built Soviet MIG's. They built Soviet tanks. They were on the Soviet side when [Flight] 007 was shot down by the Soviets. They were the only na- tion in the world that did not condemn them. Yet we continue to kick our friend for 50 years, Pakistan, in the teeth, and we do not pay any attention to the problems that we see in India. In Pakistan, when you talk about the terrorist activities, they worked with us on Amil Kanzi. He killed a CIA officer in Virginia. He was arrested by the Pakistanis and extradited to the United States. Ramzi Yousef was accused and convicted of involvement in the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center. He was ar- rested by Pakistani officials in Pakistan and extradited to the United States. I am not pronouncing these names right, but I think you know who they are. Sidque Odey was involved in the bombing of a U.S. embassy in East Africa, was apprehended by Pakistan and turned over to Ken- yan authorities. Khalid Deek was implicated in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, was arrested by Pakistan and ex- tradited to Jordan. You know, Pakistan was picked as a vital area in December 1999. The National Commission on Terrorism report, which was re- leased on June 5, said Pakistan's cooperation was vital in warding off terrorist attacks planned for the millennium. You know, I just hate to see us have a hearing and attack some- body who does have problems. Do not misunderstand. They have problems, and I would like to see those resolved. I would like to see free and fair elections once again returned. I am sure you would as well. But the thing that concerns me is we ought to give a little bit of leeway and deference to those who are always there when we need them. They are always there when we need them. And then, right across the border, you look at India whom we show a great deal of deference to, who has not always been there when we need them, and I just do not understand that double standard, and it bothers me. If you would care to comment, you can. Ambassador S HEEHAN . Congressman, Pakistan is a great friend to the United States for a long time. I served on active duty in So- malia and again in Haiti. In Somalia, I served with the Pakistanis, and they did a great job there, and they were with us. I was on the phone when President Bush called the government of Pakistan to ask for their participation in 1992. I was on the NSC staff. They immediately responded and sent troops into Somalia. They were ac- tually already there before we led the coalition in December 1992. Again, in 1994, I served on active duty again with the Paki- stanis. The Deputy Force Commander in the operation in Haiti was a Pakistani general who was outstanding and a good friend and a professional officer. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 46 42 These are good friends, and it is difficult for me when I deal with the Pakistani counterparts on some of the tough issues that we have with them. You mentioned some of the people they have helped arrest over the years, and that is absolutely true, and all of those people are very important. The problem is that too often the terrorists, after they conduct an act, are heading back to Pakistan. Ramzi Yousef, who blew up the World Trade Center, was arrested in Pakistan. Odey, the other guy you mentioned who blew up our embassy in East Africa, hightailed back to Pakistan. That is a problem. The problem is, and, yes, they helped arrest them, but their policies in Afghanistan and in Kashmir and at home are helping to promote an environment where these folks are being generated out of there and coming back there after they con- duct attacks. So it is a mixed record. They understand the threat. We talk to them about it frankly. I want to stay engaged with Pakistan and help them through this. They are friends. The threat actually, Congressman, as you know, not only affects us. It affects them as well, and that is why we have to stay work- ing with them to address the problem. Mr. B URTON . Let's talk about this double standard again, and then I will summarize and we can get on with this and let some- body else have the last question or two. You know, we have penalized Pakistan because of their nuclear development program, and yet India has not been penalized. India has a nuclear program, and we put severe limitations on military exports to Pakistan because they decided to do something that they thought was necessary to protect themselves in the event that there was an attack by India, and there have been a number of wars, as you know, between the two. And so, this double standard does exist, and I think it is some- thing that the State Department and other agencies of our govern- ment ought to take a real hard look at. I will not belabor the point because my time has run out and I am going to yield to Mr. Delahunt, or whoever wants to finalize because you have to leave in about 3 minutes, and that is that Kashmir and Punjab continue to be real terrible tragedies in human rights violations. We just do not talk about that enough. There are 500,000 troops in Kashmir, a like number in Punjab. The atrocities continue. We do not do anything to put pressure on India to stop that, and we should because they go on year after year after year, and people are suffering and they are being tor- tured. Women are being gang-raped by Indian troops, and Amnesty International has reported on that. I mean it is reported on, but our State Department and our gov- ernment seems to want to keep this on a low profile basis. Why, I do not understand, because we jump all over Pakistan, but we do not say anything about India, and when we do it is very, very low key. Mr. E ASTHAM . I think you can take as your guide, Mr. Chairman, what the President of the United States did in going out to South Asia. We have been very clear that the desire to buildup a relation- ship with a country that has a billion people and that will rep- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 47 43 resent a significant force in world affairs in the coming century is not at the expense of our old friend and ally Pakistan. I have personally lived for 5 years of my life in Pakistan, have significantly pleasant memories of that time. I have also spent a couple of years in India, and I can tell you that it is possible to pur- sue a good relationship with each of these countries at the same time and simultaneously. I am convinced of that. With respect to the Punjab and Kashmir situations that you mentioned, I had the opportunity to accompany your colleague, Mr. Ackerman, up to Kashmir on his trip there several years ago, if you will recall that. I have been working on the problem of Kashmir. I know the leadership both of the government in Kashmir as well as the opposition in the form of the All Parties Conference; I can tell you that we do not sweep that under the rug or ignore it, while at the same time pushing on Pakistan for different reasons. We are trying to address all of them at once, and I hope you will take that as a sincere commitment. Thank you very much. Mr. B URTON . Well, I will take you at your word, but I hope you will make it a little higher profile because we have some of our Seek friends here. We have friends from Kashmir who are in the audience and from Pakistan, and they know very well first hand the problems that are existing over there, and year after year after year we listen to them. Our heart bleeds for them, and yet the con- ditions continue. We are the greatest power on earth supposedly right now, and we ought to be doing everything we can to end that tragedy over there. With that, Mr. Delahunt, do you have any more comments? Mr. D ELAHUNT . I understand they must leave. Mr. B URTON . If not, well, then we appreciate your being here, and the Committee stands adjourned. [At 12:38 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 48 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 49 (45) A P P E N D I X J ULY 12, 2000 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 50 46 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 51 47 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 52 48 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 53 49 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 54 50 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 55 51 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 56 52 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 57 53 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 58 54 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 59 55 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 60 56 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 61 57 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 62 58 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 63 59 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 64 60 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 65 61 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 66 62 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 67 63 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 68 64 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 69 65 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 70 66 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 71 67 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 72 68 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 73 69 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 74 70 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 75 71 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 76 72 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 77 73 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 78 74 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 79 75 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 80 76 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 81 77 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1 Page 82 78 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:30 Jan 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68482.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1

Bush deal 43m taliban { May 26 2001 } Cia sides against afghan hero fighting taliban Clinton pro taliban Funds enemies { November 5 2001 } House of representatives [htm] People wont accept afghan invasion before 911 { March 25 2004 } Soilders let taliban go { December 18 2002 } Taleban hosted in bush texas to discuss oil { December 4 1997 } Taliban cia history { July 12 2000 } Taliban had US support says pakistan PM { August 24 2006 } Taliban us installed { September 10 2002 } Us helped taliban safety { January 21 2002 } Us supported taliban throughout 90s { July 12 2000 } US threatened to bomb pakistan after 911 { September 11 2001 } Files Listed: 14