News and Document archive source
copyrighted material disclaimer at bottom of page

NewsMine9-11inquiry — Viewing Item


Panel has testy exchange with firefights police { May 18 2004 }

Original Source Link: (May no longer be active)
   http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/19/terror/main618344.shtml

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/19/terror/main618344.shtml

Testy Exchanges At 9/11 Hearing
NEW YORK, May 18, 2004


The former police and fire chiefs who were lionized after the World Trade Center attack came under harsh criticism from the Sept. 11 commission, with one member saying the departments' lack of cooperation was scandalous and "not worthy of the Boy Scouts."

Commission members, in New York for an emotional two-day hearing, on Tuesday focused on how leaders of the two departments failed to share information effectively in the early frantic moments after two hijacked planes slammed into the World Trade Center.

Former fire commissioner Thomas Von Essen and former police chief Bernard Kerik shot back with infuriated responses to commissioner John Lehman's questions, the strongest of a series of pointed statements from the panel.

Families of Sept. 11 victims applauded the tough questioning and shook their heads sadly as the panel enumerated a litany of communication breakdowns between the departments. Family members sporadically mocked and booed Von Essen, Kerik and Richard Sheirer, former Office of Emergency Management commissioner, and they wept earlier in the day as they watched videotape of the buildings collapsing.

As Von Essen testified, Sally Regenhard who lost her firefighter son held up a piece of paper reading: "LIES."

The 10-member bipartisan panel has been holding hearings over the last year, including high-profile meetings in Washington last month about intelligence failures, to examine what led to the attacks and determine ways to avoid future attacks. The panel will issue its final report July 26.

Tuesday's hearings represented a shift of emphasis for the commission, which has focused on intelligence and domestic security preparedness going back months or even years before the attacks, reports CBSNews.com's Jarrett Murphy.

Former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was scheduled to testify at the second day of hearings Wednesday.

While the New York hearings, held near ground zero, were meant to examine problems in the city's emergency response system, officials also were asked about what they knew about terrorism threats in the months before Sept. 11.

The former director of the World Trade Center told the commission that he knew nothing of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network until the summer before the attacks, and was never privy to FBI intelligence that Islamic terrorists might hijack U.S. planes.

Alan Reiss said he first heard about bin Laden's al Qaeda network when ex-FBI agent John O'Neill was hired in the summer of 2001 as head of security at the trade center. O'Neill, who had hunted bin Laden for years, was one of the 2,749 people killed in the attack.

"I was aware of the plot against some of the other Port Authority tunnels and the U.N.," Reiss testified. "But we were never briefed" by the FBI.

Reiss also said he was more focused on fending off possible bioterrorism attacks such as anthrax, spending more than $100,000 to protect the building from such an assault.

"We felt this (anthrax) was the next coming wave," he said. "We had developed plans on how to isolate the air conditioning system and shut it down but never did we have a thought of what happened on 9-11."

Later, the miscommunication was termed "a scandal" by Lehman, who then complained it was "not worthy of the Boy Scouts, let alone this great city."

Family members cheered when commission member Slade Gorton launched an aggressive line of questioning about the city's emergency system to Kerik, Von Essen and Sheirer.

When the agency heads tried to defer to their successors, Gorton refused to let them.

Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly was asked if the city was prepared to handle a chemical attack with 10,000 injuries. "I would say no," he replied.

The hearing began with a commission report recounting how city officials were forced to make life-and-death decisions based on incomplete communications, leading to some of the deaths in the twin 110-story buildings.

The communication problems resulted in incidents such as the deaths of Port Authority workers told to wait for help on the 64th floor of one tower. Many of them died when the building collapsed.

Scores of family members were in the audience as the commission showed footage of both hijacked planes slamming into the 110-story towers, along with videotaped testimony from survivors. As the footage showed the towers' collapse, family members held hands and locked arms as they waited for the inevitable, many of them wiping tears from their eyes.

"For me, it was reliving what my mother heard, what she saw, what her last moments were," said Terry McGovern, whose mother died in the south tower.

Committee member Sam Casperson, in a minute-by-minute recounting of the second plane's crash into the World Trade Center, detailed how Port Authority workers were advised to wait for assistance on the 64th floor and many of them died when the tower collapsed.

Communications breakdowns also prevented announcements to evacuate from reaching civilians in the building, Casperson said. One survivor of the attacks recounted calling 911 from the 44th floor of the south tower, only to be placed on hold twice.

Emergency 911 operators had a "lack of awareness" about what was happening at the twin towers, and were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of calls, Casperson said.

"On the morning of September 11 the last best hope of the people in the World Trade Center lay not with national policy," but with firefighters and police officers who responded to the disaster, said commission staff director Philip Zelikow.

But like national policy, the local emergency response had its roots in past experience particularly the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which killed six people and exposed major flaws in emergency response plans for the twin towers. Stairways went black and public address systems failed. Firefighters' radios lost their signal. It took ten hours to evacuate the towers in the 1993 attacks, the commission said.

After the 1993 attacks, radio repeaters were installed in the twin towers to improve communication for rescue workers. Batteries were installed in emergency lights. And fire drills were held for civilians.

"People who evacuated both in 1993 and 2001 say they were better prepared in 2001," the commission staff reported. However, despite the effort to train civilians, neither full nor even partial evacuation drills were held.

Crucially, the staff reported, "Civilians were never instructed not to evacuate up." They were not told they needed a key to reach the roof, from which helicopter rescue would be difficult anyway.

"The Port Authority acknowledged that it had no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire," the staff found.

Alan Reiss, who headed the Port Authority's World Trade Department, acknowledged that some workers may have headed to the rood with a "false sense of security" because of anecdotes about roof rescues in 1993.

Most distressing for the family members attending the hearing, the commission reported that workers in the north tower of the trade center the first one hit who called 911 were usually told to stay where they were and await instructions from emergency workers.

"The protocol to stay where they were was one of the lessons learned from the 1993 bombing," the commission staff reported, because evacuations can create new problems for civilians and can hamper emergency workers.

After the north tower was hit, workers in the south tower were instructed not to evacuate. Some who started to evacuate on their own were told to go back to their offices.

"We do not know the reason for this advice," staff member John Farmer said, "in part because the deputy fire safety director for the south tower perished in the attack."

Workers calling the Port Authority police desks in the towers got conflicting advice. Emergency 911 operators did not know where the planes had struck, and so couldn't tell people whether they were above or below the fire.

Those were only a few of the widespread communication problems found by the investigation. Firefighters used different radio channels. Public address systems and intercoms failed.

There was particular confusion over warnings that the towers might collapse. For example, one worker called 911 to report that, "90-something floor was collapsing." But the 911 operator misreported that warning to the police, and the NYPD dispatcher also erred in reporting it to police at the scene. The message police eventually received was "106th floor is crumbling."

After the south tower collapsed, firefighters in the north tower were told to evacuate, but many did not hear the order because the radio channel they were using was overwhelmed, because they were on a different channel, or because they were off-duty rescuers who had responded without their radios.

Others ignored the order to assist handicapped and injured workers to leave.

"Many perished," the report said.

Other firefighters heard the order to evacuate, but were not aware of the degree of danger.

"Firefighters who received these orders lacked a uniform sense of urgency in evacuation," perhaps because the evacuation order did not mention that the south tower had collapsed.

The commission reported that the communication problems were compounded by a lack of clear lines of authority, partly due to a "longstanding rivalry between the NYPD and FDNY."

Members of the panel worried that ambiguity has persisted over who is in charge at emergency scenes in New York City, still a likely target for another terrorist strike.

Commission vice chairman Lee Hamilton called the current NYC plan, in which the fire and police departments are assigned command for different types emergencies, a "prescription for confusion."



berger-incident
bush-interview
commission-failure
commission-recommendations
conflicts-of-interest
congress-report
dissent
hampering-probe
public-heaings
senator-graham-alleges-coverup
9 11 probe quit
911 attacks preventable panel head believes { December 19 2003 }
911 commission chairs son runs for new jersey senate { October 19 2006 }
911 inquiry fired
911 panel cites communication failures between nyfd nypd { May 18 2004 }
911 panel reaches deal on access to papers { November 13 2003 }
911 panel to get more access to memos
911 probe panel
911 victim families not taking bribe money
Air defense flaws detail in 911 panel { April 25 2004 }
Ashcroft blames clinton rules for 911 { April 14 2004 }
Ashcroft blames intelligence sharing wall { April 14 2004 }
Battle over 911 panels deadline intesifies { January 29 2004 }
Breaks on 9 11 truth commission
Bush disagrees with saddam 911 connection { June 17 2004 }
Bush grants commission extension { February 4 2004 }
Bush press conference during 911 hearings
Bushs 911 coverup { June 18 2003 }
Chair says attack was preventable
Chief assess blame but holds off on higher ups { December 19 2003 }
Cia report criticizes cia leaders actions { January 8 2005 }
Commission could subpoena oval office files { October 26 2003 }
Commission investigates FBI { April 13 2004 }
Commission tells of many warnings { July 25 2004 }
Commission votes to subpoena pentagon
Congressional investigation angers cia fbi
Conspiracy theories abound in 911 probe { December 29 2003 }
Deal 911 commision { November 15 2002 }
Failed put hijackers watch list { May 15 2003 }
Families seek curb probe officer
Grassley investigate 911
House 911 inquiry
Kean says 911 attacks could have been prevented { December 19 2003 }
Kean says 911 report will be surprising
Most families havent taken payoff fund { August 31 2003 }
News reporters ordered not to investigate 911
No iraq link to 911 says panel
Panel describes how attackers got money { September 11 2001 }
Panel grills alqaeda chiefs on 911 { May 12 2004 }
Panel has glimpse presidential briefings { November 16 2003 }
Panel has testy exchange with firefights police { May 18 2004 }
Panel may subpoena its summaries of bush briefings { January 31 2004 }
Panel plans hard questions for fbi doj { April 6 2004 }
Panel probes failures of air defenses
Panel requests documents { June 19 2003 }
Panel seeks declassification of 911 warning memo
Panel urged disciplinary { December 11 2002 }
Panel will sharply fault role of congress { July 22 2004 }
Report citing blame for 911 supressed till after election { October 19 2004 }
Secrets of 911
Tenet lies about not seeing bush in august 2001 { April 16 2004 }
Terrorism catchall too vague an enemy for war { July 23 2004 }
Top brass says no chance hijackers fly into pentagon { April 15 2004 }
Victims relatives press white house for sept 11 details { October 29 2003 }
Why does 911 inquiry scare bush { July 11 2003 }

Files Listed: 55



Correction/submissions

CIA FOIA Archive

National Security
Archives
Support one-state solution for Israel and Palestine Tea Party bumper stickers JFK for Dummies, The Assassination made simple